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ABSTRACT 
 
Land values are a central part of the farm business sector and are the vast majority of 
assets on the farm business sector’s balance sheet. Land is the single largest collateral 
backing for agriculture debt with farm real estate representing about two hundred billion 
dollars of debt.  In total, U.S. farm real estate is valued at over two trillion dollars.  Farm 
real estate, and in particular, cropland values, have historically driven changes in farm 
business sector assets.   
In the past century, the farm business sector has witnessed three major boom-
and-bust cycles, land values being at the center of each.  Once again, cropland prices 
have increased at record rates.  The recent growth in prices has brought into question the 
sustainability of the market price for cropland. 
This work addresses major shortcomings and gaps in the previous literature on 
cropland valuation.  The work here has three goals.  First, develop a model that 
replicates market land prices by addressing characteristics of the market that have 
previously been overlooked.  The model uses a relative pricing approach which 
addresses the incomplete market structure of cropland markets.  The approach 
implements the good-deal bound methodology to calculate the value of land given yearly 
rental income discounted by a stochastic discount factor.  The model also uses a dynamic 
optimization framework allowing state variables, which determine each of the contract 
prices, to vary over states throughout time.   
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Second, a further investigation into the determination of rental rates is performed. 
The outcome from the first analysis and earlier research has shown the difficulty in 
estimating land prices as a function of the income to land.  A consensus has been made 
by previous literature that rental rates are the best proxy for income to land.  The 
difficulty in determining rental rate deals with how they are “sticky” over time.  The 
second analysis uses an error correction model to test the existence of asymmetric price 
transmissions between rental rates and crop prices.  The error correction model tests for 
the presence of asymmetric price transmission between change in the income to land and 
the cropland prices.  The model also allows for analysis on a short-run and long-run 
basis.   
Third, the paper discusses the connection between the current boom in cropland 
prices and previous cycles in the farm business sector.  The analysis addresses the likely 
causes of the contractions of these markets by looking at capital expansion leading to 
unsustainable credit risk in the market.  Capital expansion is analyzed structurally to 
allow for forecasting possible future changes in it.  Data from the Federal Reserve Bank 
regional surveys are also considered to understand the creation of credit risk both from 
the perspective of the lenders and borrowers.  Addressing both the demand and supply of 
debt considers, holistically, the composition of financial risk in agriculture markets and 
how both the demanders of debt and the suppliers of debt create and manage risk in the 
farm business sector.   
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Land values are a central part of the farm business sector.  Cropland amounts to 85% of 
the assets on the U.S. farm business sector’s balance sheet (USDA ERS- FIWS). It is the 
single largest collateral backing for agriculture debt.  There is about two hundred billion 
dollars of debt associated for all farm real estate.  In total, U.S. farm real estate is valued 
at over two trillion dollars.  Farm real estate, and in particular, cropland values, have 
historically driven changes in the farm business sector’s assets.   
In the past century, the farm business sector has witnessed three major boom-
and-bust cycles, land prices being at the center of each of these cycles.  Cropland prices 
grew nearly 410% in the most recent cycle, in the 1970s and 1980s (USDA NASS).  As 
cropland prices increased, operators expanded their business operations and as a result 
put themselves in risky, over-leveraged positions.  Inevitably, the farm business sector 
was unable to support the debt positions it created and witnessed one of its largest 
recessions.  Many farm operations, farm input suppliers and banks with significant farm 
loan portfolios went out of business as a result.   
Once again, cropland prices have increased at record rates.  From 2000 to 2014, 
national cropland prices grew 180% with average yearly increases of 8.0% (USDA 
NASS).  The Midwest or “Corn Belt” region has seen the largest growth in cropland 
prices, increasing 243% from 2000 to 2014, on average (USDA NASS).  The increase in 
cropland prices coincides with the increase in demand for agriculture products.  The 
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increase in demand has been a function of a number of factors.  Several free trade 
agreements in the mid to late 1990s and 2000s made exporting goods to other countries 
easier.  Second, expansion in both the population and income of developing countries 
has increased demand for U.S. exports.  Finally, the boom in biofuels significantly 
increased domestic demand for row crops. 
The recent rapid growth in cropland prices calls into question the sustainability 
of the market price for cropland.  The volatility in the price of cropland is concerning for 
the overall stability of the farm economy.  The farm business sector supports many rural 
economies, with a varying but large portion of employment in rural communities across 
the nation directly related to agriculture or to the agricultural services and processing 
industries.  Instability in the farm business sector has sent ripple effects throughout the 
economy through increased food and fiber prices in the past (Assets, Debt, and Wealth 
2015).   
The rapid growth in cropland prices has led many to re-evaluate the literature that 
arose from the 1980s bubble in cropland.  Much of the literature for valuation methods 
of cropland has been criticized for its over-simplified modeling and the restrictive 
assumptions placed on parameters.   Cropland prices, in general, are difficult to model 
and previous attempts to do so have encountered substantial challenges.  The objectives 
of this paper are to address two of the substantial shortcomings of previous valuation 
literature.  The paper will consider the unique characteristics of cropland to estimate 
market cropland prices, test a commonly cited theory of the structure of land pricing and 
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analyze the boom and bust pattern created by the suppliers and users of debt in the farm 
business sector.  
Addressing the shortcomings of previous cropland valuation techniques 
This work will address two major shortcomings of previous work on the subject of 
cropland valuation.  Previously, models have not considered the incomplete market 
structure that defines cropland markets. Additionally, the model will not assume the 
underlying state variables that determine the cropland price and will allow them to 
evolve over varying states of the world.   
The model developed in chapter II addresses these issues in two ways.  First, a 
relative pricing approach developed by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) will be 
applied to address the incomplete market structure of cropland prices using a stochastic 
discount factor.  The stochastic discount factor values an asset by discounting the 
income as a function of the state the income is paid out in.  Second, the contract values 
calculated from the relative pricing approach will be applied to a dynamic optimization 
framework to allow the state variables determining each of the contract prices to vary 
over states and time.  Backward induction will then be used to determine an initial 
cropland value.   
Re-addressing sticky rental rates 
Chapter II analyzes the presence of autocorrelation of rent using a maximum likelihood 
estimation to model the relationship between rent and long-run crop prices.  Previous 
literature has described the stickiness in rent being a result of rent responding to positive 
and negative changes in income at different rates.  The presence of an asymmetric price 
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transmission between rent and income has been discussed by several authors, but it has 
not been tested empirically.  Chapter III tests for the presence of asymmetry cropland 
price using an error correction model.   
The re-emergence of previous boom and bust patterns in today’s cropland markets 
The boom and bust cycle of the 1970s and 1980s brought about a plethora of literature 
on the causes and the 1970s boom in cropland values.  The recent boom in agriculture 
markets have brought with it a discussion of cropland valuation as well as concern over 
markets repeating the bust of the 1980s.  Chapter IV highlights a pattern that has 
occurred in several of the previous boom and bust cycles.  Ultimately, the pattern shows 
market participants becoming overleveraged and unable to service debt leading to the 
busts witnessed throughout the farm business sector.  Furthermore, the chapter models 
the actions of both supplier and users of liquidity in the farm business sector to 
understand the development of the debt positions created during boom periods.  By 
considering both the demand and supply of debt, the analysis will address, holistically, 
the composition of the financial risk positions of agriculture market participants and how 
both the demanders of debt and the suppliers of debt create risk in the farm business 
sector.   
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CHAPTER II 
A GOOD DEAL BOUND APPROACH TO VALUING FARMLAND 
 
In the late 1970s, the United States saw a significant increase in the market price of 
cropland. In the following years, the country experienced what was characterized as a 
bursting of a cropland price bubble.  Many have speculated as to the cause of the 1980s 
bubble, largely attributing it to a fatal combination of factors beginning with significant 
increases in demand for agricultural products, caused by rises in global liquidity; rising 
incomes and a reduction in competing countries’ crop production (Peters, Langley and 
Westcott 2009).  Intense contractionary policies by the Federal Reserve to combat 
double digit inflation led to the Federal Funds rate increasing to 19% along with the 
prime rate rising even further to 22%.  The outcome of the 1980s left loan payments 
unfulfilled and ultimately caused many to leave the farm business sector altogether.  
Once again, cropland prices have increased at record rates.  From 2000 to 2014, 
national cropland prices grew 180% with an average yearly increase of 8.0% (USDA 
NASS).  The Midwest or “Corn Belt” region has seen the largest growth in cropland 
prices, increasing 243% from 2000 to 2014, on average (USDA NASS).  This has been 
the largest growth in cropland prices since the 1980s where the farm business sector 
witnessed a 410% growth rate in eleven years and an average yearly growth of 24% 
(USDA NASS).  Today, there have been increases in demand for agriculture products 
similar to that of the 1970s.  The cause of the current cycle’s increase in demand has 
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largely been a function of the enactment of several trade agreements, biofuel production 
creating an alternative use for crops and increases in developing countries’ income.  
On a macro level, the 10 Year Constant Maturity Treasury rate, a proxy for the 
risk-free rate, has decreased to all-time lows since the 2008 recession.  Currently at 
2.19%, it has reached as low as 1.80% (Federal Reserve Economic Database, “FRED”).  
The Federal Reserve has already begun to increase the federal funds rate and speculation 
expects interest rates to continue to rise and inflation to grow in the near future.  The rate 
increases present an opportunity for a correction in cropland prices due to the inverse 
relationship of interest rates and cropland prices.  Similar to the 1980s, hostile macro-
economic factors may lead to massive decreases in crop prices. 
Cropland comprises the vast majority of assets on the farm business sector’s 
balance sheet, totaling about 85% (USDA ERS- FIWS).  It is also the single largest use 
for collateral for farm loans.  As of 2016, U.S. farm real estate was valued at over two 
trillion dollars, with close to two hundred billion dollars of farm real estate debt on the 
balance sheet.  Farm real estate, and in particular, cropland prices, have historically 
driven changes in the balance of the farm business sector’s assets.  The growth in 
cropland prices came to a halt in 2014 with the decline in row crop prices.  The national 
average corn price in 2012 was $6.89 and has since declined to $3.61 (USDA NASS).  
Depressed crop prices put a strain on operators’ ability to break even as rent has also 
risen following the rapid increase in land prices. 
When there is volatility, or rapid changes in the price of cropland, there is cause 
for concern about the overall stability of the farm economy.  Stability in the farm 
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business sector provides stability in rural economies, with a varying but large portion of 
employment in rural communities across the nation directly related to agriculture or to 
the agricultural services and processing industries. Instability in the farm business sector 
can send ripple effects throughout the economy through increased food and fiber prices 
(Assets, Debt, and Wealth 2015).  In recent years, cropland prices have increased 
substantially, leading many to re-evaluate the literature that arose from the 1980s bubble 
in cropland.  Much of the literature for valuation methods of cropland has been criticized 
due to either over-simplified models or the restrictive assumptions placed on parameters.  
Largely, the literature has focused on the relationship between the asset’s return 
and its value.  Using this framework, development of the return to the land has varied 
with respect to the use of macroeconomic factors such as interest rates and inflation 
(Robison, Lins and VenKataraman 1985, Moss 1997), non-agricultural demand for the 
land and non-agricultural issues (Robison, Lins and VenKataraman 1985), parcel 
specific characteristics (Vantreese, Skees and Reed 1986) and even the inclusion of all 
these factors into a single model (Just and Miranowski 1993).  While all these models 
provide economic intuition to the relationship between cropland and its major 
determinants, they each have limitations or constraining assumptions that reduce the 
robustness of their models.  Pope, et al. 1979 finds that when some of these models are 
updated, sign changes and loss of significance occur for the variables’ coefficients.  
These results indicate previous models do not reflect relevant structural changes or the 
true characteristics of cropland markets. 
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Cropland, in general, is difficult to model for several reasons.  The finite supply 
of land does not allow for the classic market structure modeling of supply. There are also 
many “difficult to quantify” factors affecting a market participant’s motivations to buy 
or sell cropland, ones that do not apply to the classic profit maximization framework.  
Variables include the desire for contiguous land, desire to hold land for familial purposes 
or desire for portfolio diversification from institutional investors.  Furthermore, there are 
structural issues that many models, especially the capitalization models, have difficulty 
addressing such as choosing an appropriate discount factor and determining how or if it 
should evolve over time. 
Previous cropland valuation models have lacked in their ability to capture the 
relevant underlying characteristic of cropland markets.  Over time, this has become 
apparent as their models are updated with new data and model results have lost 
significance or seen sign reversals.  This paper will address several of these models’ 
shortcomings. 
 The model developed here will address these two issues in two ways.  First, a 
relative pricing approach developed by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) will be 
applied to address the incomplete market structure of cropland prices.  Second, the 
contract values calculated from the relative pricing approach will be applied to a 
dynamic optimization framework to allow the state variables determining each of the 
contract prices to vary over states and time.  Backward induction will then be used to 
determine an initial cropland value.   
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Literature Review 
Cropland Valuation  
There literature on valuing and understanding the determinants of cropland is abundant.  
Much of the literature arose from and was in response to the large increases and then 
plummeting of prices in the 1970s and 1980s.  This literature primarily focused on 
understanding the causes of such price fluctuations.  
 In the 1960s, Herdt and Cochrane (1966), Tweeten and Martin (1966) and 
Reynolds and Timmons (1969) developed simultaneous equation models attempting to 
explain cropland valuation using a classic market framework.  This type of modeling 
requires strict assumptions to create a supply and demand framework.  Because cropland 
is fixed, it is difficult to create an appropriate proxy for its supply.  For example, the 
number of available cropland acres is often used as a proxy for supply, yet changes in 
this number are usually insensitive to the price of the asset.  As a result, the price of 
cropland is largely, if not wholly, determined by demand.   
Herdt and Cochrane (1966) attribute large gains in cropland to the expected gains 
associated with technological advances.  Their intuition is that the decrease in per unit 
cost associated with technological advances increases producer’s net income, which 
causes them to expand their operations and as a result cropland prices increase.  The 
expected gains are captured in the price increases in cropland.  Pope et al. (1979) tested 
this model with more recent data and found many coefficients either lost significance or 
the signs of coefficients changed.  Tweeten and Martin (1966) use three econometric 
models; ordinary, recursive and autoregressive least squares, to answer the question, “are 
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land prices too high?”  They use annual, national land data and their results show that the 
causes of the increases in land prices are not stable nor based on fundamental factors.   
Many empirical models have also been estimated to determine the causes of 
changes in cropland value.  Klinefelter (1973) explains Illinois cropland values using 
four explanatory variables associated with farm production– net rent, average farm size, 
number of voluntary transfers of cropland and the expected capital gains.  Klinefelter 
(1973) states that any excess income above current costs occurring from technological 
advances in production equipment, better management practices, and greater capital 
inputs, will be capitalized into the value of the non-reproducible land resource following 
the Ricardian theory of rents. As the value of cropland increases from the capitalization 
process, the cash rental rate charged by the landowner will increase to compensate them 
for the annual use of the land.   Excluding the 1980s, cash rental rates have historically 
aligned with the returns to farming operations and one would expect cash rental rates 
and returns to farming operations to continue to align, in the long run.  Pope et al. (1979) 
find that Klinefelter’s model, when updated, remains the most robust out of all the 
models tested. 
Others such as Alston (1986) focus on macroeconomic factors to try to explain 
the drastic changes in cropland prices.  Specifically, Alston (1986) considered the 
relationship between inflation and cropland prices.  One motivation was to consider 
hedging opportunities against inflation using investments in cropland.  Using a tightly 
parameterized empirical model, he concludes that there is no support for the notion of 
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cropland as a hedge for inflation and net rental income was the primary driver for most 
of the real growth in U.S. land prices during the 20 years prior to 1982.   
Less common models are that of Shalit and Schmitz (1982) and Phipps (1984).  
Shality and Schmitz (1982) use a life-cycle utility maximization of farmers to create a 
derived demand model for cropland.  They focus on savings, income minus 
consumption, and cropland debt as the primary determinant of cropland prices.  The 
intuition is that cropland prices are both affected by the income derived from the land 
and the debt it carries.  They conclude that as banks increase the supply of credit to 
farmers, prices will increase faster compared to times when no liquidity is available.  
Phipps (1984) uses Granger causality to test temporal hypotheses for the source of 
cropland price movements.  The results of the Granger causality test show cropland 
prices are caused by residual farm return.  Using these results, Phipps (1984) develops a 
structural cropland price model using primarily farm business sector variables. 
Just and Miranowski (1993) attempt to explain changes in cropland prices using 
previous literature’s determinants.  The authors identify the relative roles of each 
models’ influence using mainly a theoretical framework with some empirical analysis.  
They consider farm and nonfarm returns, inflation, credit, the real interest rate on farm 
real estate debt, government payments, taxation and more.  Their results indicate 
inflation, net returns, and the discount rate are the largest contributors.  Using these 
results, Just and Miranowski (1993) found that they could successfully predict land 
prices using current and lagged rent, with lags of up to 5-8 years.  They note that while 
lagging rent by those amounts proves effective, it lacks substance in terms of “defensible 
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economic rationale.”  Featherstone and Baker (1998), and Falk (1991) agree that these 
techniques, while proving strong in terms of an r-squared, are not applicable.   
Studied even more often than the determinants of land prices, is testing the 
relationship between the capitalized value of land and the price seen in the market.  In 
theory, rent, a representation of the income to land, capitalized by a market interest rate, 
usually the risk-free rate, should represent the value of the cropland and therefore should 
equal the price determined in the market.  Several studies have focused on the ability of 
the present value model to hold given the market-determined prices for rent, cropland 
and the interest rate over time.   
Melichar (1979) originates the use of cash rent as a proxy for income, placing 
emphasis on expected changes in rent.  Melichar’s (1979) work arose from the rapid 
increases in farm asset prices.  He notes the importance of understanding where the 
capital gains are occurring—from the return to the asset or from other influences.  He 
states the increases in returns to land, over labor, are the primary cause of the increases 
in land prices. “Over the last twenty-five years, the proportion of the total return that 
could be ascribed to operators’ labor has dropped from 63% to 17%, while the 
proportion that could be regarded as a return to production assets has risen from 25% to 
69%” (Melichar 1979).  To properly assess the income to land price relationship, 
Melichar (1979) states net farm income cannot be reliably used for several reasons.  
First, net farm income is an aggregate measure whereas land prices are a unit price.  
Using net farm income to represent return to land alone, ignores the number of other 
productive assets that are included in the net farm income measure.  Additionally, net 
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farm income lacks comprehension of the non-operator landowner.  When considering 
the substantial portion of land owned by non-operators, income from rent and interest 
payments on debt should be included in income while operator’s dwellings should also 
be excluded.  
Several authors have developed the relationship between rent and land prices 
showing it is not a direct, straightforward relationship.  Phipps (1984) uses Granger-
Causality to show the existence of a fundamental relationship between rent and cropland.  
Past rents and land prices explain the dynamics of future land price changes.  Vantreese, 
Skees and Reed (1986) previously looked at the use of net farm income as the primary 
determinant of farmland value yet ultimately agree with Melichar’s (1979) work and re-
iterate that net farm income includes returns to factors other than land such as labor, 
machinery, buildings, etc.  Vantreese, Skees and Reed’s (1986) model develops a rent 
specification using parcel specific characteristics.  Through the use of ordinary least 
squares, the authors determine the magnitude to which each factor characterizes the rent 
amount. The estimated rental rate is then used in the capitalization formula to solve for 
the value of the cropland.  Burt (1986) compliments this research by addressing the issue 
of the need for lags in the capitalization of rent into cropland value.  Burt (1986) 
includes input prices, farm commodities and technological changes as primary 
explanatory variables and estimates a second order rational multiplicative distributed lag 
on rent to determines changes in land price movements.  The change in value is the sum 
of two components– (1) the previous year’s rent and land prices and (2) the expected 
change in rent and land prices for the upcoming year.  Ibendahl and Griffin (2013), 
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provide intuition on why the lags are important in determining the land price.  They 
explain there exists an asymmetric relationship between changes in rent and land prices.  
The asymmetries are created when the lessee chooses to share varying amounts of 
information during productive and non-productive years.  The authors determine that 
this asymmetric relationship between lessee and landowner is the basis for the need to 
use lags in determining land prices.    
 Robison, Lins and VenKataraman (1985) try to improve on the capitalized 
valuation model by including the expectations of changes in factors.  The growth rate in 
cash returns to land, inflation expectations, income and capital gains taxes are included 
in their model.  They determine that inflation and non-agricultural demand are important 
influencers.   Similarly, Moss (1997) considers the effects of returns, interest rates and 
inflation on cropland values, concluding inflation is the biggest driver of land values. 
 Schmitz (1995) takes a closer look at the involvement of government policy and 
its effect on value with a focus specifically on boom and bust cycles.  He finds that 
cropland values and inflation are positively related. He states these results show inflation 
was a significant contributor to the rise in cropland prices in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 Falk and Lee (1998) incorporate a vast number of influences by categorizing 
them into three areas– permanent fundamental components, temporary fundamental 
components and non-fundamental components.  They find in the long-run that the 
present value formula is a strong predictor of prices; but in the short-run the models tend 
to overreact to fundamental and non-fundamental factors.  Falk (1991) considers rent the 
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primary determinant of cropland prices noting that in the short term, land prices will 
likely be more volatile than cash rents.   
Falk (1991) and Lloyd (1994) create a series of tests to determine the usefulness 
of the present value models.  Lloyd (1994) states two reasons the present value model is 
attractive.  First, the present value model is the quintessential example of the economic 
theory that in the long-run the income and value of an asset should not diverge.  Second, 
the simple and tractable nature of the present value formula is a benefit.  Falk (1991) is 
more critical of the model.  He uses two criteria to determine if the model is robust.  
First, he states the two series should follow the same process, i.e. be stationary, first 
difference stationary, etc.  Rent is determined to follow a difference stationary process 
and therefore, if the two variables are related, cropland should also follow a difference 
stationary process.  Second, theory imposes both Granger causality and cross equation 
restrictions on the vector autoregressive representation of the spread and the changes in 
rent.  Falk (1991) concludes that both criteria fail.  Cropland prices and rent movements 
are highly correlated yet cropland price movements are more volatile.  Additionally, 
testing of the cross-equation restrictions imposed by the present value model failed to 
support the restrictions and therefore the model itself failed.  Falk (1991) states the cause 
of the failure is likely economic factors such as a rational bubble or the presence of a 
time varying discount factor. 
During the period preceding the 1980s land prices were increasing at a rate that 
outpaced multiple series thought to be an indicator or driver of cropland value. The rapid 
increase in price led to the research interest and proliferation of literature pertaining to 
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the topic of forecasting land prices.  Following the “collapse” of cropland value in the 
mid to late 1980s the majority of the literature pertaining to cropland prices transitioned 
into “post-mortem” ideology attempting to explain the rapid decrease in cropland prices.  
The literature for cropland valuation is now abundant.  Since the late 1980s and early 
1990s little modeling research has been added to the literature and many of the previous 
literature has come to contradictory conclusions on the usefulness of certain models and 
the primary determinants conveying the relationship between income and cropland 
values.  Two articles, Pope (1985) and Clark, Fulton and Scott (1993), even go so far as 
to state that net farm income, a common proxy for the return to the land, is incapable of 
capturing the level of land value.  Furthermore, as previous models have been applied 
and updated over time, sign changes as well as the loss of significance of variable’s 
coefficients have occurred (Pope, et al. 1979).  
The Effect of Government Payments on Land Prices and Rental Rates 
Government payments play an essential role in the farm business sector and as a result 
likely have an influence on the pricing of assets in the sector.  The study of the effects of 
government payments on the price of land have been studied thoroughly, usually in the 
midst of changes or proposed changes in farm bill programs.  The literature is reviewed 
here in determining whether government payments should be included in the modeling 
of cropland prices.  
Roberts, Kirwan and Hopkins (2003) provide intuition on the relationship 
between government payments and land prices, “a large component of land values 
(much like stocks and bonds) includes the belief held by landowners and potential 
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landowners in future net returns and government payments, which are uncertain and 
therefore intangible.”  Roberts, Kirwan and Hopkins (2003) as well as other authors 
considering this subject look specifically at the effect of government payments on cash 
rental rates and how, as a result, those changes cause land prices to change. Roberts, 
Kirwan and Hopkins (2003) state, “…we focus on cash-lease rents, rather than on land 
values, so that we can focus squarely on current expectations, which are more tangible 
than the amalgamation of current and future expectations that land values encapsulate.” 
Prior to the 1996 Farm Bill, Featherstone & Baker (1988) analyze two scenarios 
of land prices—one under the 1985 farm program and the other under a free market 
scenario.  Using data from Indiana, the authors determine a sequence of causality from 
the farm payments to land prices.  The farm payments, at the time, were tied to 
commodity prices.  Therefore, the government programs changed the realized 
commodity price, which in turn, sets the level of rent charged and result in changes in 
the price of the land.  The authors simulate grain price distributions under the alternative 
policies to determine how rental rates are set based on the varying market commodity 
prices.  The model output has rent, and therefore, land prices, lower and more volatile 
under the market scenario.  Specifically, the authors found that the market scenario 
would lead to a 16% decrease over a four-year period.   
Barnard et al. (1997) divide the United States into 20 regions to measure the 
effect of the 1996 Farm Bill on a regional basis.  Barnard et al. (1997) again show the 
capture of government payments into cash rental rates.  The authors measure the effect 
of both the returns to production and government payments on rent by estimating the 
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elasticities using both parametric and non-parametric estimators.   By dividing the 
United States into 20 regions, the authors are able to estimate the effects on a regional 
basis.  The regions with the largest elasticities, or those who are affected the most by 
government payments, are parts of Texas, Georgia, Alabama, the southern Corn Belt, 
and parts of North Carolina.  These regions have elasticities ranging from 22% to 50%.  
North Dakota, Kansas, the southern Lake States, and the northern Corn Belt elasticities 
ranged from 10% to 20% (Barnard, et al. 1997). 
 Roberts, Kirwan and Hopkins (2003) use the 1992 and 1997 Agricultural Census 
data to assess how the decoupling of payments from crop prices affected land prices.  
“Because the payment level does not depend on farmers’ current production decisions, 
they should not cause farmers to alter them, so the payment should be fully reflected in 
higher rents” (Roberts, Kirwan and Hopkins 2003).  Their analysis yielded an increase in 
rent of $0.33 and $1.55 for every dollar of government payment, respectively.   
Shaik, Helmers and Atwood (2005) look at the effects of government payments 
over time and how they may have changed given the changes in farm programs.  They 
find that over time, the portion of land values determined by government programs has 
declined.  The effects of farm programs have ranged from 30% to 70% of agricultural 
land value from 1938 to the 2002 Farm Bill.  In the 1960s and 1970s, the authors found 
that farm program payments attributed to about 40% of land value.  At the time of the 
article, value attributed to government payments declined to about 15-20%.  The authors 
conclude, “…although real per acre government payments have been increasing over 
time, it appears that their distorting effects upon land markets have diminished with 
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time.  If true, then future efforts to reduce net subsidization of agriculture would not be 
expected to have the catastrophic effect upon land prices, as would have been the case in 
the 1960s and 1970s.” 
Based on the conclusions made in the articles and the relationship between rent, 
the proxy used for income, and government payments, an additional value should not be 
added to the model for expected government payments.  Intuitively, government 
payments can be considered an additional income source for a farmer.  Since all income 
is considered in the determination of rental rates, it would be redundant to add an 
additional amount to the stated rental rate for government payments.  
The History of Government Payments to Agriculture  
Farm bills and programs originated as part of President Roosevelt’s New Deal in 1933. 
The hope was to help producers rebound from The Depression.  Since then, the “Farm 
Bill,” as it has been termed, has gone through six major structural modifications.  For the 
purposes of this paper, the Acts in 1996, 2002, 2008 and 2014 will be reviewed.   
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 
On April 4, 1996, the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (“1996 
Farm Bill”) was signed.  The major changes the 1996 Farm Bill brought about was the 
elimination of target prices for income supports, a defined outlay of $35.6 billion to be 
split among commodities by fixed percentages, basic nonrecourse commodity loans were 
made available, and the elimination of the requirement to purchase crop insurance to be 
eligible for farm program payments (lack of purchase of crop insurance did waive the 
producers’ eligibility for emergency crop loss assistance on a crop specific basis).  The 
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market loans and specified contract payment level remained as they were before.  The 
removal of target price for income supports was done to give producers more flexibility 
when it comes to planting decisions.  Previously, if more than 15% of a producer’s base 
acreage was planted to other crops or sitting idle, payments would be reduced.  With the 
change, any crop could be planted, and the planting decision became a function of the 
market place and no longer one of government programs (Young and Shields 1996). 
 The 1996 Farm Bill also delineated $35.6 billion dollars to replace expected 
deficiency payments for the years of 1996 to 2002.  The money was divided into fixed 
percentages for crops based on the projected deficiency payments in the Congressional 
Budget Office’s February 1995 budget baseline.  The fixed percentages are found in 
Table 2.1 (Young and Shields 1996). 
 Another feature of the 1996 Farm Bill was the requirement of the producers to 
enter into a production flexibility contract (PFC) to receive government assistance in the 
PFC payment and loan programs.  Producers were required to comply with the 
conservation, wetland, and planting flexibility provisions as well as keep the land in 
agricultural use to receive payments and loans on program commodities (Young and 
Shields 1996). 
 The programs also lowered the upper limit on the amount of money received by a 
single producer.  The bill restricted payments to $40,000 per person. The bill did include 
a “three entity rule.”  A producer can receive up $80,000 in contract payments on three 
separate entities but the producers stake in the second and third entity must not exceed 
50% (Young and Shields 1996). 
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Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (“2002 Farm Bill”) was 
established for the 2002 to 2007 marketing years.  The 2002 Farm Bill authorized the 
use of marketing loans, Direct Payments and Counter-Cyclical Payment programs 
(DCP), managed by the USDA Farm Service Agency (FSA).  The 2002 Farm Bill also 
provided producers the opportunity to re-determine their base acreage.  If producers re-
determined their base acreage, they were also given the opportunity to update their 
count-cyclical payment yield but not their Direct Payment yields (Direct and Counter-
cyclical Payment Program 2003). 
 The Direct Payment program replaced the PFC program from the previous farm 
bill with some changes in the program to remove the connection between Direct 
Payments and the production process.  The payments would support farm income 
without distorting producers’ production decisions.  The Counter-Cyclical Payments, on 
the other hand, provided support when there was downturn in commodity prices.  The 
Counter-Cyclical Payments are only issued if the effective price (Direct Payment rate 
plus the larger of either the national average market price or the national loan rate for the 
commodity) is less than the target price.  The payments were determined using either the 
updated base and Counter-Cyclical yields or the base acres and payment yields 
established in previous farm bills (Direct and Counter-cyclical Payment Program 2003). 
The eligibility requirements of these programs were that the owner, operator, 
landlord, tenants or sharecroppers must have some risk in the production of the crop on 
the base acres of a farm enrolled in the DCP program.  The producer was also required 
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to report the farm’s cropland acres annually.  The land itself was required to be in 
compliance with the cropland and wetland protection requirement and the planting and 
flexibility requirements.  Finally, the acreage must be used for agriculture or a related 
activity, and the land should be protected from erosion and control for weeds.  Table 2.2 
shows both the eligible crops and their Direct Payment rates and the target prices for the 
Counter-Cyclical payments (Direct and Counter-cyclical Payment Program 2003). 
Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 
The major change that came from the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 
(“2008 Farm Bill”) was the additional choice given to producers of the Average Crop 
Revenue Election (ACRE) program.  The 2008 Farm Bill also expanded the eligible 
commodities for the DCP program.  Specifically, the 2008 Farm Bill added dry peas, 
lentils, small chickpeas (garbanzo bean, desi) and large chickpeas (garbanzo bean, 
Kabuli) to the list of eligible crops for the Direct and Counter-Cyclical Payment 
Programs.  Table 2.3 states the Direct Payment Rates and the target prices for the 
Counter-Cyclical payments.  Once again, the Counter-Cyclical payment is only paid out 
if the effective price is less than the target price.  The effective price is determined as 
outline in the 2002 Farm Bill (Direct and Counter-Cyclical Payment (DCP) Program 
2008). 
 The ACRE program was a revenue-based program alternative to the previous 
price focused payment programs.  The eligibility for the program was similar to that of 
the DCP programs.  The ACRE program uses the base acres as specified in previous 
programs and the payment rate is 80% of the DCP Direct Payment rate.  The ACRE 
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program is triggered when revenue is below both a historical state average (the Actual 
State Revenue is less than the State ACRE Guarantee) and the farm average (the farm’s 
Actual Farm Revenue is less than the Farm ACRE Guarantee) for planted and 
considered planted acreages (Direct and Counter-Cyclical Payment (DCP) Program 
2008). 
The Agricultural Act of 2014 
The Agricultural Act of 2014 (“2014 Farm Bill”) was signed into effect on February 7, 
2014.  The 2014 Farm Bill repealed the Direct and Counter-Cyclical Program and the 
Average Crop Revenue Election program.  In their place, the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) 
and the Agricultural Risk Coverage programs (ARC) were put into place.  The only 
eligibility requirements for these programs were that the producers must be “actively 
engaged” in farming.  The 2014 Farm Bill was tasked with defining this requirement.  
The designation of actively engaged became explicit that the entity “must provide 
significant contributions to the farming operation. Contributions consist of capital, land, 
and/or equipment, and active personal labor and/or active personal management. The 
management contribution must be critical to the profitability of the farming operation 
and the contributions must be at risk” (Payment Eligibility and Payment Limitations, 
2014 Farm Bill Fact Sheet, December 2015) Sunflower seed, rapeseed, canola, 
safflower, flaxseed, mustard seed, crambe and sesame seed were all added to the list of 
covered crops.  Cotton was removed from the list of eligible crops (What's in the 2014 
Farm Bill for Farm Service Agency Customers 2014). 
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 The 2014 Farm Bill allowed producers the choice to maintain the previously 
determined base acres from 2013 through 2018 or reallocate the base acres.  Producers 
were also offered the opportunity to update their program payment yield for each 
covered commodity using 90% of the farm’s 2008-2012 average yield per planted acre 
(What's in the 2014 Farm Bill for Farm Service Agency Customers 2014). 
 The PLC is similar to the Counter-Cyclical payments in that it pays out when the 
effective price of a commodity is less than a reference price for the specific crop.  The 
ARC payments are determined based off average revenue measures.  Producers can elect 
either the county ARC or individual ARC program.  In the case of the county ARC, a 
producer is issued a payment when the actual county crop revenue is less than the 
determined ARC county guarantee.  The ARC county guarantee is determined using 
base acres, not planted acres.  Payments cannot exceed 10% of the benchmark county 
revenue.  The individual ARC program issues payments when the sum of crop revenue, 
across all crops, is less than the individual ARC guarantee summed for the covered 
commodities on the farm.  The individual ARC payments also cannot exceed 10% of the 
individual benchmark revenue (What's in the 2014 Farm Bill for Farm Service Agency 
Customers 2014). 
Producers must have at least 10 base acres or more to be eligible for PLC, and 
county or individual ARC.  Producers with an adjusted gross income greater than 
$900,000 are also not eligible for any of the programs provided by FSA or the Natural 
Resources Conservation Service. The 2014 Farm Bill no longer distinguishes this 
adjusted gross income between farm and non-farm income.  Combined payments for 
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PLC, ARC, marketing loan gains, and loan deficiency payments are not allowed to 
exceed $125,000 per crop per year (What's in the 2014 Farm Bill for Farm Service 
Agency Customers 2014). 
Real Options 
Real option analysis has grown in popularity for situations such as illiquid assets and 
investment decision-making.  Dixit and Pindyck (1994), in their book, Investment Under 
Uncertainty, describe in detail the advantages of moving away from the net present value 
(NPV) method of valuing an asset and to the use of a real option approach.  NPV 
modeling assumes a now or never scenario and does not consider the value associated 
with the arrival of new information or opportunities.  Dixit and Pindyck (1994) explain 
the value of that information is an opportunity cost that should be included in the cost of 
an investment.  Leaving this additional cost out of the analysis leads to overly optimistic 
decision-making. 
 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) describe two essential factors that must be present 
when including the additional value of an opportunity cost to the NPV framework.  First, 
a portion of the investment must be irreversible.  In the case of an option, the sunk cost 
is the initial cost of investment.  If no portion of the investment is sunk per se, one could 
simply uninvest at any time without consequence. Second, the ability to wait or invest in 
the future must be possible.  If the investment opportunity is only available in the 
present, the option to wait for information has no value.   
 Du and Hennessy (2008) model Iowa cropland rents by adding the value 
associated with an Iowan farmer’s ability to change its planting decision after a rent 
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agreement has been made. The rental rate is determined using a maximization of the 
expected income from planting either corn or soybeans.  The rent is determined from the 
maximization of the NPV valuation calculated as the sum of discounted expected cash 
flows from either corn and soybean crop production.  Under cash rent agreements, the 
gap from fall to spring proves important for cash renters’ valuation of the land.  The 
NPV approach does not consider the tenant’s ability to switch from that original 
expected maximum as more information arrives between the time of the agreement and 
planting.  Their results found that the average cash rent for the real options approach 
were 11% higher than that of the NPV method.   
  Moreno et al. (2009) use real option theory to value the return to cropland 
adding additional value to the flexibility associated with owning land.  They consider the 
valuation from the perspective of a cropland owner whose sunk cost is the initial 
purchase of the land and who has the option to sell the land at a price in the future or 
continue to collect revenue from planting crops or renting it out.  Moreno et al. (2009) 
show the option value associated with owning the land accounted for a quarter of the 
land value determined. 
The use of real options in mortgage real estate research has also become 
substantial.   Hendershott and Van Order (1987), Archer and Ling (1993), Kau, Keenan 
and Muller (1993), and Kau and Keenan (1995) address better valuation techniques of 
mortgages by including options.  Most of the research has expanded to and focused on 
the use of options to determine probability of default (Kau, Keenan and Kim 1994) and 
patterns of prepayment (Bartholomew, Berk and Roll 1988, Chinloy 1989, Follian, Scott 
  
 
27 
and Yang 1992, Kau and Springer 1992, Archer and Ling 1993, Deng, Quigley and Van 
Order 2000). 
 Research in the area of real options shows promise for use in valuing illiquid 
assets such as cropland.  Du and Hennessy (2012) find positive results in better valuing 
rental rates and Moreno et al. (2009) show the option value is a significant part of the 
total value of land.  The expansion and use of real options in the literature regarding 
mortgages, a related asset to cropland, shows research in this area has potential to 
expand into the current valuation literature.  The added benefit of fusing the dynamic 
framework of real options is the limited number of constraining assumptions placed on 
parameters.  The state variables used in the modeling of the state space are allowed to 
evolve over time. 
Incomplete Markets and “Good-Deal” Bounds 
Cropland markets are unique in that their prices are not traded on an exchange and sales 
are illiquid and infrequent.  Assets with these traits are considered to be a part of an 
incomplete market and suffer from the inability to completely hedge the asset’s risk.  
Overall, there does not exist a portfolio of assets to fully span the asset.  Therefore, the 
asset carries both hedgeable and unhedgeable risk.  The presence of unhedgeable risk 
does not allow for the standard risk neutral valuation method.  Methods such as Black-
Scholes are not applicable and may yield results that are even opposite of what should 
occur (Floroiu and Pelsser 2013).  As an alternative, the asset can be hedged partially 
with a portfolio of basis assets.  The basis assets are chosen such that they closely mirror 
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the focus asset’s payoffs.  Once this portfolio is created, the only uncertainty concerning 
the option value that remains is the pricing of the residual risk.   
Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) develop a technique for calculating the option 
value for an asset in an incomplete market.  The method uses a stochastic discount factor 
in place of defining assumptions to arrive at a market price of risk associated with an 
asset.  Many times, the method for estimating a market price of risk results in output that 
is sensitive to the defined assumptions.  The stochastic discount factor is a random 
variable that varies across states, both within and across time periods, discounting 
appropriately to the state.  It is chosen using the method of “good-deal bounds” 
developed by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000).  Cochrane (2005) describes the 
methodology of “good-deal” bounds as “a systematic search of all possible assignments 
of the market price of risk for the residual to find upper and lower bounds on the option 
price.”  Constraints are imposed to create reasonable values for the market price of risk 
and eliminate arbitrage opportunities.  The bounds should be general yet tight enough to 
provide insight on the asset’s value (Cochrane 2005).   
Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) impose three constraints that create 
informative bounds without being unnecessarily restrictive.  The first assumption draws 
from the “Law of One Price” and applies the idea of relative pricing to enforce that the 
discount factor must price a set of basis values (Cochrane and Saa-Requejo 2000).  
Information from the basis assets describes the option price (Cochrane and Culp 2003) 
and ultimately the prices of these assets describe the discount factor and not vice versa. 
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Second, and equivalent to the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the discount 
factor must be positive.  If a payoff can be non-negative in every state of nature, then the 
value of the asset must also be non-negative, implying a positive discount factor 
(Cochrane and Saa-Requejo 2000).  This will, in the end, lead to positive bounds on the 
option prices (Cochrane and Culp 2003).  The first and second constraints create 
“arbitrage bounds” on the value of the asset. The bounds at this point are too large and 
not useful for analysis.  More information is needed about the discount factor to tighten 
the bounds.    
The third constraint draws from absolute pricing theory to restrict the volatility of 
the stochastic discount factor.  The constraint is equivalent to an upper limit on the 
Sharpe Ratio of mean excess return.  The idea behind this constraint is that an investor 
will buy any asset with an exceptionally large Sharpe ratio, therefore; the situation is 
unlikely to persist in the market.  The quick resolution of these scenarios leads them to 
be ruled out as potential pricing of an asset (Cochrane and Culp 2003).  This constraint is 
an easy way to eliminate unreasonable discount factors within the arbitrage bounds, 
leaving non-volatile discount factors. 
The addition of the third constraint yields the “good-deal” bounds, which enforce 
the assumptions that investors will buy any asset with a high Sharpe ratio and pure 
arbitrage opportunities.  As the correlation between the basis asset and the traded asset 
increase, the bounds will tighten.  In general, small or tight bounds imply good 
approximations for the replication of the underlying asset and large bounds indicate that 
the replication is likely a poor approximation (Cochrane and Saa-Requejo 2000).   
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Methodology 
The model developed here can be broken down into two components, each addressing 
the two major issues noted from previous literature—the assumption of a complete 
market structure for land markets and the restrictive nature of previous models.  First, by 
implementing a relative pricing approach developed by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo 
(2000), the model accepts the incomplete market structure that define cropland markets.  
The approach solves for stochastic discount factors that avoid the necessity of choosing 
or exogenously determining a discount factor.  The method solves the single period 
problem of valuing the income to land.  The proxy for land used here is statewide 
averages of cropland rental rates.  The incomplete market structure measures the price of 
rent with the understanding that the values carry both hedgeable and unhedgeable risks.  
The hedgeable risk is the price of the predominant crop produced in each state.  The 
residual from this formulation is the unhedgeable portion of the risk.   
The second component of the modeling process is employing the relative pricing 
approach in a dynamic optimization framework.  Structuring the model in this way 
minimizes the number of strict or unrealistic assumptions that would otherwise be placed 
on the parameters of the model.  A two-dimensional tree is developed to capture the 
movements in rent as the underlying state variables are allowed to fluctuate over varying 
states of the world for a certain period of time.  The model uses real-world probability 
measures to define movements to each value in the state space.   At a designated final 
time period, a terminal value is estimated.  The initial cropland value is then determined 
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considering the value at the terminal time step plus the income received at each node and 
a value associated with an intrinsic utility of owning the land itself.  
Calculating the Income and Contract Values 
The first component of the model addresses the rent contract value given that the asset is 
in an incomplete market.  The ultimate value of the land is calculated as the sum of the 
income that arises from the production on the land and the utility associated with the 
ownership of the land. The income is represented by an annual rent payment paid to the 
landowner.  The rent is modeled as a function of hedgeable risk, the long-run commodity 
price and unhedgeable risk, the residual of the estimation equation: 
 !"#$% = '( +	'+,-,% +	/% (1) 
Rent at time t is determined by the current expected crop price and the current value of 
the unhedgeable risk.  The coefficients of the model are determined by the regression 
estimation process using the long-run crop prices.   
The relative pricing approach of Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) uses the rent 
determined in equation (1) to value cropland considering it is in an incomplete market.   
“The good-deal bound finds the minimum and maximum value of the [payoff] by 
searching over all positive discount factors that price the basis assets and have limited 
volatility” (Cochrane 2005).  The good-deal bound method avoids defining strict and 
unrealistic discount factors that are used in the literature.  The discount factor is no 
longer assumed a constant nor is it exogenously determined by methods such as the 
capital asset pricing model.  The model is identified broadly as: 
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 0 = max4 5 67- 	 (2) 
 8. $.				: = 5 67 ,	 5 6; ≤ =;,	 6 ≥ 0 
 
 @ℎ"B"				=; ≡ 1 + ℎ;!E;   
The ℎ term refers to the market Sharpe ratio that is assumed to be 1.0 (Cochrane and 
Saa-Requejo 2000).  The Sharpe ratio describes the amount of compensation needed by 
an investor given the risk of taking on the investment of an asset.  !E refers to the risk-
free interest rate.  Model output is assessed at varying magnitudes of the risk-free rate. 
The model output values are not sensitive to changes in the variable; therefore, it is set at 
1%. 
 More specifically, the estimation of the good-deal bounds can be described by 
minimizing or maximizing the following objective function under the four constraints 
outlined above. 
 min{4I} K( = LM6MK%N+,MM  (3) 
 
8. $.			
6M ≥ 	0	∀MLM6M,%N+,M − ,( = 0M LM6M	– 1!E = 0M=; −	 LM6M; ≥ 0M
 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
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K%,M is the contract price at time t and state in i; LM is the objective probability of state i; 6M is the stochastic discount factor; and ,(is the traded asset price.   
 The objective function states that the contract value should equal the sum of the 
expected discounted payoffs in future states.  Depending on the bound being estimated, 
the objective function is either minimized or maximized.  The first constraint of the 
model is a “no-arbitrage” constraint merely stating the discount factor must be greater 
than one.  The second constraint is a relative pricing assumption that states the model 
will take the traded asset, the long-run commodity price, as given to learn about the basis 
asset, the rent contract in this case.  The third and fourth constraints are volatility 
constraints where first, unrealistic discount factors are eliminated and second, there is an 
upper bound or limit placed on the Sharpe Ratio.  The upper limit on the Sharpe Ratio is 
an assumption that assets with overly large Sharpe Ratios are likely not to persist in the 
market and therefore, can be eliminated.  These additional constraints tighten the bounds 
and make them useful for analysis. 
To solve for the stochastic discount function, a Jacobian vector is calculated.  
The vector allows for element-wise multiplication of the probability of moving to a state 
with the contract value at time t and state i. 
 RK(R6M = 	LMK%N+,M (8) 
 STUVWXT#	0"U$VB = L+K+L;K;⋮LZKZ  (9) 
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STUVWXT#	[V#8$BTX#$8:	
R55R6M = 	LM,%N+,MR56R6M = LMR57R6M = 2LM6M
 (10) 
where E5, E6, and E7 reference equations 5, 6 and 7. 
Estimation of the Rent Function 
To model rent, the long-run expected price of the new crop price is regressed on rent.  
Intuitively, it can be expected that previous rental rates likely have an effect or are 
correlated with current or future rent.  As a result, when tested, the models exhibit 
substantial autocorrelation that is defined as the correlation of a variable with itself over 
time.  Essentially, there is a systematic relationship between the residuals of the 
regression and time, i.e. the value of an error in one period has an effect on the value of 
an error in a future time.  In this case, it is that rent is “sticky”. 
In time-series analysis, ordinary least squares (OLS) disturbances are ideally 
independent across time periods.  The resulting parameters of an OLS estimation with 
the presence of autocorrelation are unbiased (as long as the explanatory variables are 
strictly exogenous) or consistent but they are not efficient.  The OLS standard errors and 
test statistics are therefore no longer valid, even asymptotically, and cannot be used for 
testing purposes (Wooldridge 2015).  Commonly, the correlation between the variables 
and the error terms are positive which cause the variance associated with each 
independent variable to under-state the actual variance of the estimator.  The downward 
biased variance of the coefficients leads to larger t-statistics and the overstatement of the 
  
 
35 
statistical significance of the variables (Wooldridge 2015).  If the data are stationary and 
weakly dependent, the goodness-of-fit measures such as R-squared and adjusted R-
squared, are still valid (Wooldridge 2015). 
The following equation shows the correlated relationship between the error 
terms.  The numerator is the covariance relationship between the residual at time t and 
the residual at time t-s.  The denominator of the equation is the standard error of the 
residuals.   
 [VBB /%, /%ab = [Vc /%, /%ab0TB /% ∗ 0TB /%ab 	 (11) 
The Breusch-Godfrey (BG) test for autocorrelation on the regression of rent as a 
function of the new crop futures’ settlement price is used for its ability to generalize to 
any order of autocorrelation.  The more commonly used test, the Durbin-Watson, is 
restricted to testing only the presence of a first-order autoregressive disturbance or an 
AR (1) processes where 1 is the order of autocorrelation.  The BG test is a Lagrange 
multiplier test.  Using the residuals from the OLS estimation of the original equation, the 
BG test regresses lagged residuals up to lag q and the original independent variables on 
the residuals in time t. 
 /% = 	e+/%a+ + ⋯+	eg/%ag + '+7% + h% (12) 
The joint test is of the first q autocorrelations of the residual.  The null hypothesis 
is that there is no autocorrelation present and the e coefficients equal zero.  The 
alternative hypothesis is that there is an AR(q) process present.  Since the BG test uses a 
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joint test of significance, determining the important number of lags to test can be 
difficult.  This test is also only valid asymptotically. 
The BG test shows that the null hypothesis of no presence of autocorrelation is 
rejected at the 1% level (p-value = 0.0).  The series is determined an AR (1) process 
where 1 is the order of autocorrelation.  The AR (1) function is presented as follows: 
 /% = e/%a+ +	h% (13) 
where e ranges from negative one to positive one.  The h% term, by substitution, captures 
all historical values of the / series with more weight given to terms in the recent past.  
The following are assumed of the error of the regression: 
 5 h% = 0 (14) 
 5 h%h%i = 	jk;l  (15) 
 UVc h%, hb	 = 	0, where t ¹ s  (16) 
The first property indicates consistency in the series, the second states the 
variance of the residual is constant over time hence the lack of a t subscript, and third, 
that the residuals are not correlated over time i.e. the disturbances are independently and 
identically distributed.  Under these assumptions, e can be estimated using OLS.   
Estimating the Coefficients in the Presence of Autocorrelation 
For the estimation of the rent regression, a maximum likelihood estimation process 
presented in Greene (2000) is implemented to account for the presence of serial 
correlation.  Specifically, we are interested in estimating the following coefficients: 
 !"#$ = '( + '+,-,% +	/% (17) 
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 /% = e( + e+/%a+ +	m% (18) 
From the OLS assumptions, /% has a mean of zero; therefore, it will be assumed 
that e( will equal zero.  '(, '+and e+ remain to estimate.  A maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation process is used.  The coefficients are solved for by maximizing the following 
log-likelihood function with respect to ', jn;, and	e: 
 p#q = − h%;r%N+2jk; + 12 ln 1 − e; − t2 p#jk; (19) 
where the coefficients are maximized as follows: 
 Rp#qR'M = 1jk; 	 h%,∗-,%r%N+  (20) 
 h+ = 	 1 − e;(!"#$+ − ,-,%+i 'M) (21) 
 h% = (!"#$% − e!"#$%a+ − ,-,% − e,-,%a+ i'M								 wVB	$ = 2,… , t (22) 
 ,∗-,+ = 	 1 − e;,-,+	T#y		,∗-,% = (,-,% − e,-,%a+) (23) 
 Rp#qRjk; = − t2jk; + 12	jkz 	 h%;r%N+  (24) 
 Rp#qRe = 1jk; h%/%a+r%N; + e/+;jk; − e1 − e; (25) 
where /% = !"#$% − ,-,%i '.   
The epsilon value evolves according to a mean-reverting stochastic process.  It 
can be described by the following structure: 
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 {/% = |/ − |/%a+ +	m% (26) 
where | is the rate of long-run mean reversion and / is the mean of epsilon.  / minus / 
in the previous time period is a measure of the deviation from the long-run mean or the 
magnitude of deviation.  The process is fitted imposing the prior knowledge that the 
long-run expected value of the error, /, is zero.  Forcing / to zero fits the regression with 
no constant. 
The specification of the epsilon equation is determined using: 
 /% = e/%a+ +	h% (27) 
which can be re-written as 
 /% −	/%a+ = e − 1 /%a+ +	h%.		 (28) 
 {/% = 	| / −	/% {$ + 	j/ {$ (29) 
As stated before, by assumption, / has a long-run mean of zero; therefore, / equals zero 
and the equation becomes: 
 {/% = −|/% + j/ {$ (30) 
Using the estimation results from above, the rate of mean reversion is calculated as: 
 −| = 		e − 1 (31) 
 } = 1 − e (32) 
To recover the goodness-of-fit for each equation, the r-squared values can be 
calculated using transformed variables given the recovered rhos from the maximum 
likelihood output.  Essentially the transformed regression is as follows: 
 ~ = 	'7 + h%  (33) 
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 where ~ = 	~% − e	~%a+ (34) 
 and 7 = 7% − e7%a+  (35) 
Creating the State Space—Magnitude and Probability Changes, Reserve Rent & 
Terminal Value 
The second component of the model uses the estimation of the contract prices and 
applies them to a dynamic optimization problem.  The contract price represents the rent 
and income associated from rent payments.  The state variables that create the tree 
include the hedgeable risk, the long-run crop price, and the unhedgeable risk, the 
epsilon.  The different stochastic processes present in each variable, determine both the 
magnitude of change and the probability of moving to the next node.  Each state variable 
can move in two directions—up or down— creating a tree with four possible evolutions 
at each node: {(ÄÅ, ÇÄÅ), (ÄÅ, ÇÄa), (Äa, ÇÄa), (Äa, ÇÄa)}.  The “+” represented an upward 
movement and the “-” represents a downward movement in the tree.  Associated with 
each of these movements, is an objective probability calculated from the product of the 
individual probabilities for each variable.  Figure 2.1 provides a two-step example of 
how the variables can evolve.  The variables evolve on a monthly basis and pay out a 
rental rate at the end of each year.  Therefore the “ÉÄ” in this case is one twelfth. 
Magnitude Changes for the Crop Price 
The long-run price used in the model is the settlement price on a futures contract.  The 
futures price follows a simple Brownian motion (Hull 2006).  As explained in Black 
(1976), because of the mark-to-market nature of futures contracts, the drift associated 
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with the contract should be zero.  Therefore; the drift is set equal to zero in the stochastic 
formulation.  The futures contract is considered in its logarithmic transformation as:  
 yp#, = 	jÑyÖ (36) 
The changes throughout the tree for the settlement prices of the futures prices move 
multiplicatively as follows:  
 ,-,%Å+Å = 	,-,% ∗ "Üáà â%		 (37) 
 ,-,%Å+a = 	,-,% ∗ "aÜáà â% (38) 
where ,-,%Å+Å  is the upward magnitude movement and ,-,%Å+a is the downward movement.  ,-,% is the current price of the variable or contract in the current time step, jÑà is the 
standard deviation of the contract price, and {$ is the size of the time step.   
Magnitude Changes for Epsilon 
The evolution of / is determined using Hahn and Dyers’s 2008 paper, “Discrete Time 
Modeling of Mean Reverting Stochastic Processes for Real Option Valuation.”  In the 
case of the mean-reverting stochastic process, the movements are additive and reflect the 
local variance. 
 /%Å+Å = /% +	 {$	jn (39) 
 /%Å+a = /% −	 {$	jn (40) /%Å+Å  and /%Å+a  are the upward and downward movements in epsilon, respectively. /% 
represents the current value of the epsilon, {$ is the square root of the size of the time 
step, and j the standard deviation of /. 
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Development of the Probabilities Associated with the Movements Throughout the Tree 
The final probability of moving up or down to a specific state is determined by the 
product of the individual variable’s probabilities of that up or down movement.  The 
orthogonal nature of the OLS regression’s independent variable with its error term 
allows for an objective probability of the / and the crop contract price to be calculated as 
the simple product of the two individual probabilities.  
 äWã"U$Xc"	åBVWTWXpX$~%Å+M,M = Π[åBVW ,-,%Å+M , åBVW /%Å+M ] (41) 
The i subscript signifies the up or down movements that must be calculated.  In each 
step, four probabilities are calculated for the combined up and down movements of the 
futures contract and epsilon value.  
The probability associated with the movement of a futures contract is a random 
walk (Black 1976) therefore equal weight will be assigned to both the up and down 
movement.  On the other hand, the probability of the mean-reverting stochastic process 
of the / is conditional on the current state and time, and censors the probability 
calculation between 0 and 1.  Conditioning the probabilities this way provides 
dependence on the state of the / at that time and takes into account the local drift.  This 
probability structure developed by Hahn and Dyer (2008) is as follows: 
 
åBVW /% = 	
12 + {$	c /, $2j 								Xw	0 ≤ 12 +	 {$ 	c /, $2j 	≤ 1		0																												Xw	 12 +	 {$ 	c /, $2j ≤ 0		1																												Xw	1 ≤ 	12 +	 {$ 	c /, $2j
 (42) 
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 where		c /, $ = | / − /% − 12j; (43) 
The parameters of the probability estimation include {$, the time step; j, the annualized 
volatility of the epsilon; |, the annualized mean reversion factor estimated from the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the AR (1) process; /, the mean value of epsilon 
which in this case is zero; and /%, the current observation of epsilon.  This formulation 
can be simplified to the following specification: 
 :BVW /% = max(0,min 1, 12 +	 {$ 	c î, $2j ) (44) 
Reserve Rent 
The model pays out a rental rate once a year.  Since the model can evolve both positively 
and negatively, there is a possibility that the model could return a negative rental rate.  
Intuitively, cropland is unlikely to reach a negative value or even a value substantially 
smaller than the previous years’ value due to the availability of alternative uses for the 
land other than crop production.  Therefore, a reserve rent is invoked if the rental rate 
moves lower than the reserve rate value.  Based on historical decreases in rental rates, 
the reserve rent is calculated as 20% of the most recent historical rent observation.   
Terminal Value 
The problem assumes ownership will continue indefinitely; therefore, the model is an 
infinite horizon problem.  A finite solution to an infinite horizon problem is to apply a 
terminal value function at the end of the specified valuation period.  The terminal value 
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used in this case is a perpetuity of the final rent paid in time T capitalized by a 
capitalization rate. 
 0r = '( +	'+,-,r +	/r[T:	!T$"  (45) 
States tested and forecast evaluations  
Following estimation, three forecast evaluations measure the success of the model output 
in predicting market prices.  The goal of each of these measures is to minimize the 
values.  As a point of reference, the capitalized value of land is also estimated and the 
outcome of the forecast evaluations are compared.  The three measures used are root 
mean squared error (RMSE), mean absolute percent error (MAPE) and mean error (ME).  
The evaluation metrics are calculated as follows: 
 !ïñ5 = 1ï (,% − =%);ó%N+
+;
 (46) 
 ï=å5 = 1ï	 ,% − =%=%ó%N+ ∗ 100 (47) 
 ï5 = 1ï (,% − =%)ó%N+  (48) 
M is the number of periods included in the forecast; Ft is the forecasted value and At is 
the actual value.  Each of these measures provides a different intuition on how well the 
forecasted values performed.  The RMSE evaluates the average unit amount the forecast 
is off over the forecast period. The MAPE measures the average percentage error of the 
out-of-sample forecast from the actual observation.  The RMSE and MAPE values are 
  
 
44 
good in providing average values of how much the forecasts are off in terms of 
magnitude.  The ME provides a picture of whether the forecasts are consistently under or 
over forecasting the cropland prices and on average, by how much.   
Data 
Historical data on land and rent prices are available through two USDA NASS 
publications.  Data from 1967 to 1994 is obtained from the NASS publication, 
“Agricultural Land Values Survey (ALVS).”  More recent data, 1994 to 2016, is 
obtained from the NASS Quick Stat platform and designated as historical “ag land, 
cropland.”  The USDA receives the data from state extension offices.  Both the cropland 
prices and rent are statewide averages.  
Cash rent agreements and land prices in general, vary across states and 
regions.  As shown by Robinson, Lins and VenKatarman in “Cash Rent and Land Value 
in U.S. Agriculture,” studies of rent and land must take place on a state or region-wide 
basis as there are significant differences across local land markets and even due to local 
non-agricultural demand for land.  Rent is the payment of a non-owner operator to a 
landowner in exchange for the use of that owner’s land for production.  
There are two primary lease agreements for cropland rent—cash and share.  Cash 
rent is a pre-specified cash payment paid to the landlord.  The tenant assumes all risk and 
return associated with the production of the land.  Cash rent is typically agreed upon 
prior to, and remains constant over the growing season. A share rent agreement, is an 
arrangement between the tenant and landowner where both parties share a portion of the 
risk and return of production. Contracts can vary but the landowner, to some extent, pays 
  
 
45 
for a portion of production expenses and receives a portion of production revenue. Share 
rent agreements inherently consider a premium needed to assume a portion of risk.   
Rent agreements can also vary in terms of specified periods.   Cash rent 
agreements and land prices in general, vary across states and regions.  The model is 
applied to 24 states.  Figure 2.2 shows a map of the states the model is applied to and the 
crop used to represent each state.   
For the purpose of representing the information available to landowners and 
renters at the time of negotiation, the settlement price of the new crop futures price is 
used as a proxy for the intended income to the land.  Assuming negotiations for rental 
rates takes place post-harvest and pre-planting, it is expected that negotiations and 
information collecting will take place in the late fall to winter.  Du and Hennessy (2008) 
provide intuition, “When making planting decisions, farmers observe and use price 
information for the futures contracts expiring right after harvest time to formulate 
harvest price expectations.  When deciding what can be paid for rented land, farmers 
will use futures prices to establish what they may plant, how intensively they will farm, 
and the values of what they will reap.  On the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), the 
December contract for corn and the November contract for soybeans are the first 
available futures contracts after harvest time.”  Taking this into consideration the new 
crop futures contract on the upcoming year’s crop is used as an indication of producers’ 
sentiment or expectations for the coming year’s prices.  The daily settlement price is 
averaged for the trading days in the month of either October, November or December 
one year prior to the estimation date of interest depending on data available.  For 
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example, if the goal is to estimate the value of the rent contract in 2018 for the state of 
Iowa, the average settlement prices for observations in December of 2017 for the 
December 2018 futures contract on corn would be consulted as what producers expect 
corn prices to be as they were negotiating their contracts.  Four contracts were used 
depending on the state of interest—December corn, November soybean, September 
Chicago Wheat and July Kansas City Wheat.  Corn and soybean contracts are exchanged 
on the Chicago Board of Trade.  The Chicago Wheat and Kansas City Wheat contracts 
are traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  Data available for each of these 
contracts ranged from 1963 to 2016 from the Quandl database.  A summary of the data is 
presented in Table 2.4.  The crop used for each state is chosen depending on the crop 
that produces the largest amount of gross receipts per state.  The USDA ERS provides 
the information for determining this crop ranking on a state-by-state basis. 
All price and interest rate data are deflated using the same method implemented 
by the USDA NASS service.  The deflator is a GDP chain-type price index published by 
FRED.  All data is deflated to comparable 2009 levels. 
Results 
A rolling forecast is used in estimating cropland prices for each state and year.  A rolling 
forecast implements the model for each state in every time period, consecutively 
updating the available information as the model progresses through the time periods.  A 
total of 456 iterations are performed given the 24 states and 20 time periods from 1997 
to 2016.  The output from the maximum likelihood estimations is, in general, consistent 
over the iterations run for each state and time period and the output of the parameters are 
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as expected.  The maximum likelihood estimations, on average explained 81% of the 
variation in rent.  Table 2.8 outlines recovered R2 for each state.  The minimum R2 is 
12.9% for the state of Maryland where the crop price used in that state, corn, represents 
9.9% of the cash receipts for the agricultural products grown in the state.  Maryland 
receives most of its agricultural income from broiler production, which represents 42% 
of cash receipts.  Due to the smaller representation of the income in the state, it is 
understandable that the fit is much smaller for rent on a statewide basis.  On the other 
hand, the state of Iowa has a model fit of 95.8%.  Corn prices are highly representative 
of the state’s income generation with 31.7% of the state’s cash receipts in 2016 coming 
from corn production, and soybeans representing 20% of cash receipts. 
The tree specification also produced results consistent with expectations.  The 
mean reversion characteristic of the epsilon, or the non-hedgeable risk factor, should 
yield probabilities that converge to zero as the value moves further away from the 
variable’s mean, zero, whether moving in a positive or negative direction.  As the 
epsilon value gets larger, the probability of an upward movement converges to zero, and 
as epsilon gets smaller, the probability of moving to a more negative state also converges 
to zero.  The rate of mean reversion averages about 0.35. 
After running several iterations of the models with varying time horizons, the 
model output converges in year seven. Therefore, the models are run with a terminal 
time horizon of seven years at which time the terminal value calculation is executed. 
The rho values represent the relationship between the residuals and lagged values 
of itself.  The rho values, as noted, can range from negative one to positive one.  In this 
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case, it is expected that the values will be near positive one.  The output yields rho 
values ranging from 0.54 to 0.99 with average being about 0.82.  The recovered rho’s 
can be found in Table 2.8 in the appendix. 
The model output is measured for forecast accuracy using RMSE, MAPE and 
ME.  As a point of comparison, these measures are compared to forecast output of a 
capitalized valuation forecast.  The capitalized value—the income or rent, discounted by 
a capitalization rate—is used as a basis of comparison because of its simplicity as well as 
for how common it is referenced in literature and its use as a reference point for those in 
the industry looking at the value of land.   
On average, the model output has a MAPE of 68.9%.  This can be interpreted 
that the model is off, on average, 68.9% of the time.  In comparison, using a capitalized 
value for each forecast yields a MAPE of 36.2%.  Additionally, the average RMSE for 
the model is about 2,257.20 whereas the RMSE for the capitalized value forecasts 
average about 1,175.27.  The ME also shows that the model output for each state on 
average, underestimates the market price.  In every iteration, the model output is 
substantially less than the observed market price.  The capitalized value both over and 
underestimates the market price, with over half of the forecasts being underestimated.  
On average, the model output has a ME of -2,105.25.  The capitalized value has an ME 
of -664.59.  The large magnitude of the model ME shows the substantial underestimation 
of the forecasts.   
In general, the simple capitalized value forecast does a better job of estimating 
market cropland prices using current rent and an assumed capitalization rate.  Table 2.9 
  
 
49 
presents the RMSE, MAPE and ME measurements on a state-by-state basis for both the 
model output values as well as the capitalized values.  Model output for Nebraska, North 
Dakota and South Dakota are the only states that outperform the capitalized valuation in 
terms of their MAPE.  In six cases, the model produces a MAPE of less than 60%; 
Arkansas, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota.  North 
Dakota performs the best with a MAPE of 49.1%.  Maryland performs the poorest, as 
expected with the lowest model fit, with a MAPE of 91.2%.  Figure 2.3 through Figure 
2.26 graph the model output values on a state-by-state basis from 1997 through 2016 
with the actual and capitalized values overlaid for comparison. 
Model Implications and Further Research 
The model output performs, on average poorly and overall worse the calculated 
capitalized value of the cropland.  In every case, the model heavily underestimates 
market prices implying there is some margin of price not taken into consideration by the 
model.  There are several potential causes of this significant discrepancy, some which 
have been debated in previous literature.  Commonly noted and discussed is the 
substantial amount of value placed on non-quantifiable attributes of the land.  Therefore, 
despite the income generation to the land, additional value is added for several other 
factors.  Qualities that have been cited before are locational benefits (contiguous land to 
currently owned land, proximity to city centers, proximity to water) and even things such 
as emotional ties to the land (the desire to hold land owned by family and the desire to 
pass land on to future generations).  Essentially, there are several factors that may add 
value to the price of land that is not logically tied to the income produced from the land.  
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Therefore, even taking into consideration the incomplete structure of the asset, the model 
cannot fully capture the above pricing attributes. 
These non-quantifiable risks would also not be present in the capitalized values.  
Therefore, there still remains a certain margin that is unexplained by this reasoning.  
Another commonly debated feature of cropland valuation models is the proxy used to 
represent the income to the cropland.  It is possible that rent is not the best representation 
of the income from the land.  Although rent is not a perfect representation and concerns 
of its use are valid, previous research (Melichar (1979) and Vantreese, Skees and Reed 
(1986)) has concluded that rent is the best proxy available to represent income to 
agricultural land.  Rent is directly correlated to the income strictly from the land.  Other 
income choices such as net farm income consider other sources of income than solely 
income from the farming operations. 
A second issue with the use of rent is its relationship with land prices.  The 
transmission of income to rent to land may not be one-to-one.  Rent contracts have 
proven to be “sticky” with the presence of autocorrelation.  The model here assumes a 
one year correlation of rent with itself.  Other research includes a single lag and lags as 
far back as eight years of lags in the modeling of rent (Burt (1986) and Ibendahl and 
Griffin (2013)).  There are several possible sources of this stickiness.  Rent contracts can 
be set for three to five years and depending on the knowledge of the landowner may not 
be set as competitively priced as possible.  Ibendahl and Griffin (2013) point out that the 
renter has the greatest amount of knowledge about the farming operations and may 
choose to share that information with the landowner sparingly depending on how 
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agricultural markets are performing.  The alternative theory for the asymmetric price 
relationship is that the landowner has more power in setting the rental rates and is 
unlikely to decrease prices on they are set.  The asymmetry present in the transmission 
of rental rates to land prices may not be best represented by the maximum likelihood 
estimation.  Alternative methods used in some of the asymmetric price transmission 
literature may be better equipped to directly estimate that asymmetric relationship. 
The model output also indicates that, depending on the state, there is a wide 
variation in the percent of risk that is actually hedgeable.  Cochrane and Saa-Requejo 
(2000) note that as the correlation between the asset of interest and the traded asset 
increases, the good-deal bounds become tighter.  Specifically, the percent of 
hedgeability available can be identified in the variation of R2 values that arise from the 
maximum likelihood estimations.  “The size of the bounds is directly related to the size 
of the residual, or the R2 in a regression of option payoffs on basis asset payoffs 
(Cochrane and Saa-Requejo 2000).”  Intuitively, the R2 of the regression represents the 
amount of variation in rent that can be explained or hedged by the traded asset, the crop 
price futures contract.  As noted, the percent of hedgeability ranged from 95.8%, in Iowa 
to 12.9% in Maryland.  Five states have an R2 less than 65% and the remaining above 
70% fit, with 75% of the R2 being above 80%.  Overall, the model fit is relatively good. 
Given the level of ability to hedge the risk associated with the income to the land, 
these results question the reality of the use of real options to understand market prices 
for some assets in the presence of unhedgeable risk.  Although a portion of the asset can 
be hedged using the income generation of the land, it may be likely that individuals do 
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not actually think about that relationship or available hedging opportunity in actual 
pricing settings.  Therefore, as the asset is priced, a margin is added for the additional 
risk that is hedged away in this model. The critique of the reality of the use of real 
options in market pricing is something that has not been discussed in real options 
literature in much detail.  There is a lot of potential for expansion of research into the 
question of how realistic is the assumption that individuals think in terms of real options 
when pricing assets.  
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CHAPTER III  
READDRESSING STICKY RENTS:  EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN 
ASYMMETRIC PRICE TRANSMISSION RELATIONSHIP 
 
Rent has commonly been described as “sticky” in the literature on cropland prices.  For 
example, Ibendahl and Griffin (2013) show that their lagged rent model performs well 
when land prices are increasing but not when prices are decreasing.  Their output 
suggests a negative asymmetric relationship between rent and land prices. 
 While Ibendahl and Griffin (2013) and other literature on cropland prices has 
offered observations or anecdotal evidence of asymmetry in rent and land prices, the 
relationship has not been empirically tested. 
There are two competing arguments for the presence of asymmetry in rental 
rates.   Rent may be positively asymmetric indicating prices increase more rapidly than 
they decrease.  The argument implies that the landowner has a greater power in setting 
the rental rate and is reluctant to decrease prices once they are set. 
The opposing argument is that there exists asymmetric information shared 
between the landowner and the operator.  The operator has the most information about 
the profitability of production and chooses to share that information selectively.  The 
operator will share information with the landowner when it is beneficial to them and 
therefore will likely do so when production is becoming less profitable.  The asymmetric 
information between parties causes a negatively asymmetric relationship between input 
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prices and rental rates.  Prices are more likely to decrease rapidly in response to a 
decrease in profitable and less likely to increase as production becomes more profitable. 
Previous asymmetric price transmission models have focused on the relationship 
between input costs and output prices.  In the following analysis, an error correction 
model is used to empirically test the existence of asymmetric responses in rental rates to 
changes in the revenue or long-term crop prices. 
Literature Review 
Asymmetric price transmission is the study of how the price of an asset may increase or 
decrease at different rates in response to positive or negative input price changes.  
Largely, the research has focused on how input costs may affect the output price of a 
good.  The literature has also predominantly focused on positive asymmetry where 
output prices respond more so to cost increases than cost decreases.   
The literature is divided between the theoretical description of the causes of 
asymmetry and the empirical tests of showing the existence of asymmetry in a market or 
asset price.  The theoretical causes of asymmetry have largely been attributed to non-
competitive markets and the existence of adjustment costs.  Government intervention, 
inventory management and asymmetric information describe the other, less common 
stated theoretical causes of asymmetric price transmission.  Recently, the literature has 
focused on empirically testing the existence of asymmetry.  
Additionally, the topics covered in the asymmetric pricing literature have been 
vast.  A significant focus has been on agriculture.  There have been studies on the beef 
industry (Bailey and Brorsen 1989 and Goodwin and Holt 1999), pork industry (Miller 
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and Hayenga 2001), fresh vegetable supply chain (Ward 1982), dairy (Kinnucan and 
Forker 1987) and the food industry in general (Gardner 1975 and Azzam 1999).  Other 
authors have tried to more broadly test for asymmetries in consumer sectors looking at 
broad indexes that define sectors at various times along their supply chain (Peltzman 
2000).  Another significant area of focus has been in the energy sector, specifically 
between the transmission of oil prices into gasoline prices (Borenstein, Cameron and 
Gilbert 1997; Balke, Brown and Yucel 1998; Bachmeier and Griffin 2003; Chen, Finney 
and Lai 2005; Radchenko 2005; Adeyemi and Hunt 2007). 
Theoretical Explanations  
The two main theoretical arguments for causes of price asymmetry will be reviewed.  
The arguments are non-competitive market power and the cost associated with adjusting 
prices.  Other less common explanations have been used—political intervention 
(Kinnucan and Forker 1987), asymmetric information sharing and price reporting 
(Bailey and Brorsen 1989), and inventory management in general and specific to FIFO 
management and non-negative inventory constraints (Balke, Brown and Yucel (1998), 
Blinder (1982), Reagan and Weitzman (1982)).  These arguments will not be covered in 
extended detail but are still interesting to mention.  
Market power has been the most commonly cited explanation for asymmetry in 
agriculture markets.  Non-competitive markets for processors and retailers in agriculture 
take the blame for distorting price movements from the farmer to the consumer 
(Kinnucan and Forker 1987; Miller and Hayenga 2001).  Many refer to oligolopolist 
structures that punish non-collusive behavior (Ward 1982; Balke, Brown and Yucel 
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1998).  Ward (1982) believes the oligopolist structure causes output prices to respond 
more quickly to price decreases, also known as negative asymmetry.  Firms want to 
avoid losing market share so are hesitant to increase prices.  Balke, Brown and Yucel 
(1998) believe the opposite will occur in a oligopolist market structure.  Firms maintain 
the collusive arrangement by increasing prices accordingly to changes in input costs but 
are hesitant to reduce prices and signal they are compromising the collusive agreement.  
Damania and Yang (1998) also emphasize the importance of a potential punishment in 
an oligopoly or competitive duopoly setting.  When there exists a threat of punishment 
firms are likely to increase prices when demand is high but are reluctant to increase 
prices when demand is low.  Many others have argued similar scenarios but few have 
tried to test empirically due to the difficulty in defining market power.  For example, 
Peltzman’s (2000) empirical results contradict one another.  He finds that fewer firms 
create more asymmetry but high market concentration yields less asymmetry. 
 Menu costs, or the cost associated with adjusting prices, dominates as another 
common cause of assymetry.  The application of the theory of menu costs varies in the 
application and results are contradictory, overall.   Bailey and Brorsen (1989) and 
Peltzman (2000) highlight the inherent asymmetry in costs associated with production.  
The fixed costs packers in the beef markets face are much larger than the fixed costs of 
feedlots (Bailey and Brorsen 1989). The packers will reduce margins to remain 
competitive when input prices increase and therefore do not reduce input supply.  The 
absorption of the increase price by packers creates a positive asymmetry for farm prices.  
Peltzman (2000), similarly, raises the point of input management.  He states it is easier 
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for producers to reduce input use as costs increase, rather than increase the use of inputs 
due to either production constraints or the cost of sourcing additional supply.  
Ultimately, Peltzman (2000) determines there is no connection between menu costs and 
price asymmetry. 
 Heien (1980) and Ward (1982) provide contrasting perspectives on the effects of 
shelflife on price asymmetry.  Heien (1980) presents the argument that products with 
long shelflives are negatively price asymmetric.  The products have a larger time cost 
and therefore, alienating customers caused by an increase in prices is too risky.  Ward 
(1982), on the other hand, proposes the alternative—negative asymmetry exists in fresh 
food products. Sellers of fresh products will do what they can to maintain demand to 
avoid spoilage of their product.  
 Another interesting argument for the cause of asymmetric price transmission is 
the relationship between inflation and modifiying prices.  Ball and Mankiw (1994) and 
Buckle and Carlson (2000) present an argument for positive price asymmetry in the face 
of positive trend inflation.  They reason that a positive input price shock is more likely to 
cause a price adjustment than a negative input price shock.  Inflation is a natural adjuster 
for the negative price shocks. Buckle and Carlson (2000) use unique data from a 
business survey in New Zealand to confirm the inflation and price asymmetric 
relationship. 
Empirical Explorations 
The articles in this section have attempted to test for the existence of asymmetric price 
transmissions and measure the extent to which it exists.  The earliest model of Tweeten 
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and Quance (1969) models aggregate farm output as a function of censored lagged prices 
received by farmers for production inputs, beginning of the year stock of productive 
farm assets and a productivity index of farm output to input.  The results from Tweeten 
and Quance (1969) show positive supply responses but low magnitudes.  They conclude 
that the outcome of their results would be difficult to convey specific policy implications 
for policy makers on the effect of increases in prices to farm output. 
 Wolffram (1971) addresses several mathematical errors in Tweeten and Quance’s 
(1969) work.  Wolffram (1971) notes two major issues.  First, the incorrect method of 
quantifying irreversible supply reactions to increasing and decreasing prices; and second, 
identifying the partial influence of independent variable in distinct periods.  The author 
explains each issue and how to correct the methodology but does not in fact update the 
model nor give alternative conclusion from results. 
 Ward (1982) applies the model updates from Wolffram (1971) to study the 
asymmetry of prices at the retail, wholesale and shipping levels for fresh vegetables.  
One extension of the model is the addition of lags of the independent variables.  The 
author finds that decreases in wholesale pricing is reflected more fully in both the retail 
and shipping prices compared to price increases, indicating negative price asymmetry.   
Boyd and Brorsen (1988) expand on earlier analysis to test for not only direction 
of price adjustments but also the speed of those adjustments in the U.S. pork industry.  
They also improve on Wolffram and Houck’s models by accounting for prices changes 
that take longer than the contemporaneous time period to affect changes in output prices.  
Boyd and Brorsen (1988) also expand the model used by Ward (1982) by including 
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measure of wage to account for the magnitude of the margins.  The authors find that 
wholesale and retail prices are not “sticky downward” and state that wholesalers respond 
consistently to farm price increases and decreases. 
A recent innovation in the empirical study of asymmetric price transmission is 
the use of error correction models, which take into considertaion cointegration between 
the input and output prices.  V. Cramon-Taubadel (1998) and V. Cramon-Taubadel and 
Loy (1996) point out the necessity of recognizing the cointegrating relationship and 
recommend the use of an error correction model with asymmetric adjustment terms to 
properly understand the asymmetric relationship.  The long-run relationship between the 
input and output prices are understood through a simple regression of output prices as a 
function of input prices.  If a cointegrating relationship exists, the coefficient on the 
input prices will be statistically significant and the residuals of the regression will be 
censored into positive and negative series.  The positive and negative series along with 
contemporaneous and lagged, censored price differences are regressed on the diferenced 
output price series.  The authors then suggest an F-test to test for the existence of 
asymmetry.  The use of an error correction model to study price symmetry has been 
applied to several areas of research. 
The application of the error correction model to study price asymmetry has been 
extensively used in the energy sector.  Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997), Kilian 
and Vigfusson (2011) and Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) are just a few examples of the 
application of the error correction methodology to better understand the effects of energy 
prices on gasoline and the macro economy in general.  Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert 
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(1997) conclude there is a positive asymmetry in the relationship of crude oil prices and 
gasoline prices yet do not state at which point along the supply chain these asymmetries 
occur.  They do presume the asymmetry could likely be a result of the cost of inventory 
adjustment or even the reduced searching consumers perform decreasing the elasticity of 
demand for retailers.  The model the authors use do not censor their long-term dynamic 
variable in the error correction model.  
Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) also look at the relationship between oil prices and 
gasoline prices using an error correction model with spot gasoline and crude oil prices 
from 1985 to 1998.  The authors estimate two models—a symmetric and an asymmetric 
error correction model.  They then use the two models to comparatively test for the 
existence of asymmetries but ultimately conclude one does not exist.  
Kilian and Vigfussion (2011) use a vector autoreggression to assess the effects of 
oil prices on macroeconomic factors, looking specifically at real gross domestic product.  
The authors find no support for an asymmetric relationship between oil prices and real 
gross domestic product or admit that if they do exist “they are too weak to be detected in 
aggregate data” (Kilian and Vigfusson 2011).  The authors also state that the impulse 
response functions estimated from the vector autoregression model are fundamentally 
misspecified and therefore the parameter estimates will be inconsistent and conclusions 
made from them are not valid.   
Several authors also presented the idea that asymmetry may be present but not 
until there is a large enough price deviation from the long-run equilibrium that was of a 
certain magnitude or that surpassed a threshold.  In this case, the authors used a 
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threshold error correction model.  Tong (1983) presents this idea and states that 
thresholds are not necessarily uniform for positive and negative price changes.  Azzam 
(1999) believes the threshold theory is plausible when adjustment costs are present.  
Originally, Enders and Granger (1998) apply the threshold method to interest rates.  
Enders and Siklos (2001) update the article by testing for asymmetry in interest rates for 
instruments with different maturities.  The results of Enders and Siklos (2001) models 
suggest there is an asymmetric relationship among interest rates with varying maturities. 
Non-linearity in threshold error correction models has also been studied by 
several authors.  These authors recommend using multiple thresholds if linearity is 
rejected (Goodwin and Holt (1999); Balke and Fomby (1997); Tsay (1989); Goodwin 
and Piggott (2001)). 
The theories for causes of price asymmetry as well as the applications have been 
numerous.  As for the theory, it is largely not unified.  In addition, the empirical research 
is contradictory with about half of the studies showing the existence of asymmetry.  
Even when applied to the same subject, authors reach opposing conclusions.  In general, 
the methodology has centered around the use of an error correction model but a 
consensus has not formed a standard model to use for the empirical testing of 
asymmetric price transimissions. 
As shown, the previous literature on asymmetric price transmission has focused 
on the effect of changes in input costs to output prices.  The analysis of this paper will 
consider how changes in the income of an asset affect changes in the asset’s value.  
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Specifically, the effect of changes in the long-run crop price on changes in rental rates is 
considered. 
The study of asymmetric price transmissions has not directly been applied to 
cropland prices.  Many theoretical arguments have been made for the existence of 
asymmetryic price responses in cropland prices and rental rates but the relationship has 
not been tested empirically.  Burt (1986) states the need for lagged rental rates to 
describe the relationship between rental rates and land prices.  Ibendal and Griffin 
(2013) mention the existence of asymmetries due to asymmetric information between 
landowner and operators.  This paper serves to fill a hole in the cropland literature and to 
expand the use of the asymetric pricing methodology to another subject and how it is 
applied. 
Methodologies 
An error correction model describes both the co-integrating, long-run relationships as 
well as the short-run dynamics that is of interest for the input and output price 
relationship.  In general, to understand the short-run dynamics, the differences of the 
price series are taken when the series are non-stationary.  While necessary for the 
analysis, this procedure eliminates interesting information about the long-run effects.  
The error correction model eliminates this issue by first modeling the long-run 
relationship in levels and then includes them as independent variables in the difference 
model of the short-run dynamics. 
Once again, changes in rent are specified as a function of changes in long-run 
crop prices.  Three panel models are estimated.  The models are delineated based on the 
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major crop produced in each state.  The error correction model develops both the long-
run and short-run effects of input prices to an output price with a two-step regression 
process.  The first regression provides the long-run relationship between rent and the 
crop price.  The long-run output is then employed in the second regression which 
estimates the asymmetric relationship for the long-run effects and the immediate and 
lagged short-run effects.  
Long-Run Effect Estimation and Tests 
The long-run effects of crop prices and state dummy variables on the respective rental 
rate is determined using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  The values are 
measured in levels in the regression.  Equation (49) shows the OLS regression. 
 !"#$%,b = 	'( +	'Mòb +	'ôå% + /%  (49) 
Where s is the associated dummy variable for each state and p is the crop price 
associated with that state grouping.  The equation for the corn price will include 15 state 
dummy variables with one state, Delaware, dropped to avoid perfect collinearity.  The 
soybean equation has six states with Alabama excluded.  Wheat has a total of two states 
and excludes Oklahoma.  
Following estimation, the error terms are tested for long-run stationarity using an 
augmented Dicky-Fuller (DF) test developed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) for panel 
data.  Typically, the DF test is used for times series data and not for models using panel 
data.  Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) develop a test of the unit root hypothesis for strongly 
balanced cross-sectional time series.  Their results indicate a high power for the panel-
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based unit root test as compared to running separate unit root tests for individual time 
series.   
The test’s null hypothesis assumes all of the panels have the same autoregressive 
parameter, i.e. not specific to an individual state, and that they contain a unit root.  The 
models are tested with one lag.  A t-test is used to test the significance of the coefficient 
associated with the lagged error term.  If the coefficient is significantly different from 
zero, then the null hypothesis that the error term contains a unit root is rejected.   
 {/% = 	ö( + ö+/%a+ +	h%  (50) 
 If the unit root test is rejected, the error terms are recovered from the estimation 
and separated into positive and negative series.  The series are censored such that the 
positive series only have positive errors and are zero otherwise, and so forth for the 
negative series.  Once separated, the two series are differenced.  The long-run 
relationship answers the question of whether two-series trend together, without drifting 
apart, over time.  It is not always necessary for the co-integrating relationships to have 
economic meaning but it is not uncommon to discern an intuitive meaning between the 
two. The economic meaning also helps when forecasting future output prices given 
changes in input prices. 
Short-Run Effect Estimation  
The second step of the regression is to combine the long-run residuals with the short-
term dynamics.  The second equation will include lagged dependent variable 
observations, contemporaneous and lagged crop prices and the lagged co-integrating 
series.  The final equation will reveal the presence of asymmetry in the short-run and 
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long-run effects.   If the coefficients are statistically significant and different, it shows 
there is likely an asymmetric relationship present.   
Three pools of data are specified, in which the major delineating factor is the 
major crop produced in the state.  Corn, soybean and wheat production are the primary 
crop productions.  The independent variables are the crop prices which are a single time 
series.  Rent varies both over the state they are drawn from and time period observed.   
 The error correction model will include lags of the dependent variable as well as 
contemporaneous and lagged values of the crop price series.  To arrive at the appropriate 
number of lags, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) are used as indicators of the best set of parameters for each model.  
The regression is initially run with the first difference of rent as a function of 
lagged differenced rent variables and contemporaneous and lagged differenced crop 
price data.  At this point, the long-run parameters are not included in the model.  
Equation (51) illustrates the equation estimated.   
 {!"#$-,% = õú + ∑õM{!"#$-,%aM +	∑õû{å-,%aû 	+ 	m%  (51) 
where c represents the crop group the regression represents either corn, soybean or 
wheat.  The i and j index the number of lags and the coefficient specific to that 
parameter.    
 One constraint is placed on the model selection at this point.  No years are 
skipped in the lag selection so as to not over fit the data and include extraneous 
information that does not contribute to the economic understanding of the relationship 
presented in the model. 
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The regression that minimizes the AIC and BIC measures is used as a basis for 
the second step.  In the second step, the crop price data is censored into positive and 
negative values.  The coefficients indicate the pace of change associated with an increase 
or decrease of an input price.  Based on the number of lags determined in the first step, 
the equal amount is included both for the dependent variable as well as the crop price 
data.  Again, the AIC and BIC criterion is used to determine if the lags found in the 
previous step are still the best parameterization of the model.  A second constraint is 
imposed at this point. The censored prices must be included as pairs to maintain 
economic intuition of positive and negative price movements.  Equation (52) presents 
the structure of the second step. 
 {!"#$-,% = 	ü( + üM{!"#$-,%aM 	+ 	∑üMÅ{å-,%aMÅ 	+	∑üMa{å-,%aMa 	+	m%  (52) 
 The third and final step, introduces the long-run deviations into the specification 
determined in step 2.  Equation (53) presents the final regression with all possible 
parameters included.  The significance of variables is considered and the model is once 
again determined based on the competitiveness of the AIC and BIC measure.   
 {!"#$-,% = 	 †( +	∑°M{!"#$-,%aM + ∑†ûÅ{å-,%aûÅ 	+ ∑†ûa{å-,%aûa +öÅ/-,%a+Å +	öa/-,%a+a + m%  (53) 
 where /M,% = !"#$% − 'MòM − 'ôå% (54) 
On the right-hand side, the independent variables are divided into short-term and 
long-term effects.  The coefficients associated with the crop price variables, {å-,%, 
represent the short-term effects.  While the rent variable changes over states, the crop 
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price is of one type, delineated by the c subscript, i.e. crop type.   The long-term effect is 
represented by the recovered residuals from Equation (49).  The / variables are also 
censored into positive and negative values to understand how rent changes according to 
positive and negative changes in the long-term.  Table 3.12 presents the parameters 
included in each step described above, including the final parameterization determined 
in step three for the error correction model. 
 Two hypotheses are tested when modeling the error correction model. 
 ¢(£:	†ûÅ = 	†ûa¢§£ :	†ûÅ 	≠ 	 †ûa	 (55) 
 ¢(££:	öÅ = 	öa¢§££:	öÅ ≠ 	öa (56) 
Intuitively, the hypotheses are asking the question, “do increases and the decreases in the 
crop prices have symmetric effects on cropland rents in both the short-run and long-
run?”  A t-test is performed to test these hypotheses. 
Each model is also tested for the stability of the coefficients on the long-run co-
integrating effects to justify the grouping of the states by major crop production.  The 
procedure tests the statistical significance of the long-run coefficients in the error 
correction model estimation under the original grouping and a subset of the group.   A t-
test measures the existence of a statistical difference between the coefficients from the 
entire group and the coefficient estimated from the subset of states using a 5% criterion.  
If there exists a statistical difference between the two estimated coefficients, the 
coefficients are not stable across various groupings and it is not justified to group the 
states by crop type in the long-run effect equations.  The null hypothesis tested is 
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presented in Equation (57).  If the hypothesis is rejected, the grouping of states by crop 
type is not necessarily appropriate.  
 ¢(: 'M£ = 	'M££ (57) 
Data 
The data used are the same data referenced in chapter II.  The difference here is in the 
application of the data.  Whereas chapter II used the data in a strictly time series 
fashion— regressing historical crop price data on rent data separately for each state—the 
error correction model combines several rent data series to create both a cross sectional 
and time series dataset grouped based on the major crop production by state.  The data is 
an unbalanced panel dataset.  Observations are both across units, the state observations, 
and over time. The unbalanced portion of the panel arises from the various available 
historical data for either rent or long-run crop prices. Corn data is available beginning in 
1974, soybean and Kansas City Wheat price data is available from 1968.  10 states in the 
data set have price data going back to 1968, 13 going back to 1974 and one state 
beginning in 1978.  Table 3.10 outlines each state’s beginning observation.   
 As mentioned, the data used in each of the models is determined by the major 
crop produced in each state according to cash receipts.  Therefore, all state rental rates 
associated with corn production states are grouped, as well as for the soybean and wheat 
producing states.  Table 3.2 provides the delineation of state groupings based on crop 
production. One crop-to-state delineation that is modified in the model in this chapter as 
compared to the model in chapter II is for North Dakota.  The long-run crop price used 
in the model in chapter II uses the settlement price on the nearby Chicago Wheat futures 
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contract.  Due to non-stationarity in the regression of the Chicago Wheat price on North 
Dakota rent, the Kansas City Wheat futures contract is used for both North Dakota and 
Oklahoma.  
 Differences are used for each rent and crop price series to get at the relationships 
between the positive and negative movements of crop prices and rent.  The long-run crop 
prices are censored into positive and negative series depending on the differenced value.  
The positive price series yield the differenced value if the price is greater than zero, else 
zero.  The negative series contains only negative differenced values, otherwise zero. 
Empirical Results 
The model output for each crop will be presented individually.  A suitable, common 
model parameterization of the three models is determined and presented in equation 
(58).   {!"#$-,% = 	 †( + 	°{!"#$%a+ + †(Å{å-,%Å +	†+Å{å-,%a+Å + †;Å{å-,%a;Å +	†¶Å{å-,%a¶Å+	†(a{å-,%a +	†+a{å-,%a+a +	†;a{å-,%a;a +	†¶a{å-,%a¶a + öÅ/-,%a+Å+	öa/-,%a+a + m% 
(58) 
Overall, the estimations show signs of asymmetry for all three crops.  The wheat 
regression has the fewest asymmetric relationships present. 
Corn State Results 
The long-run estimation, results presented in Table 3.13, yield stationary error terms and 
stable coefficients over varying groupings of the states.  Output for both tests can be 
found in Table 3.14 and Table 3.15.  The dummy variables for three states in the 
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estimation are not statistically significant—Maryland, Michigan and Wisconsin.  
Otherwise, all other Table 3.13 level.  
 The error correction model parameters are presented in Table 3.16.  All variables 
are statistically significant except for the positive second lagged price coefficient, single 
and third negative lagged price coefficient and the negative residual coefficient.  In 
general, we expect positive coefficients for the short-run positive and negative series.  A 
negative movement in crop price will yield a negative change decreasing the dependent 
variable.  All but the second positive lag have positive coefficients.  As noted, the 
coefficient associated with the second, positive lagged price series is not statistically 
significant.  Therefore, all statistically significant variables have the positive relationship 
as expected.  
 The cointegration parameters of an error correction model are not necessarily 
economically intuitive but some intuition is provided here.  If a positive residual from 
the long-run regression is present, rent observation is greater than the predicted value, or 
rent is overvalued.  The coefficient should imply a corrective attitude to reduce the rent 
amount.  The negative residual value, by the same intuition, would indicate there is an 
undervaluation of the rent.  The scenario should cause an increase in rent and, therefore, 
result in a negative coefficient.  The output of the long-run parameters is also presented 
in Table 3.16.  The coefficient of the positive long-run equilibrium deviation is negative, 
as expected, and significant.  The coefficient associated with the negative residual series 
is positive, but not statistically significant. 
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A t-test is used to test for a statistical difference between the positive and 
negative movements for both the long-run equilibrium error and short-run dynamics.  
The results are presented in Table 3.17.  The null hypothesis tested is that the 
coefficients associated with the positive and negative movements are equal.  Results 
show that the first, second and third lags as well as the long-run effects coefficient 
differences are statistically significant.  The first and second lagged differences are 
significant at the 5% level with the third and residual differences statistically significant 
at the 1% level.  The rejections of these null hypotheses show asymmetry is present in 
the rent-price relationships for corn. 
The type of asymmetry is defined by the relative magnitudes of the positive and 
negative coefficients.  The relative magnitudes of only the statistically significant 
relationships will be discussed.  Positive asymmetry is present in the first and third lag as 
well as the long-run residuals.  Negative asymmetry is present in the second lag 
relationship.  The relative magnitudes can also be considered in a cumulative fashion as 
the sum total of short-run effects from positive price changes minus the sum total effects 
from negative movements in prices.  Overall, the short-run dynamics show a cumulative 
positive asymmetric price transmission.  The common positive asymmetry in the short 
and long-run effects support the hypothesis that the landowner is in a dominant position 
for setting the rent for corn.   
Soybean State Results 
The results of the long-run estimation for the soybean grouping are presented in Table 
3.18.  The results of the long-run stationarity test of the error terms, presented in Table 
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3.19, show the error terms are stationary.  The results of the stability test provided in 
Table 3.20 show the coefficients are stable over varying groupings of the states.  These 
results indicate the delineation of the states is justified.  In the co-integrating regression, 
all variables are statistically significant at the 1% level.   
Table 3.121 presents model output for the error correction model.  The 
coefficients are all statistically significant except for the coefficient on the single lag of 
the dependent variables and the third negative crop price series.  All short-run price 
change coefficients are positive as expected except for the coefficient on the first 
positive lagged price series, which was not statistically significant.  The long-run, co-
integrating coefficients are both negative, as expected. 
In terms of asymmetry, the soybean coefficients show signs of asymmetry in the 
first, second, and third time lags for price changes as well as in the coefficients for the 
long-run equilibrium errors. 
Table 3.22 presents all calculated test statistics for the relationships in the 
soybean model.  The relative magnitude of the first time lag has a negative asymmetric 
relationship.  The second and third time lags and co-integrating relationships all have 
positive asymmetry.  Overall, the soybean model is cumulatively positively asymmetric 
in the short-run and positive in the long-run effects.  This consistency indicates a 
relationship that, agrees with the corn estimates and favors the landowner as the price 
setter.  
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Wheat State Results 
Initially, the wheat states, North Dakota and Oklahoma, are estimated individually using 
the Chicago and Kansas City Wheat futures contract settlement prices, respectively.  The 
output of the North Dakota model using the Chicago Wheat price is not stationary and 
therefore, is grouped with Oklahoma. The Kansas City Wheat contract price is used as 
the long-run wheat price.  Following re-estimation, the errors are stationary.  Results 
from the re-estimation are in Table 3.23 and the stationarity tests can be found in Table 
3.24. 
 The coefficients of the long-run co-integrating equation, presented in Table 3.23, 
are all statistically significant yet the R2 is much lower compared to the corn and 
soybean regressions.  The error correction model has less impressive explanatory ability.  
The error correction model output for the wheat regression can be found in Table 3.25.  
The only statistically significant coefficient is the negative, first-period lagged price 
series.  All short-run dynamics are positive except for the negative, two-period lagged 
crop price series.  The positive and negative long-run series coefficients are negative.  
 The only positive and negative price change effects to show signs of asymmetry 
is the second-period lagged crop prices.  The t-statistic results are available in Table 
3.26.  The relationship has a positive asymmetry, consistent with the previous models’ 
asymmetric conclusions. 
Conclusions 
The output of the error correction model shows the presence of asymmetry in rent both 
in the short and long-run effects. The models show varying directions of asymmetry in 
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each positive and negative relationship but the overarching direction across all models is 
a positive, both in the short and long-run relationships.  The corn and soybean states 
have the most statistically different positive and negative movements. 
The magnitude of the positive or negative asymmetric effects for the corn model 
are larger than those of the soybean and wheat models.  The magnitude of one of the 
positive or negative coefficients compared to its counterpart indicates the degree of 
asymmetry present in each positive and negative relationship.  The corn regression 
shows larger differences across all statistically significant relationships.  This is an 
indication of a larger degree of asymmetry in corn producing states than in the soybean 
and wheat states.  The strength of the coefficients for the corn regression may also likely 
be due to the strength of the model.  The states within the corn grouping are more 
represented by income from corn production compared to the other groups.  States 
included in the soybean model do not necessarily receive a substantial amount of their 
cash receipts from soybean production, in general.  Therefore, soybean prices may only 
represent a small proportion of the income produced from the state. 
The short-run coefficients should all have positive coefficients since they are 
separated into positive and negative series.  The positive or negative effects the series 
should have on rent will be captured in the sign of the price change present in the series.  
The only coefficient that does not follow this structure is in the soybean estimation.  The 
first lagged positive series has a negative coefficient.  Possibly with better specification 
of the model, the coefficient may correct. 
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The long-run coefficients are all expected to be negative.  The residuals represent 
an over or undervaluation of the rent term in the long-run and therefore should work in a 
corrective manner.  A lagged value that is positive indicates a previously overestimated 
value and a negative residual indicates an underestimated value.  The coefficient of the 
positive lagged residual is negative indicating that when a value is positive, the outcome 
will decrease the rental rate.  Alternatively, the coefficient of the negative residuals is 
also negative.  The two negative values result in a value that will increase the rental rate.  
The corn group model produces a positive coefficient for the negative residual series but 
the coefficient is not statistically significant.  All other long-run coefficients are 
negative.  
 The positive asymmetric results of the model disprove Ibendahl and Griffin’s 
(2013) theory that the asymmetric sharing of information between land operators and 
owners causes rental rates to be adjusted more slowly when prices are increasing than 
decreasing.  The positive asymmetric results indicate that rental rates are more sensitive 
to increases in profitability of crop production and therefore increase rapidly to crop 
price increases.  Alternatively, when crop production profitability decreases, rental rates 
are less reactive.  The opposing intuition to Ibendahl and Griffin’s (2013) theory is that 
landowners have more power in the determination of the rental rates or that landowners 
are reluctant to decrease prices once they have reached higher levels.  
 The results do not necessarily disprove the possibility of information being 
shared or known asymmetrically.  It could be likely that landowners have less 
knowledge about the profitability of the production on their land.  The inferior 
  
 
76 
knowledge could cause their reluctance to decrease prices.  Educating or providing more 
information to the landowner may reduce some of the asymmetry. 
These results may also disprove the conclusions made by Melichar (1979) that 
land prices change at the same rate as the income to land.  If rent is still believed to be 
the best proxy for the income to land and it does not change proportionally to changes in 
the crop production prices, it may not be likely that land prices would adjust 
accordingly.  A natural and optimal addition to the analysis would be to use the error 
correction model framework to test if an asymmetric relationship exists between rent and 
cropland prices.  The supplementary analysis would provide a holistic view of the 
transfer of revenue from production to final asset value. 
Previous research has tried to use lags of rent and land prices to account for the 
difficulty in measuring cropland price.  The authors state that the models are only able to 
characterize cropland price dynamics in the short-run or long-run due to varying factors.  
For example, Phipps (1984) states past rents and past land prices explain the dynamics of 
land prices but their model is only useful in quantifying short-run adjustments.  Falk 
(1991) states that land prices can be determined by rents using the present value formula 
but only in the long-run estimation of prices.  Due to the volatility of land prices in the 
short-run, the model is not useful for estimating prices for the short-run.  The results of 
this work show that the difficulty found in previous literature to estimate land prices is 
not in the formulation of lags and whether they are affected by short or long-term 
volatility, but in fact due to the way value of land responds to changes in the income to 
land.  The use of the capitalization model is also affected.  Output will likely only be 
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representative when prices are increasing.  When prices are decreasing, the value of the 
asset is not going to change according to the capitalized relationship of income to asset 
value. 
The positive asymmetry is also an indication that the farm operator is taking on a 
disproportionate amount of farming risk and does not receive the payoff associated with 
bearing the risk.  When production is profitable, rent increases and more of the profits go 
to the landowner.  When production is less profitable, the rents decrease 
disproportionately to the reduction in revenue.  Therefore, when times are risky, the 
landowner is shielded from that risk, yet when revenue is good, the landowner retains a 
disproportionate amount of the revenue compared to the operator who bears the risk.  
Ensuring operators are receiving a proportionate amount of benefit from the risk they are 
bearing from operating the land is important to safeguarding the long-term success of the 
operators and maintaining a stable farm business sector overall.  Creating a more 
symmetric price relationship between revenue and rental rates would be an important 
policy implication from these findings.   
 In general, the models would benefit from more granular data yet such data is 
not available for each state nor for the major crop produced in each state.   Aggregation 
at the state-wide level removes a lot of important variation in the data.  The analysis is 
also restricted to crop production in each state due to available price data.  These data 
limitations require creating assumptions on the grouping of states in each model.  States 
such as Iowa who have uniform state-wide crop production are grouped with states such 
as Georgia which is not largely a row crop producing state.  Georgia’s corn production 
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represented about 2.2% of its cash receipts in 2016 (USDA ERS 2016) yet corn prices 
are still used to represent the state’s agriculture income.  The state-wide data for rent, 
especially for states whose crop production is not as uniform across the entire state, may 
not be as well represented by the crop price chosen for that state.   
Data at the county-level would likely improve the modeling of the asymmetric 
relationship and provide even more interesting relationships for more specific production 
types.  Crop production at the county-level is likely more concentrated than what is 
produced on a statewide basis.   
Additional analysis may also benefit from a stricter criterion for the grouping or 
even inclusion of states for the analysis.  A minimum threshold of production of a crop 
may strengthen conclusions that can be made from a model’s results. 
The output of the models across varying states and crop production types is 
consistent for the relationship between changes in income and rental rates.  As noted, the 
addition of more granular data would create the opportunity to expand the model and 
tighten criterion on the delineation of regions into crop-based groups.   
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CHAPTER IV  
THEMES IN MACRO AG FINANCE: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? WHAT HAVE 
WE FORGOTTEN? 
 
In the past century, the farm business sector has witnessed three major boom-and-bust 
cycles, all following a relatively similar pattern.  Net farm income increases due to a 
growth in exports and prices received; with the larger cash flow, deleveraging and an 
expansion in capital expenditures occur.  Once net farm income begins to fall, capital 
expansion tends to continue for a period of time and debt grows to finance expansion, 
thereby increasing leveraged positions (Henderson and Kaufman 2013).  In the most 
recent boom, various aspects of the pattern have emerged yet again and have brought 
into question whether a bust, similar to those that occurred in that past, will follow. 
 The recent growth in the farm business sector has predominantly occurred in the 
row crop producing states of the Midwest.  Net farm income in the Iowa farm business 
sector, a representative Midwestern state, expanded nearly 450% from 1999 to 2012 
(USDA NASS 2016).1  The increase in crop prices (corn, +300%) (USDA NASS 2016), 
yield per acre and demand both domestically and internationally during that time period 
predominantly caused the increase in net farm income.  Demand increases have been 
attributed to several factors.  First, the emergence of multiple free trade agreements in 
the mid to late 1990s and 2000s made exporting goods to other countries easier.  Second, 
expansion in both the population and income in developing countries increased demand 
                                                
1 All data is in real terms using 2009 as the base year unless otherwise noted. 
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for U.S. exports. Finally, the boom in biofuels significantly increased domestic demand 
for corn. 
 The farm business sector booms today and in the late 1970s have several 
similarities.  Both witnessed expansions in demand due to increases in international trade 
and higher crop prices.  As a result, producers have expanded operations, increasing both 
their capital expenditures and debt positions.  These booms have been coupled with 
rapid increases in farmland prices.  The changes in farmland prices during these cycles, 
play a role in the stability of the debt positions of market participants since farmland is 
the primary source of collateral for loans.   
In the 1970s, the average yearly increase in the value of land in Iowa was 10%.  
The land prices for the state increased over 400% from 1970 to 1981, the peak of land 
price increases (USDA NASS 2016).  Today substantial increases in the market price of 
farmland have occurred again, with the Midwest witnessing the largest gain.  Cropland 
prices since the downturn in the 1980s has increased nearly 500%.  In 1987, cropland 
prices in Iowa averaged $1,311 per acre.  Today, the average cropland price in Iowa is 
$7,464.  In the past decade alone, farmland prices have increased, 128% in Iowa, 
peaking at $8,050 per acre (USDA NASS 2016).  Figure 4.28 shows the historical 
farmland prices and net farm income in Iowa. Figure 4.29, for reference, shows nominal 
and real net farm income for the entire United States.   
 The average debt level of the farm business sector is a commonly cited difference 
between the current boom and previous cycles.  Figure 4.30 shows the fluctuations in the 
debt-to-asset ratio since 1959.  In 1985, the debt-to-asset ratio peaked at 22%.  By 
  
 
81 
comparison, the sector has witnessed much lower values recently.  The debt-to-asset 
ratio was 12% in 2015.  Many have cited this as an indication that the sector is 
significantly less risky. 
In previous cycles, debt accumulation continued despite signals of a downturn.  
For example, Figure 4.31 shows the relationship between national net farm income and 
outstanding debt.  The graph shows outstanding debt does not change direction, or stop 
growing for many years following a negative turn in net farm income.      
As seen in Figure 4.32, capital expenditures tend to continue to increase following 
several years of decreases in net farm income.  Previous busts in the farm business sector 
have largely been fueled by the producers’ inability to support their over-leveraged 
position from cash flows with farm operations. Yet as the graph shows, as sources of 
cash flow diminish, the sector continues to increase capital expenditures.   
While this boom has seen a relatively lower debt-to-asset ratio, several risks may 
still exist.  The concentration of debt on fewer producer’s balance sheets differentiates 
today from conditions observed in the 1980s.  Almost two-thirds of producers reported 
no outstanding term debt on their balance sheets in 2009 as opposed to nearly 60% of 
producers in 1986.  Additionally, 55% of the outstanding debt was held by farms with 
multiple loans usually from multiple sources (Harris, et al. 2009).  The profile of the 
likely holders of the outstanding term debt may be another risk.  According to the 2012 
Census of Agriculture, the average age of the U.S. farmer was 58 and 78% of the 
producers had been on the farm for more than 10 years (USDA NASS 2016).  Therefore, 
those holding most of the outstanding debt and risk may be newer entrants making 
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significant capital expenditures to begin and expand operations.  The profile variation of 
the borrowers between today and the previous cycles compromises the use of the debt-
to-asset ratio over time.   
The times interest earned ratio and the debt burden ratio provide a more 
substantive comparison of the farm business sector over time to the usually cited debt-to-
asset ratio.  The times interest earned ratio is farm revenue divided by the interest 
expense for real estate and non-real estate loans.  The debt burden ratio measures the 
debt outstanding divided by net farm income.  While the debt-to-asset ratio represents a 
single balance sheet statistic, these two ratios describe the farm business sector’s 
capacity to service current outstanding debt. 
Lenders use a general threshold to determine an enterprise’s access to credit.  A 
debt burden ratio of four, or total debt outstanding not exceeding net income by a 
multiple of four, is most commonly used.  As can be seen in Figure 4.33, the average 
debt burden ratio does not exceed that threshold for most of the historical period 
examined.  The debt burden ratio surpassed the threshold of four in 1976 and reached a 
peak of 13 in 1983.  The debt burden ratio remained around four until 1986.  Since that 
time, the ratio has remained below the threshold until 2015 when it reached 4.41 and has 
since continued to rise and may reach 6.34 in 2017 given the USDA’s projection for net 
farm income.  The spread between the times interest earned ratio and the debt burden 
ratio also indicates stress in the farm business sector.  In 1977, the two ratios reversed 
their relationship and the debt burden ratio became greater than the times interest earned 
ratio.  The inverted relationship between the two ratios continued through the entirety of 
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the farm business sector downturn and reversed in the late 1980s as the sector began to 
recover.  These ratios have not seen a similar relationship reversal of a significant 
magnitude until 2016 when the debt burden ratio increased to 4.41 and the times interest 
earned ratio decreased to 5.37.  The USDA’s projections for net farm income in 2017, 
shown in the graph, imply further widening of the spread. 
Two market participants play a role in the debt accumulation of the farm business 
sector.  The producer adds risk to their financial position by growing debt when they 
expand or modernize operations.  Lenders add risk by expanding their loan portfolios to 
satisfy profit maximizing objectives. 
The debt positions of the market, overall, play a significant role in the creation 
and management of risk in the farm business sector.  Debt has played a major role in all 
previous boom and bust cycles.  The following analysis serves to decompose each 
players’ role in that creation and management of risk.  By better understanding these 
individuals’ actions, future unnecessary risk can be avoided.   
Capital expenditures describe the demand for debt for both the expansion and 
modernization of producer’s operations.  An econometric analysis of investment 
behavior will provide insight into factors affecting capital expenditures and forecasting 
expected changes.   
Debt will be analyzed using data collected from regional agriculture banks 
surveyed by the Federal Reserve district banks.  These data display the credit market’s 
interactions with borrowers.  The data captures lenders’ sentiment towards the current 
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and future farm business sector and their decisions around supplying credit to borrowers.  
These surveys also give insight to the signals lenders send to borrowers.   
The assessment of demand and supply of debt, holistically, analyzes the 
composition of the financial risk positions of agriculture market participants and how 
both the demanders of debt and the suppliers of debt create risk in the farm business 
sector.   
Background 
Henderson and Kauffman (2013) identified a pattern in the past three expansion and 
contraction periods—1910-1940, 1940-1960 and 1970-1980.  The progression of events 
begins with an expansion in net farm income, caused by varying factors usually related 
to increases in trade, exports and prices received.  As cash flow increases, producers 
decrease their leveraged positions, decreasing their debt-to-asset ratios.  Both the 
decreased amount of cash flow required for servicing debt and the increase in net farm 
income increases the wealth accumulation of producers.  The increase in wealth leads to 
increases in capital expenditures.  The farm business sector then begins to contract with 
a downturn in farm commodity prices.  Net farm income decreases and reduces available 
cash flow to cover the increased debt positions created by capital expansion.  Despite the 
contraction in net farm income, capital expansion continues to grow based in part on an 
overly optimistic outlook by both producers and lenders.  Eventually producers are 
forced to either expand or restructure their debt positions to service their debt positions 
(Henderson and Kaufman 2013).  The following analysis will identify the pattern in five 
time periods—1910-1939, 1940-1969, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, and 1990-present.  Figure 
  
 
85 
4.44 provides a timeline of major events highlighting the factors occurring at each point 
in the pattern for the previous boom-and-bust cycle period. 
1910-1939 
The 1910s were already experiencing increases in food demand as a result of World War 
I.  The war caused demand for US agricultural exports to double.  From 1916 to 1919, 
exports increased about 10% year over year and accounted for nearly 20% of U.S. food 
production (Henderson, Gloy and Boehlje 2011).  The largest increase in exports was 
experienced in livestock.  Prices received for crops and livestock doubled between 1915 
and 1918 (Henderson, Gloy and Boehlje 2011).   The price of corn increased from $0.42 
in 1910 to $1.34 in 1919 (USDA NASS 2016).  Net farm income increased as much as 
60% by 1917 and continued at that level through 1919 (Henderson, Gloy and Boehlje 
2011).  The farm business sector was also going through a period of mechanization of 
farm operations.  Producers were adopting the use of tractors, combines and other farm 
machinery and equipment leading to surges in the level of productivity.  In 1917, 
producer expenditures on vehicles, machinery and equipment increased 33% from the 
previous year and continued to expand through the decade with the help of low interest 
rates creating for cheap debt financing (Henderson and Kaufman 2013). 
By 1921, exports had decreased and the onset of a recession suppressed prices 
and net farm income.  Exports returned to pre-war levels by 1922 with commodity 
prices, overall, seeing about a 40% decline (Henderson, Gloy and Boehlje 2011).  
Specifically, corn prices dropped nearly 70% from their high in 1919 to their lowest 
price of $0.41 (USDA NASS 2016).  Real net returns to operators decreased 53% as a 
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way to provide liquidity to their operations, many producers expanded and restructured 
their debt positions.   
By 1923 farm bankruptcies began to increase.  Following the initial recessionary 
period, the onset of the Depression in the 1930s caused net farm income to collapse 
again— net farm incomes reached as low as $26.8 billion in 1932, creating another wave 
of farm bankruptcies (Henderson and Kaufman 2013). 
1940-1969 
World War II spurred an increase in prices and demand for US agricultural exports and 
brought the farm business sector out of the recession it had been in.  Exports increased 
from $4.3 billion in 1941 to $25 billion in 1944 (Henderson, Gloy and Boehlje 2011).  
Once again, the majority of the increase in the exported goods was livestock and crop 
exports only increased moderately.  Grain prices saw average increases of nearly 400 
and 300% for corn and soybeans, respectively.  Net farm income in the sector more than 
doubled from 1940 to 1943 (USDA NASS 2016).   Following the increase in income, 
capital expenditures increased more than three times over the 1943-1949 period (USDA 
NASS 2016).  By 1947, non-real estate investment increased by 73% (Henderson, Gloy 
and Boehlje 2011).  From 1950 to 1956, net farm income was suppressed and debt was 
expanded to finance previous capital expenditures.  Between 1950 and 1960, average 
farm debt rose close to 10% each year for both real estate and non-real estate 
transactions (Henderson and Kaufman 2013).  Debt levels, overall, remained below 
historical averages and therefore, the farm business sector avoided a bust following the 
expansion in the 1940s (Henderson and Kaufman 2013). 
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Exports overall did not decrease.  The development of hybrid seeds in the 1940s 
created bumper crops that were sold in foreign markets.  In 1954 the Agriculture Trade 
and Development Assistance Act was instated as the U.S.’s major international food 
assistance program.  The goal of the program was to bolster U.S. exports and benefit 
other countries in need.  Over the next three decades, exports continued to increase, as 
well as agriculture prices and production costs for seed, fertilizer, pesticides and energy.  
Throughout the 1940s, production costs increased on average 7% year over year, 
increasing 15% in 1943 and 20% in 1942.  In the 1950s and 1960s, production costs 
increased 15 and 20 percent, respectively, over each of the decades.   
1970-1979 
The boom in the 1970s was largely a result of an increase in exports and prices 
following a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in 1972.  The year following the 
trade deal, U.S. agricultural exports and net farm income nearly doubled— net farm 
income reaching $130 billion (USDA NASS 2016).  Net farm income returned to near 
previous levels following that initial spike in returns but remained 44% higher than the 
previous decade (USDA NASS 2016). Commodity prices increased substantially as 
well.  Corn increased from $1.04 in 1971 to $2.97 in 1974; a 186% increase in three 
years.  Soybean prices increased from $2.36 to $7.05 from 1969 to 1976; a 199% 
increase in seven years.  Wheat also saw an increase in prices of $1.25 in 1970 to $4.13 
in 1974; a 230% increase in prices over four years (USDA NASS 2016).  Exports 
peaked in 1980 at $96 billion (Henderson, Gloy and Boehlje 2011).  The substantial 
increase in net farm income caused an expansion in both non-real estate investments and 
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land improvements.  Capital spending began to rise faster than incomes, increasing debt 
levels by about 5% per year.  The substantial leveraged positions and decreases in net 
farm income resulted in the second farm financial crisis.   
1980 - 1989 
Farm export and price declines led to a collapse in net farm income at the onset of 1980.  
Due to bumper crops, production increased and caused crop prices to decline.  Corn, 
soybean and wheat prices decreased 33, 16% and 10%, respectively.  Coupled with a 
strong valuation of the dollar, exports collapsed.  Net farm income decreased from about 
$130 billion to $36 billion in 1980, a decrease of about 72%.  All capital expansion 
halted to minimize the accumulation of more debt but the over-leveraged positions of the 
market had already been realized.  The farm business sector witnessed another decrease 
in profit in 1983 to $26.5 billion.  The massive decline in cash flow coupled with an 
increase of the Federal Funds rate and the prime rate to 19% and 22%, respectively made 
servicing debt even more difficult for producers.   
Growth in farm debt levels began to slow as soon as 1980 with less than a 1% 
increase and declined in value from 1983 to 1993.  The previous decade showed debt 
levels rising about 6% each year with a debt-to-asset ratio of about 15%.  Although some 
of the decline in debt accumulation was due to more conservative spending by producers 
following the decrease in cash flow, a substantial portion was from the number of 
bankruptcies occurring and the writing off of debt.  The slowing of debt accumulation 
did not remedy the liquidity issues as much as needed.  From 1982 to 1987 the debt-to-
asset ratios averaged 20% and peaked in 1985 at 22%. These levels did not return to pre-
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bust levels of 15% until 1990.  Lower net farm income coupled with higher interest rates 
increasing debt obligations caused massive stress on borrowers to cover their debt 
positions.  By the mid-1980s, the farm business sector witnessed 2.3 bankruptcies per 
1000 farms, the highest number of bankruptcies since 1933. From 1985-1987, close to 
70 agricultural commercial banks failed per year (FDIC).  Between 1985 and 1988, debt 
per farm decreased 10% annually as lenders wrote off existing debt (Henderson and 
Kaufman 2013).  Farm foreclosures peaked in 1987.  
The crashing of the sector reverberated throughout the farm business sector 
causing massive declines for many such as John Deere, Minneapolis Moline, Oliver 
Farm Equipment Company and other farm machinery manufacturers.  Minneapolis 
Moline and Oliver Farm Equipment Company closed their doors in 1985.  The 
government intervened with substantial supplemental appropriations and assistance 
programs to restrict agriculture production to increase prices and net farm income. 
1990 - PRESENT 
Exports and prices rebounded in the 1990s and early 2000s from the bust of the 1970s 
and 1980s bubble.  Several major drivers caused the increases in demand and 
commodity prices largely caused by growth in exports and biofuel production.  
Population growth and rising incomes in developing countries have bolstered 
international demand.  For example, in 2011, China was 20% of U.S. exports 
(Henderson and Kaufman 2013).  Second, the demand garnered from The Renewable 
Fuel Standard established in 2005 and the amendment in 2007, The Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007, have created an alternative demand for corn and 
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oilseed domestically.  Droughts in 2012 throughout the Midwest caused supply issues 
for major corn and soybean states ultimately affecting the price of grains.  Corn reached 
its highest price in 2012 at $6.92.  In 1999, the price of corn was $1.72. Soybeans 
increased from $4.35 to $14.40 from 2001 to 2012. Wheat was $2.15 in 2000 and 
increased to $7 in 2012.  Net farm income reached a peak of $116 billion in 2013, an 
increase of 60% from 2002 levels.  By 2014, the market was saturated with product and 
as a result prices started their decline.  Corn, soybean and wheat prices in 2016 were 
$3.50, $8.65 and $3.70, respectively. Input costs for crop producers remained relatively 
constant over the period.  As a consequence, net farm income has declined for the third 
year in a row.   
 The question is now as the market begins to contract, will we see a bust similar to 
previous cycles.  One of the continually noted differences between today and the 1980s, 
is the lack of substantial debt accumulation and the reasonably leveraged positions of the 
entire farm business sector.  In the early part of the decade, 2000-2005, debt levels 
remained stable and accumulation was minimal.  During that time, the average debt 
accumulation year over year was about 1.5%.  In 2007 and 2008, debt levels increased 
9% and 6%, respectively.  The rise in debt accumulation was during the boom in ethanol 
production.  Recently, debt levels have seen larger percentage increases.  In 2013 and 
2014, debt increased 4.5% and 8%, respectively.  The average debt-to-asset ratio has 
remained around 12% with a maximum for the decade of 15% occurring in 2002.  By 
comparison, the debt-to-asset ratio peaked at 22% in the mid-1980s.  
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While these lower levels of the debt-to-asset ratio prove promising, previous 
cycles have shown that capital expenditures increase well past decreases in net farm 
income which have just begun. The consistency of today’s cycle and those of the past 
give evidence that the debt accumulation stage may just be beginning.  As previously 
noted, the debt-to-asset ratio does not provide a well-rounded view of the health of the 
farm business sector as it does not account for important structural changes that have 
occurred in the sector.  The more intuitive measures, the times interest earned and debt 
burden ratio, both in their relative relationships and magnitude show signs of stress and 
similarities to the 1980s. 
Literature Review 
Credit markets, in general, have inherent and important ties to the growth and wealth of 
an economy.  Barry and Robison (2001) reiterate the repeated, proven connection 
between the two, “Theory and empirical evidence indicate that the sophistication of 
financial systems and an economy’s growth and development are strongly related to one 
another [Levine (1997) and Gertler and Rose (1996)].”  Given the inherent relationship 
between the credit markets and an economy, overall, the actions of producers and 
lenders intuitively, influence one another’s decision-making.  The lending patterns that 
have developed overtime—the distribution of credit—affect not only local economies 
but overall market structures.  Kaufman (1986) states that while the relationship between 
access to credit and economic growth has been important to the development of the 
relationship between the lenders and the markets they serve, they may not be as efficient 
as they once were.  “Historically, the act of creating debt contributed to economic and 
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financial exhilaration.  But in the past several years, we have realized that the obligations 
inherent in debt may impose hardships on lenders and borrowers and indeed, on the 
economy and the financial markets as a whole.”   
In the case of agriculture, financial risk expands further than just the farm 
business sector.  Barry and Robison (2001) point out that losses were disseminated to the 
government and American taxpayer in the previous farm business sector bust.  “Between 
1980 and 1997, the farm loan losses of commercial banks and the Farm Credit System 
totaled $4.57 billion and $3.82 billion, respectively, with most of these losses occurring 
from 1984 to 1988 [ERS (1998)].  In contrast, the last-resort lending program of the U.S. 
government, [the Farm Service Agency], experienced loan losses of $20.18 billion” 
(Barry and Robison 2001). 
Previous literature has concluded that producers respond to the signals from 
lenders about the availability of loans.  Barry and Robison show that “…preferences of 
the lender, as expressed the interest rate and non-interest rate terms of the loan contract, 
may influence the rate of firm growth, risk management practices, resource allocations, 
and enterprise choices of the borrower.” (Barry and Robison 2001).  Barry and Robison 
(2001) asset that the information lenders communicate to borrowers through price and 
non-price signals influence the production management of firms.  Barry and Robison 
(2001) continue, “The financial intermediary, thus, provides the service of identifying 
and monitoring the most promising firms, managers and perspective investments.”  The 
conclusion from Barry and Robison (2001) asserts that the financial intermediaries are 
tasked with understanding the risk levels of both the market and individual borrowers.  
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Therefore, poor lending practices by creditors may result in riskier behavior by 
borrowers that will affect not only the firm but have potential to reverberate through the 
entire farm business sector.  
Barry and Robison 2001 discuss historical lending patterns in detail.  “Past 
practices in farm lending, which have included more liberal lending in favorable times 
and more conservative lending in less favorable times, have strongly influenced the size, 
profitability, and well-being of family farms” (Barry and Robison 2001).  These lending 
patterns may be inefficient and act counter-productively to the stability and growth of 
the farm business sector.  “During the stress times of the 1980s in the U.S., some 
institutional responses to risk (e.g., floating interest rates, larger risk premiums in loan 
rates) had the unintended effects of transmitting credit risk and interest rate risk to 
healthy agricultural borrowers, thus widening and deepening the adversities” (Barry and 
Robison 2001). 
Barry and Lee (1983) delineate loan portfolio risk into six categories—credit risk 
from potential default, investment risk from capital losses on assets pledged as collateral, 
liquidity risk from loss of funding sources, cost of funds risk from unanticipated changes 
in the cost of funds, financial risk from high financial leverage and regulatory risk from 
unanticipated changes in the regulatory environment (Barry and Lee 1983).  These 
individual risks are not independent.  Barry, Baker and Sanint (1981) expand the 
definition of the first risk, credit risk, to not only include the borrowers risk of 
delinquency but add the lenders’ ability to cause credit risk to increase by restricting 
access to additional credit.  Increases in the volatility of credit availability diminishes the 
  
 
94 
value of credit as a source of liquidity.  Producers must find other, possibly costlier, 
sources diminishing the producer’s efficiency in managing liquidity.  Barry, Baker and 
Sanint’s (1981) work shows that the new definition of risk increases the liquidity and 
financial risk for the producer and decreases their overall use of leverage.  Barry and 
Robison (2001) use the most recent boom-and-bust cycle of the 1970s and 1980s as an 
example of the risks associated with the additional volatility credit risk.  “Swings in 
credit conditions can magnify changes in the financial well-being of agricultural 
producers.  In the U.S., for example, the boom times of the late 1970s were fueled by 
readily available, low-cost credit, only to be met by the credit management and loan 
repayment problems of the early 1980s, and the significant stresses faced by many 
financial institutions” (Barry and Robison 2001). 
 The creation of debt positions by borrowers can be described as two types of 
investment—replacement and expansion (Penson, Jr., Romain and Hughes 1981).  
Replacement investments refer to expenditures needed to replace existing capital stock 
that has lost productivity.  Expansion investments on the other hand, expand the 
producer’s current capital stock levels.  The estimation of expected farm business 
investment depends upon understanding the various types of expenditures as well as the 
annual depreciation associated with the resulting capital stock.  Penson, Jr., Hughes and 
Nelson (1977) state, “If firms behave as neo-classical investment theory suggests, their 
annual capital expenditures are influenced by the current productive capacity of their 
exitisting captial stock, while the level of firm output depends on flow of productive 
services provided by capital, other things being constant.”  The authors suggest that 
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future expansion decisions depend largely on the return to the investment, or in other 
words, the productive capacity of the capital stock.  The consideration of “real 
productive value of capital” relates to the basic theory that in equilibrium.  Capital 
expansion decisions will be made such that marginal value product will equal marginal 
investment cost. 
 In an article by Penson, Jr., Romain and Hughes (1981), the authors discuss the 
relationship between current capital stock and desired capital stock.  The paper is a 
development of Penson, Jr., Hughes and Nelson (1977) work which determines the most 
appropriate depreciation pattern of farm tractors based on engineering data.  The authors 
develop an aggregate investment behavior model assuming the theory of the firm in 
continuous equilibrium.  In their work, the partial adjustment theory applies to the 
adjustment to desired capital stock.  Concluding, it may take more than a single period 
for the producer to adjust from current capital stock to desired capital stock.  The partial 
adjustment factor, likely in the form of a lagged dependent variable, describes the speed 
of adjustment (Penson, Jr., Romain and Hughes 1981). 
The previously cited authors have looked specifically at capital expenditures as a 
proxy for the accumulation of debt.  Henderson and Kaufman (2013) find that the five-
year average of net returns and the level of farm equity primarily cause changes in the 
magnitude of the dependent variables.  Previous to Henderson and Kaufman’s (2013) 
paper much exploration into the development of investment behavior and capital 
expenditures had not been performed since Penson, Jr., Hughes and Nelson (1977) and 
Penson, Jr., Romain and Hughes (1981) work.  Updating these studies with current data 
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provides the opportunity to assess how these relationships have evolved over time and 
see how the relationships have changed as the farm business sector has moved into a 
contraction period.   
Several authors have developed work focused on identifying variables that 
capture the sentiment and actions of lenders and borrowers and those that lead to the 
ultimate creation of credit standards and lending patterns.  Barry, Baker and Sanint 
(1981) show changes in the interest rates are not exhaustive descriptors.  Their article 
states, “Even when rates do vary, the response may be more to differences in loan sizes 
and costs of lending than to differences in risk.  Instead, lenders’ risk responses to 
differences in a producer’s creditworthiness primarily occur in non-price ways that 
include differing loan limits among borrowers and differences in security and 
documentation and other means of credit administration.”  The article notes that signals 
from lenders may be in the form of loan fund availability.  Similarly, considering 
borrowers, an increase in demand for loans may be a sign of expansionary time for 
production. 
Briggeman and Zakrzewicz (2009) article, “Can the Agriculture Credit Survey 
Predict National Credit Conditions,” highlights other variables of interest.  The authors 
use responses from the Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank’s quarterly survey of 
agricultural bankers in their respective districts to test their overall predictability for the 
nation.  The authors specifically look at loan repayment rates and collateral requirements 
with the goal of assessing the predictability of trends in loan delinquencies and credit 
standards on a national level.  The authors found that over a 28-quarter period, the 
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regional survey correctly predicts the directional movement of national delinquent farm 
loans 19 times, a 68% success rate.  Since the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second 
quarter of 2009, the forecast rate of loan repayments correctly predicted the path of 
delinquent farm loans four out of the total six quarters.  Overall, they conclude that the 
regional forecasts are reliable indicators for national activity.   
Many of the papers cited thus far and other industry professionals, consider the 
debt-to-asset ratio an important indicator of the financial health of the farm business 
sector.  The debt-to-asset ratio uses balance sheet statistics to get an overall measure of 
leverage.  As seen in the 1970 and 1980s, the price of farmland became over-inflated in 
response to market conditions.  As a result, the debt-to-asset ratio did not indicate stress 
until 1982 which likely caused farm lending to continue despite signals of stress in 
repayment capacity (J. B. Penson, Jr. 1987).  Penson’s (1987) article, “Evaluating 
Financial Trends in Agriculture,” illustrates the balance sheet indicators provide 
insufficient assessments of a market as they focus on unrealized capital gains and losses.  
The debt-to-asset ratio efficiently evaluates current insolvency but does not work as a 
preliminary indicator of stress.  “These statistics highlight the magnitude of current 
insolvency problems and do not indicate trends that might ultimately lead to insolvency” 
(J. B. Penson, Jr. 1987).  In addition, Penson’s paper emphasizes the need to focus on 
cash flow versus collateral interests, “The 1980s taught us the importance of lending 
money to farmers based upon their ability to repay from income rather than principally 
upon collateral considerations—evaluations of financial health of the farm business 
sector should consider flow-of-funds as well as the balance sheet.”  In his paper, he 
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shows that three other ratios or indexes gauge financial stress more efficiently by 
comparing current income to debt and interest obligations. 
Penson considers three measures—the times interest earned, the financial 
leverage index and the debt burden ratio.  Comparing the historical changes for each of 
these ratios with the changes in the debt-to-asset ratio shows that the debt-to-asset ratio 
did not vary much from its mean.  The increase in the debt-to-asset ratio, when it did 
change, was due not to changes in debt but to decreases in the value of assets from the 
large decline in farmland prices. The times interest earned and debt burden ratio, on the 
other hand, both changed significantly throughout the 1970s signaling changes in the 
farm business sector’s stability (J. B. Penson, Jr. 1987).   
The authors presented in the literature review thus far have primarily focused 
their analysis on either one side of the credit transaction assigning risk responsibility to 
only the market participant considered.  In reality, both sides of the transaction 
determine and are responsible for the risk created in the market.  Assigning 
responsibility to one merely creates a scapegoat for the actions of the other.   The 
following analysis seeks to address the lack of discussion of the interaction of the 
providers of credit with those who demand it and how both party’s signals affects their 
individual debt management and the actions of the other party.   
Capital Expenditure Methodology  
Capital expenditures (CE) measure the expansion of operations or modernization of 
production.  Capital expenditures often times use debt to finance the expansions or 
modernizations.  Therefore, capital expenditures will be used as a measure of risk 
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accumulation for producers.  Five models are developed to explain changes in capital 
expenditures and are broken down into real estate and non-real estate transactions.  Real 
estate capital expenditures considers capital expenditures on buildings and 
improvements but does not include capital expenditures on land due to the unavailability 
of data.  Non-real estate transactions are separated into expenditures on tractors and 
expenditures on machinery and equipment.  Two explanatory variables are used in each 
equation.  Total return on investment (ROI), calculated as revenue divided by operating 
costs2, is included in every equation as an indicator of expected return of the investment 
in the varying capital expansions.  The denominator of the ROI measure captures any 
impact from interest rates.   
A lagged value of capital expenditures associated with each dependent variable is 
also included as an explanatory variable.  The lag of the dependent variable for each 
model accomplishes two goals. First, it captures the dynamic effects present in capital 
expenditure outlays—current capital expenditures depend on previous capital 
expenditure levels.  The independent variable can be intuitively explained as a speed of 
adjustment factor.  The desired capital stock of a company equals the sum of current 
capital stock and net investment, capital expenditures, minus depreciation.  The 
company will make capital expenditure decisions to satisfy their desired capital stock 
level.  Second, the relationship between current and previous capital expenditures creates 
the structural issue of auto correlation in the model.  The inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable accomplishes the task of removing the autocorrelation present in the 
                                                
2The operating cost value includes capital consumption. 
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model.  Intuitively, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable should be less than 
one.  The coefficient represents the proportion of the capital expenditures explained by 
its lagged term. 
Initially, an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is used to estimate the 
relationship between the total real estate, total non-real estate, tractor, and machinery and 
equipment variables and the independent variables: 
 [5rú%§ß	®©§ß	™b%§%©,% = w(!äl%, [5rú%§ß	®™,%a+) (59) 
 [5rú%§ß	´úZa®©§ß	™b%§%©,% = w(!äl%, [5rú%§ß	´úZa®™,%a+) (60) 
 [5r¨§-%ú¨b,% = w(!äl%, [5r¨§-%ú¨b,%a+) (61) 
 [5ó§-≠MZ©¨Æ	&	™gkMô4©Z%,% = w(!äl%, [5ó§-≠MZ©¨Æ	&	™gkMô4©Z%,%a+) (62) 
Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) equations are also estimated to determine 
if more information would be gained if it is assumed that the errors of the equations are 
contemporaneously correlated.  Intuitively, the equations’ errors are likely correlated. 
A series of robustness tests are executed for each regression.  The Breusch-
Godfrey test (BG) determines the existence of autocorrelation in a regression.  
Autocorrelation defines the correlation of the dependent variable with itself overtime.  
Essentially, there exists a systematic relationship between the residuals of a regression or 
the magnitude or sign of an error in one period has an effect on the magnitude or sign of 
an error occurring in a future time period.  In time-series analysis, OLS requires 
disturbances from the typical path of a variable occur independently across periods.  The 
OLS estimation results in the presence of autocorrelation are unbiased (as long as the 
explanatory variables are strictly exogenous) or consistent but are not efficient.  The 
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OLS standard errors and test statistics are also no longer valid, even asymptotically 
(Wooldridge 2015).  The OLS statistics are invalid and cannot be used for testing 
proposed hypothesis. 
The BG test for autocorrelation generalizes to any order of autocorrelation.  The 
more commonly used test, the Durbin-Watson, restricts testing for AR (1) processes 
only, where 1 represent the order of autocorrelation.  The BG test is a Lagrange 
multiplier test.  Using the residuals from the OLS estimation of the original equation, the 
BG test regresses lagged residuals up to lag q and the original independent variables.  
The joint test is of the first q autocorrelations of the residual.   
 /% = 	e+/%a+ + ⋯+	eg/%ag + '+7% + h%	 (63) 
The null hypothesis states no autocorrelated relationship exists and the rho 
coefficients equal zero.  The alternative hypothesis states the presence of an AR(q) 
process.   Drawbacks of BG test lie in the testing for joint significance and the choice of 
the appropriate lag to test.  Distinguishing the important lagged residual may be difficult.  
The test is also only valid asymptotically.   
White’s General Test for Heteroscedasticity determines if the variance of the 
error terms depend on the regressors.  If the variance of the error terms depends on the 
regressors and is not constant, heteroscedasticity is present.  The OLS process assumes 
the variance of the error must have a consistent variance across any value of the 
regressors (Wooldridge 2015).  If a model fails the assumption and contain 
heteroskedastic errors, the estimators remain consistent but not efficient.  The 
interpretation of the coefficients is also not an issue in the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
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White’s General Test can be used for nonlinear forms of heteroscedasticity and 
when the error terms may not be normally distributed.  White’s test regresses the original 
independent variables, the square of the independent variables and their cross products 
on the squared residuals from the initial estimation.  As can be surmised from the list of 
regressors, when all of the regressors are used to test for the various types of 
heteroscedasticity, a large number of degrees of freedom are used.  Due to the small 
number of explanatory variables used in the OLS and SUR models it is assumed that the 
number of degrees of freedom would be sufficient to avoid the loss of power of the test.  
Multiplying the r-squared from the regression by the number of observations determines 
the Lagrange Multiplier test statistic.  The test statistics follows a chi-squared 
distribution with the degrees of freedom equaling the number of regressors in the test 
equation.  A test statistic greater than the chi-squared critical value at the indicated level 
of significance, usually 5%, rejects the null hypothesis that the error terms are 
homoscedastic (Wooldridge 2015).   
Finally, the variance inflation factor (VIF) determines the existence of 
multicollinearity between exogenous variables. OLS assumptions require uncorrelated 
explanatory variables.  The VIF provides a statistical measure for each coefficient and 
can be calculated for coefficient j as follows: 
 0l,û = 11 − !û; (64) 
where Rj2 represents the r-squared from regressing variable j on all the other independent 
variables and the intercept.  The VIF can be explained as the increase in the variance of 
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the coefficient due to the correlated nature of the variable with any of the other 
explanatory variables.  No range of acceptable VIF measures exists to decisively indicate 
too much or an appropriate amount of multicollinearity existing in the model.  
Ultimately, the objective is to minimize the VIF measure.  A VIF of 10 is used to 
indicate a general threshold of concern for modeling purposes.   
Two years of ex-post forecasts are estimated for each dependent variable for the 
years of 2014 and 2015.  1975 to 2013 data is used as the in-sample forecast period and 
is used to calibrate the model.   Two forecast evaluation measures evaluated the strength 
of the model and its ability to forecast the out-of-sample observations of the forecast 
objects.  These evaluations primarily measure the ability to capture magnitude changes.  
The forecast evaluations weight each forecast observation equally with the objective to 
minimize the measures. 
The root mean squared error (RMSE) is the average unit amount the forecast is 
incorrect over the entire forecast period.  The equation for calculating the RMSE is as 
follows: 
 !ïñ5 = 1ï (,% − =%);ó%N+
+;
 (65) 
where M measures the number of periods included in the forecast; Ft represents the 
forecasted value and At represents the actual value.  
 The second forecast evaluation used is the mean absolute percent error (MAPE). 
The MAPE considers the average percentage difference of the out-of-sample forecast 
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and the actual observed values or the average percent forecast error.  The following 
equation calculates the MAPE of a forecasted series: 
 ï=å5 = 1ï	 ,% − =%=%ó%N+ ∗ 100 (66) 
Capital Expenditure Data 
The data used is sourced from the USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), Farm 
Income and Wealth Statistics (FIWS) and the USDA National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS).  The FIWS data source accumulates data observations on income and 
balance sheet measure for individual states and the United States as a whole.  Data 
collection and publication takes place in February, August and November.  Historical 
data included are national, annual averages spanning from 1974 to 2015 giving the 
model a total of 41 observations.  The deflator used mimics the method implemented by 
USDA NASS, which uses the GDP chain-type price index published by FRED with 
2009 as the base year.  
Capital expenditures and ROI data are obtained from the USDA FIWS.  The 
estimated equations are divided into four measures of capital expenditures— real estate 
capital expenditures, non-real estate capital expenditures, capital expenditures on tractors 
and capital expenditures on machinery and equipment.  The various capital expenditure 
measures are from the “Gross Capital Expenditure” data release.  The FIWS data series 
provides a breakdown of each of these expenditure measures.  Real estate capital 
expenditures include expenditures on buildings, land improvements and include operator 
dwellings.  Capital expenditures for the purchase of land, while desirable for the 
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analysis, are excluded in the data provided by the USDA.  Non-real estate capital 
expenditures include those on motor vehicles, tractors, machinery and equipment.  
Figure 4.27 presents the historical total capital expenditures from 1967 to 2016. 
 The return on investment explanatory variable is calculated as revenue divided 
by total operating cost plus capital consumption. The “Return to Operator” data from the 
USDA FIWS data file, “Gross Receipts of Farms” provides the data for the revenue 
measures.  The total operating costs data comes from the “Farm Production Expenses” 
from the same source and includes capital consumption. Table 4.27 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the data used in the capital expenditure regressions. 
Capital Expenditure Empirical Results 
The regression results proved promising in terms of statistical significance as well as 
each model’s ability to capture the dependent variables’ variation.  Table 4.29 shows the 
results for the in-sample OLS and SUR models. 
In all models, the adjusted R2 values are greater than 0.80 meaning the models 
explain at least 80% of the variation in the dependent variables.  Additionally, all 
variables are statistically significant at least at the 10% level and most are significant at 
the 1% level.  The SUR model, overall, performed better in terms of the adjusted R2.  
The signs of the coefficients are also as expected for both the OLS and SUR output.  As 
an investment becomes more profitable, or as the ROI increases, the amount of 
investment will increase, as expected.  Therefore, the positive coefficients associated 
with ROI are as consistent with expectations.   
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Capital expenditures in the previous time period are expected to have some effect 
on the capital expenditure in the following period.  As seen from the results, the positive 
and near one coefficient associated with the lagged dependent variables shows the 
expected relationship.  A coefficient of a lagged dependent variable can be interpreted as 
the partial adjustment associated with that variable.  The coefficient represents the 
portion of the dependent variable determined by its lag.  Generally, a lagged variable 
greater than one indicates an issue and may imply over-adjustment.   
 Following the estimation of the models, robustness tests for multicollinearity, 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity are performed.  Each test shows no signs of any 
time-series related issues.  The outcomes of the robustness tests can be seen in Table 
4.30.  The minimum threshold of issues with multicollinearity used is 10.  All models 
have VIFs less than 2.  The null hypothesis for the BG test is that there does not exist 
evidence of serial correlation.  As the p-values in Table 4.30 show, all tests fail to reject 
the null hypothesis.  Finally, White’s General Test for Heteroscedasticity testing the null 
hypothesis of no evidence of heteroscedasticity fails to be rejected in all regressions. 
A double log transformation of the dependent and independent variables yields 
elasticity measures for each of the calculated coefficients.  The coefficients can be 
interpreted as the elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to the independent 
variable.  The coefficients then infer the percent change in the dependent variable given 
a 1% change in the independent variable holding all other variables constant.  These 
results can be seen in Table 4.31. 
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The total ROI measures in the OLS estimations, on average, have an effect on the 
independent variables by about 1.2%.  The ROI has the largest effect on capital 
expenditures on machinery and equipment.  When ROI increases by about 1%, capital 
expenditures on machinery and equipment increases by about 1.4%.   
The lagged dependent variable has an average effect on the dependent variable of 
about 0.97% across OLS regressions.  Again, the maximum percentage change occurs in 
the case of the lagged dependent variable for the capital expenditures on machinery and 
equipment at about 0.99%.   
 The elasticities for the SUR models are slightly lower.  In the case of the total 
ROI measure, a 1% increase in total ROI increases the dependent variables between 
0.83% and 1.1% across the SUR regressions.  Real estate capital expenditures on 
buildings and improvements yields the minimum ROI elasticity whereas capital 
expenditures on machinery and equipment yields the largest.   The elasticities for the 
lagged dependent variable for the SUR models range from 0.88% for non-real estate 
capital expenditures and 0.90% for real estate capital expenditures on buildings and 
improvements.   
The forecast output from each model yield promising results based on the 
forecast evaluations measures. Table 4.32 shows the RMSE and MAPE of each forecast.  
In all cases except forecasting capital expenditures for tractors, the SUR model 
outperformed the individual OLS estimations.  All MAPEs are less than 24% meaning 
that the models, on average, are incorrect by less than 24% on each forecast.  The 
MAPEs associated with the total real estate capital expenditures on buildings and 
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improvements are the lowest at 11.51% and 11.31% for the OLS and SUR models, 
respectively.  The recent observations for the variable have far less variation compared 
to capital expenditures on non-real estate assets.  Therefore, it is intuitive that the MAPE 
would be lower.  See Figure 4.34 through Figure 4.37 for model outputs for the OLS 
forecasts.  All SUR model output yield slightly smaller magnitudes than the OLS 
forecasts.  Table 4.33 provides the margin of error for each of the forecasts.  The margin 
of error indicates over or under estimation of the values estimated by the models.  The 
calculation measures the margin of error as the forecast value divided by the actual 
observation.  Therefore, the closer the value is to 100 the closer the forecast is to the 
actual observation.  In both the OLS and SUR models, the forecasts underestimate the 
amount of capital expenditures in 2014 by about 93% and 92%, respectively.  In 2015, 
both sets of models over estimate the amount of capital expenditures by about 130% and 
128%, respectively.  In the 2014 estimate, the OLS model performs better than the SUR 
model and vice versa for the 2015 forecast in terms of absolute magnitude differences.  
The models provide estimated capital expenditures based on expected economic 
behavior.  From the lender’s standpoint, the model provides a more conservative 
perspective than the actions observed in the market.  The past has shown serious 
overshooting in capital expenditures following negative signals from the market.  The 
model shows an expected decrease in capital expenditures following a decrease in ROI.  
Intuitively, lenders should limit lending and producers should minimize expansions or 
modernizations of their operations when ROI falls. 
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Federal Reserve Survey Analysis 
To gain a better understanding of the farm business sector business environment, we 
considered data available from the Chicago and Kansas City District Federal Reserve 
Banks.  These data sets provide insight into the current market’s strength and the 
borrowers and lenders sentiment about the market and their expectations for the future.  
Table 4.28 outlines several of the questions and possible responses asked by the Federal 
Reserve banks.  Specifically, six questions outlining lenders’ sentiment and current 
lending practices are used.  Questions used to gauge the current status of the market are 
changes in the rate of loan repayment; renewals and extension of loans; and the percent 
of lenders’ portfolios falling into repayment problems ranging from no significant 
repayment problems to severe repayment problems.  Questions about the changes in the 
availability of funds, lender’s collateral requirements, changes in overall credit 
standards, the expected repayment rates and percent of loan portfolio in severe stress 
determine lender sentiment.  Analyzing these data series over time show how sentiment 
and actions either coincide or lead one another.  The analysis of the series together 
provides intuition for understanding the supply of credit to the farm business sector. 
Federal Reserve Survey Data 
Data on the sentiment and actions of agricultural lenders comes from surveys given to 
regional bankers whose loan portfolios are predominately agricultural loans.  The survey 
is sent out quarterly on the first of April, July, October and January.  The Chicago 
Federal Reserve, 7th district, and the Kansas City Federal Reserve, 10th district, both have 
reasonably long historical data series and provide a significant amount of data on the 
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questions asked to participants.  The Chicago Federal Reserve covers banks in Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin.  The Kansas City Federal Reserve sends 
surveys to banks in Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Wyoming, Northern New 
Mexico and Western Missouri.  Both banks receive around 200 responses from bankers 
per quarter.  The Chicago Federal Reserve’s historical series span from 1992 to the first 
quarter of 2016.  The Kansas City Federal Reserve spans from 1980 to the first quarter 
of 2016.   
All 10th district data is on an indexed scale where 100 indicates no change.  If the 
value of the index is greater than 100, than the question at hand has seen an increase 
compared to a quarter or year prior.  For the 7th district, a couple of scales are used.  In 
the case of the question concerning the percent of the bank’s loan portfolio containing 
major or severe stress, answers are a percentage.  The measure of change in credit 
standards of the bank ranges from 1 to 5.  1 indicates credit standards have eased 
considerably; 2, eased somewhat; 3, there is no change; 4, credit standards have 
tightened somewhat and 5, tightened considerably.  Therefore, 3 represents the base-line 
of the index indicating no change.  Any value above 3 implies credit standards overall 
have increased, and below 3, credit standards have eased.  Once again, the question 
considers the change in the variable over the last three months when previously 
surveyed.  Four questions ask about changes in loan variables and the comparison of 
those variables to their magnitude three months prior.  The answers range from 1 to 3 
with 1 indicating the variable has increased; 2, it has decreased and 3, there has been no 
change.  For the sake of graphing and intuitively interpreting results, these values are 
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converted to the following range: 1 indicates a decrease; 2, no change and 3, an increase.  
Table 4.28 outlines the questions asked and possible answers in detail. 
Lender Analysis 
Figure 4.38 shows the historical data of changes in loan repayment rates and renewal and 
extensions of current loans.  Both series are indicative of the overall health of the 
borrower and therefore, agriculture credit market.  The measure of loan renewals and 
extension index has a similar implication of a borrowers’ ability to repay loans but also 
shows the current need to restructure debt due to cash flow inadequacies.  The two series 
have a strong negative correlation.  As loan repayment rates increase, or the bank’s loan 
portfolio risk decreases, the demand for renewing or extending loans decreases.  The 
data series shows a similar relationship in both direction and magnitude as was 
witnessed in the 1980s.  The similarity suggests a cause for concern in today’s market. 
Figure 4.39 overlays collateral requirements and loan repayment rates.  The 
collateral requirement graph shows the lender’s response to the change in credit risk.  
The relationship of these two series answers the question of, “as lenders notice changes 
in the repayment rates, what actions do they take to manage potential risk?”  The two 
series, in general, evolve as one would expect.  As the market becomes riskier and 
repayment rates decrease, collateral requirements are likely to increase to hedge against 
that risk.  Interestingly, the constant above 100 outcome for the change in collateral 
requirements indicate banker’s requirements are always increasing.  These series also 
fluctuations minimally overtime.  
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Today, Figure 4.39 shows the repayment rate has dropped to about 52% yet the 
collateral requirements have increased only slightly. A similar scenario was present in 
the 1990’s.  Repayment rates dropped to about 54% with little change in the collateral 
requirements.  The level of collateral requirements is similar to that of 2009 when 
expected repayment rates were about 94%.  The minimal change in collateral 
requirements despite the decrease in borrowers’ ability to repay their loans shows a 
disconnect between the markets ability to pay and lenders’ actions.  Lenders do not seem 
to be tightening their lending standards.  The lack of response indicates they are 
continuing to expand their risk positions.  They are also not signaling to the farm 
business sector the change in risk they are witnessing in the decrease in repayment rates.  
 Figure 4.40 shows the demand for renewals and extensions with the regional 
bank’s level of funds available for making loans.  The comparison of these series shows 
the relationship of need for liquidity in the farm business sector and the lender’s 
willingness to supply that liquidity.  The graph also shows the action banks take in 
response to their feelings about the overall farm business sector.  Largely, the two series 
move in opposite directions.  As the credit market becomes riskier, the banks tighten the 
funds they are willing to loan.  Barry and Robison (2001) show that the natural risk 
aversion response has negative repercussions that cause a market to become riskier.  The 
short-term cash flow problems lead to overall liquidity problems and the need to 
restructure debt or carryover loans to the next period.  As banks restrict access to funds, 
producers who may have positive long-term business prospects are put under stress and 
may not be able to sustain operations.  The stress of these businesses who fail increases 
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the overall risk in the market.  As was seen in the 1970s and 1980s, as more businesses 
failed, cropland prices plummeted as much of the debt was collateralized by the land.  
As a result, governmental assistance and borrowing from FSA occurred. 
 Today, the demand for renewals and extensions is the greatest it has been in the 
last 28 years yet loan fund availability is only slightly lower at about 95.  Lenders are not 
contracting loan creation very heavily.  The lack of contraction in the loan funds 
available is positive from the perspective of Barry and Robison (2001).  The availability 
of loan funds reduces the credit risk from not having access to loans.  On the other hand, 
the lack of reduction of funds is another indication that lenders are continuing to expand 
their risk positions despite signals of stress in the farm business sector.  They are also not 
signaling to the sector the increase in risk they are observing and possibly encouraging 
the farm business sector to take on more debt. 
 The data from the 7th district Federal Reserve Bank provides more intuition into 
stress in the portfolio of the banks and the collateral expenditures of the borrowers while 
also providing similar indicators as the 10th district in terms of overall market stress and 
lender’s actions in response to those risks.  In Figure 4.41, two series are considered—
the percentage of the bank’s portfolio with major or significant repayment problems and 
changes in bank credit standards.  There are there time periods where major credit 
standard tightening occurred—in the early 2000s, the late 2000s and today.  The 
recession in the greater macro economy and the issues of trade that resulted from it 
likely caused the contraction in the late 2000s.  Today, a similar uptick in the level of 
credit standard tightening has occurred.  Similar to the 10th district’s collateral 
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requirement levels, the change in credit standards above three at all times indicates credit 
standards are either tightening to some extent or not changing.3  Major stress in loan 
portfolios reached a maximum in the late 1990s.  Today, stress has increased but remains 
44% below the maximum reached in the late 1990s.  Today differs from the late 1990s in 
terms of the systematic issues present in the farm business sector today. 
 The two series show that the tightening of credit standards coincide with 
increases in the percentage of stress in the loan portfolio (2006-2008 and 2012-2013).  
Considering Figure 4.42, the tightening of credit standards starting in 2012 preceded the 
downturn in net farm income that began in 2014. Since 2013, net farm income has 
decreased, credit standards have increased and the amount of stress in the loan portfolios 
has increased.  Figure 4.43 measures banker’s expectations of the changes in various 
capital expenditures over the next year.   The graph shows that indicators of stress tend 
to occur several years prior to changes in capital expenditures.  Two time periods show 
bankers indicating increases in stress— either through increases in repayment problems 
or through tightening of credit standards.  From 1998 to 2001, credit standards tightened 
but capital expenditures were expected to continue to increase until 2004.  In 2008 and 
2009, repayment issues increased yet, bankers indicated that they believed capital 
expenditures would continue to increase through 2011.  These final graphs depict 
lender’s sentiment about the market not aligning with their actions creating a riskier loan 
portfolio for themselves, and the market overall.    
                                                
3 A response of 3 means no change and a response of 4 or 5 indicates some level of 
tightening of credit standards.  
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 The most recent data shows the percent of “major” and “significant” stress in the 
loan portfolio has increased since 2012.  The percent of the portfolio falling into these 
two categories doubled from 2.2% to 4.4% from 2014 to 2015.  The increase in loan 
portfolio stress indicates the farm business sector is in stress.  Lenders are expected 
capital expenditures in all categories to contract and have expected them to do so since 
2013.  These indexes are currently at their lowest value in the history of the data.  The 
contraction in the capital expenditures is a signal of a contraction in the farm business 
sector.  The two signals the graph is portraying—stress and sector contraction— 
compared to the change in credit standards show different conclusions.  The index shows 
credit standards have increased only slightly with a value of 3.5.  In comparison, 2008 
saw a similar index value for change in credit standards yet repayment problems were at 
about 2.1% and lenders were expecting no changes to capital expenditures.  Once again, 
lenders are not showing they are contracting loan origination despite signals of stress and 
sector contraction. 
Conclusions 
The timeline of events for the previous boom and bust cycles in agriculture are more 
alike than different.  A predominant pattern is the failure to contract capital expenditures 
when the market signals the farm business sector may no longer be in a period of 
growth.  The lack of risk aversion from the market creates several risks with the 
continued growth in capital expenditures.  Continual use of debt to finance these capital 
expenditures adds risk to both market participants. The additional expansion into certain 
specialty equipment, i.e. cotton-picking machinery, hampers producers’ ability to adjust 
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to more lucrative enterprises due to the asset fixity they have created.  As the markets 
become tighter and cash flows diminish, producers are less able to service their 
increased debt positions and are less able to transition to alternative enterprises and 
manage cash flow.  Through the development and forecasting of capital expenditures, 
the models for each type of capital expenditure show tightening a year prior to when it 
actually occurred in the market. The following year, the model shows a moderate 
increase in capital expenditures whereas the market in all types of capital expenditures 
contract substantially.   
A deeper consideration into the debt positions of the aggregate market shows 
more similarities between the farm business sector’s ability to cash flow its debt and the 
1980s farm business sector than recently touted.  Since that time period, the market has 
not seen the debt burden ratio grow substantially larger than the times interest earned 
until today.  Data from the 7th and 10th District Federal Reserve Banks provides insight to 
better understand the changes in these debt positions.  The data sets provide micro-level 
sentiment and action data from regional agriculture bankers.   
The 10th district shows an overall negative correlation between the demand for 
liquidity through the measure of demand for renewals and extensions and the willingness 
to provide liquidity with the loan fund availability and collateral requirements measures.  
The negative correlation, although expected, poses additional risk to the market, if 
substantial.  Many of 7th and 10th district data show that throughout history, regional 
bankers’ negative outlook on the market, does not reduce their expectations of 
expansions in capital expenditures and therefore, expansion in debt and risk levels.  
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Looking solely at loan repayment rates and renewals and extensions, the graph shows a 
similar situation to that of the 1980s.  Loan repayment rates have declined past levels 
seen in the late 1980s and demand for renewals and extensions are much greater than 
late 1980s levels.   
Today, the lender surveys indicate the level of stress in their loan portfolios are 
increasing and they are expecting the farm business sector to contract.  Yet, the lenders 
are not responding by reducing the loans funded to the sector nor are they increasing 
their standards of lending to reduce the risk in the loans they are originating.  The 
lenders’ actions are not matching their sentiment towards the strength of the farm 
business sector and therefore are also not signaling to the market an increase in stressful 
times. 
The past and present farm business sector are showing similarities across debt 
ratios and actions between borrowers and lenders, similarities that have been noted 
through multiple boom-and-bust cycles.  Understanding the pattern and how it has been 
repeated, lenders and borrowers have an ability to better manage their risk at both an 
earlier time and when in the midst of a contraction period.   
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Cropland markets, in general, prove difficult to empirically model.  The nuances 
associated with the markets are numerous.  The qualitative factors adding to the value 
placed on the land make quantifying the market price difficult.  Two models have been 
proposed to value and better understand the pricing mechanisms associated with 
cropland.  The results show the complexity of successfully doing so.  The final chapter 
addresses the relationship between debt and cropland prices that has proven important in 
the overall stability of cropland markets as well as the farm business sector.   
 Two models have been applied to cropland models that have not been done in the 
past.  The methodologies address varying intricacies of cropland that have previously 
been discussed in literature but not explicitly modeled.  This paper served to address 
those holes in the research of cropland valuation.  Additionally, the relationship between 
debt and cropland price stability is studied in more detail.  The study overall shows a 
repeated pattern of behavior in the farm business sectors that creates a riskier 
environment that may be present in the rapid increases in cropland prices seen in the 
market today. 
Addressing the Shortcomings of Previous Cropland Valuation Techniques 
The model addresses two significant shortcomings in previous cropland valuation 
literature.  Cropland is in an incomplete market structure carrying both hedgeable and 
unhedgeable risk.  Previous models also required strict assumptions to state variables 
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used in the estimation of cropland price.  The use of the good-deal bound approach in a 
dynamic optimization framework addressed both of these limitations. 
 Despite both of these issues being addressed, the model severely underperformed 
pricing the market price of cropland.  Several factors are likely the cause of the 
undervaluation.  As noted above, many of the factors that are valued for a given piece of 
land are not related to the income yielded from the land nor are they quantifiable.  These 
factors would also not be present in the capitalized valuation of land.  The model output 
is also substantially lower than the capitalized value of land therefore there remains a 
margin of error unexplained by this argument. 
 Other factors may be that the price responses of rent are not symmetric as income 
increases and decreases.  As shown in chapter III, asymmetric price transmissions are 
present in the relationship between rent and crop prices.  As a result, the model may not 
be addressing the positive and negative price movements appropriately. 
 Finally, the idea of real options is that in reality people will price a good with the 
understanding that a certain amount of risk is hedgeable and therefore the price will not 
price for that risk.  In many of the models, the hedgeable risk is assumed to be high with 
the magnitudes of the R2 associated with the model outputs.  Therefore, the substantial 
margin between the actual and modeled prices may have to do with the fact that in 
reality, people do not consider the hedgeability of an asset not directly traded on an 
exchange and therefore would not reduce the price of the asset accordingly.   
 While the model does not reflect the market price of cropland, it may provide 
insight on an inherent price of land and the possible overvaluation that is placed on the 
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asset.  The exercise, none-the-less reiterates the difficulty in empirically modeling 
cropland despite the number of nuances addressed by the approach in this paper. 
Re-Addressing Sticky Rental Rates 
As a direct extension of the previous chapter, the asymmetry of rent in response to 
changes in crop prices is empirically tested.  While the topic of asymmetry in rents has 
been discussed in literature it has not, in practice, been tested.  Using an error correction 
model, the results show the presence of asymmetry in both the short-run and long-run.  
The results show a consistent, positive asymmetry across crop estimations and in both 
the short and long-run.   
 The positive asymmetry present in the short-run dynamics indicate landowners 
likely have more power in the determination of rental rates.  The positive asymmetry 
suggests that rent in the short-run will react more fully to increases in crop prices or that 
prices are also less likely to decrease as rapidly as crop prices decease and production 
becomes less profitable.    
The positive asymmetry is present in the long-run effects of the models as well.  
The coefficients of the co-integrating variables also have the expected negative signs.  
The residuals represent an over or undervaluation of the rent term in the long-run and 
therefore act as corrective portions of the model.  In both cases, the coefficients are 
expected to be negative to achieve the corrective mechanism.   
Asymmetry was found in every model estimated and the type of asymmetry was 
consistent across all three models.  The results are economically interesting and provide 
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a basis for shaping future research on the relationship between income, rental rates and 
cropland values.  
The Re-Emergence of Previous Boom and Bust Patterns in Today’s Cropland 
Markets 
Previous patterns of the boom and bust cycles in the farm business sector suggest a 
relationship between the use of debt for capital expansion and the busts of the cycles in 
the sector.  Specifically, the farm business sector has repeatedly witnessed significant 
capital expansion occurring despite signals of a contraction in the market.  Since debt is 
used to finance these expansions, the market participants become overleveraged and 
unable to service their debt once markets contract.  The additional risk from the debt 
position further stresses the markets and causes instability overall.   
 From the analysis of the Federal Reserve Bank Surveys, agriculture markets may 
be in more similar of a situation to that of the 1970s and 1980s then recently believed.  
Stress is seen in the form of increased demand for renewals and extensions of loans and 
a decrease in the loan repayment rate.  These surveys are showing levels similar to those 
witnessed in the 1980s.  Additionally, while the overall debt-to-asset ratio is lower for 
the farm business sector overall, statistics used to measure the ability of an entity to 
service debt are not as robust.  The times interest earned and the debt burden ratio, both 
measures of the ability to service debt, are similar to the relationship and magnitude that 
was seen in the 1980s.  
 The debt positions and actions of the borrowers and lenders are more similar to 
the previous boom and bust cycles than they are different.  While the lower debt to asset 
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ratio is continually touted in recent literature on the subject, one must consider the 
measures that tell about the farm business sector’s ability to service debt.   
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
As noted previously, the research in this paper does come with data and methodological 
limitations.  The model could be improved with a more granular data set.  As is, states 
are represented by a single crop price which in many cases only represents ten or less 
percent of the cash receipts from the state’s agriculture.  If county-level data was 
available, crop prices would better represent the income yielded from production.   
 Similarly, this study is looking only at crop production.  In some cases, the states 
are predominantly livestock or specialty crop producers.  Access to richer price data 
series would allow this study to be expanded to more than just crop production.  The 
results in chapter III may also be improved by creating a stronger criterion for the 
grouping of states into crop price delineation.  The criteria may be along the lines of a 
certain amount or percentage of the state’s cash receipts must be from the crop to include 
it in that model.   
 The results from the model in chapter III may benefit the model specification in 
chapter II.  A better understanding and modeling of the asymmetric price transmission 
relationship among the specific crop producing states may yield better results when 
applied in the model from chapter II. 
 The data from the Federal Reserve surveys have several limitations.  The results 
represent only a subset of the United States therefore may not be generalizable.  The 
questions asked in the surveys are also specific to the region the survey is distributed.  
  
 
123 
Therefore, some data may be available in one region of the United States but not 
another.  The dates for which data are available are also not consistent and not 
considerably long.  The historical observations are limited and unfortunately some data 
does not even go back to the 1970s.  Therefore, comparisons made between the market 
today and previous cycles may be extremely limited. 
  
 
124 
REFERENCES  
2003. "Direct and Counter-cyclical Payment Program." Fact Sheet, Farm Service 
Agency, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington D.C. 
2008. "Direct and Counter-Cyclical Payment (DCP) Program." Fact Sheet, Farm Service 
Agency, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington D.C. 
2014. "What's in the 2014 Farm Bill for Farm Service Agency Customers." 2014 Farm 
Bill Fact Sheet, Farm Service Agency, United States Department of Agriculture, 
Washington D.C. 
2015. "Assets, Debt, and Wealth." United States Department of Agriculture. Accessed 
January 5, 2016. www.ers.usda.gov. 
2016. USDA ERS. February. Accessed Febrauary 2016.  
https://www.ers.usda.gov/. 
2016. USDA NASS. February. Accessed February 2016.  
https://www.nass.usda.gov/. 
Adeyemi, Olutomi I., and Lester C. Hunt. 2007. "Modelling OECD industrial energy 
demand: Asymmetric price responses and energy-saving technical change." 
Energy Economics 29: 693-709. 
Alston, Julian M. 1986. "An Analysis of Growth of US Farmland Prices 1963-82." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68 (1): 1-9. 
Archer, Wayne R., and David C. Ling. 1993. "Pricing Mortgage-Backed Securities: 
Integrating Optimal Call and Empirical Models of Prepayment." Real Estate 
Economics 21 (4): 373-404. 
Azzam, Azzeddine M. 1999. "Asymmetry and Rigidity in Farm-Retail Price 
Transmission." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 81 (3): 525-533. 
Bachmeier, Lance, and James M Griffin. 2003. "New Evidence on Asymmetric Gasoline 
Price Response." Review of Economics and Statistics . 
Bailey, DeeVon, and B. Wade Brorsen. 1989. "Price Asymmetry in Spatial Fed Cattle 
Markets." Western Journal of Agricultural Economics 14 (2): 246-252. 
  
 
125 
Balke, Nathan S., and Thomas B. Fomby. 1997. "Threshold Cointegration." 
International Economic Review 38 (3): 627-645. 
Balke, Nathan S., Stephen P. Brown, and Mine K Yucel. 1998. "Crude Oil and Gasoline 
Prices: An Asymmetric Relationship?" Economic Review- Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas, January 1: 2-11. 
Ball, Laurence, and N. Gregory Mankiw. 1994. "Asymmetric Price Adjustment and 
Economic Fluctuation." The Economic Journal 104: 247-261. 
Barnard, Charles H., Gerald Whittaker, David Westenbarger, and Mary Ahearn. 1997. 
"Evidence of Capitalization of Direct Government Payments into U.S. Cropland 
Values." American Journal of Agricultural Economics (Oxford University Press) 
79 (5): 1642-1650. 
Barry, Peter J. 1978. "Rural banks and farm loan participation." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 60 (2): 214-224. 
Barry, Peter J., and Lindon J. Robison. 2001. Agricultural finance: Credit, credit 
constraints, and consequences. Vol. 1. Handbook of Agricultural Economics. 
Barry, Peter J., and Warren F. Lee. 1983. "Financial Stress in Agriculture: Implications 
for Agricultural Lenders." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65 (5): 
945-952. 
Barry, Peter J., Charles B. Baker, and Luis R. Sanint. 1981. "Farmers' Credit Risk and 
Liquidity Management." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63 (2): 
216-227. 
Bartholomew, Lynn, Jonathan Berk, and Richard Roll. 1988. "Mortgage Securities 
Research Adjustable Rate Mortgages: Prepayment Behavior." Housing Finance 
Review 7 (1): 31-46. 
Black, Fischer. 1976. "The Pricing of Commodity Contracts." Journal of Financial 
Economics (Noth-Holland Publishing Company) 167-179. 
Blinder, Alan. S. 1982. "Inventories and Sticky Prices: More on the Microfoundation of 
Macroeconomics." The American Economic Review 72 (3): 334-348. 
Borenstein, Severin, A. Colin Cameron, and Richard Gilbert. 1997. "Do Gasoline Prices 
Respond Asymmetrically to Crude Oil Price Changes?" The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112 (1): 305-330. 
Boyd, Milton S., and B. Wade Brorsen. 1988. "Price Asymmetry in the U.S. Pork 
Marketing Channel." Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 10 (1): 103-109. 
  
 
126 
Briggeman, Brian C. 2010. "Debt, income and farm financial stress." Main Street 
Economist.  
Briggeman, Brian C. 2011. "The Role of Debt in Farmland Ownership." Choices 26 (2). 
Briggeman, Brian C., and Christopher Zakrzewicz. 2009. "Can the Ag Credit Survey 
Predict National Credit Conditions?" Economic Review - Federal Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City 93-110. 
Buckle, Robert A., and John A. Carlson. 2000. "Inflation and Asymmetric Price 
Adjustment." Review of Economics and Statistics 82 (1): 157-160. 
Burt, Oscar R. 1986. "Econometric Modeling of the Capitalization Formula of Farmland 
Prices." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68 (1): 10-26. 
Chen, Li-Hsueh, Miles Finney, and Kon S. Lai. 2005. "A threshold cointegration 
analysis of asymmetric price transmission from crude oil to gasoline prices." 
Economic Letters 89: 233-239. 
Chinloy, Peter. 1989. "The Probability of Prepayment." The Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics 2 (4): 267-283. 
Clark, J. Stephen, Murray Fulton, and John T. Scott. 1993. "The Inconsistency of Land 
Values, Land Rents and Capitalization Formula." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 75 (1): 147-155. 
Cochrane, John H. 2005. Asset Pricing. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Cochrane, John H., and Christopher L. Culp. 2003. "Equilibrium Asset Pricing and 
Discount Factors: Overview and Implications for Derivatives Valuation and Risk 
Management." In Modern Risk Management: A History, by Peter Field, 57-92. 
Cochrane, John H., and Jesus Saa-Requejo. 2000. "Beyond Arbitrage: Good-Deal Asset 
Price Bound in Incomplete Markets." Journal of Political Economy 108 (1): 79-
119. 
Damania, Richard, and Bill Z. Yang. 1998. "Price Rigidity and Asymmetric Price 
Adjustment in a repeated Oligopoly." Journal of Institutional and Thoeretical 
Economics 154: 659-679. 
Deng, Yongheng, John M. Quigley, and Robert Van Order. 2000. "Mortgage 
Terminations, Heterogeneity and the Exercise of Mortgage Options." 
Econometrics 68 (2): 275-307. 
  
 
127 
Dixit, Avinash K., and Robert S. Pindyck. 1994. Investment Under Uncertainty. 
Princeton University Press. 
Doye, Damona. 2016. "Farm Finance Theme Overview: Are the Good Times Really 
Over?" Choices 31 (1). 
Du, Xiaodong, and David A. Hennessy. 2012. "The Panting Real Option in Cash Rent 
Valuation." Applied Economics 44 (6): 765-776. 
Du, Xiaodong, and David A. Hennessy. 2008. "The Planting Real Option in Cash Rent 
Valuation." Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Center for 
Agricultural and Rural Developme. 
Ellinger, Paul, Allen Featherstone, and Michael Boehlje. 2016. "Leverage of U.S. 
Farmers: A Deeper Perspective." Choices 31 (1). 
Enders, Walter, and C. W. J. Granger. 1998. "Unit-Root Tests and Asymmetric 
Adjustment With an Example Using the Term Structure of Interest Rates." 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 16 (3): 2939-2955. 
Enders, Walter, and Pierre L Siklos. 2001. "Cointegration and Threshold Adjustments." 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 19 (2): 166-176. 
Falk, Barry. 1991. "Formally Testing the Present Value Model of Farmland Prices." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 73 (1): 1-10. 
Falk, Barry, and Bong-Soo Lee. 1998. "Fads Versus Fundamentals in Farmland Prices." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80 (4): 696-707. 
Featherstone, Allen M., and Charles B. Moss. 2003. "Capital Markets, Land Values, and 
Boom-Bust Cycles." Government Policy and Farmland Markets: The 
Maintenace of Farmer Wealth 159-78. 
Featherstone, Allen M., and Timothy G. Baker. 1988. "Effects of Reduced Price and 
Income Supports on Farmland Rent and Value." North Central Journal of 
Agricultural Economics (Oxford University Press) 10 (2): 177-189. 
Featherstone, Allen M., and Timothy G. Baker. 1988. "Effects of Reduced Price and 
Income Supports on Farmland Rent and Value." North Central Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 10 (2): 177-189. 
Featherstone, Allen, Laura M. Roessler, and Peter J. Barry. 2006. "Determining the 
probability of default and risk-rating class for loans in the seventh farm credit 
district portfolio." Review of Agricultural Economics 4-23. 
  
 
128 
Floroiu, Oana, and Antoon Pelsser. 2013. "Closed-Form Solutions for Options in 
Incompelte Markets." Netspar Discussion Paper. Tilburg. 
Follian, James R., Louis O. Scott, and TL Tyler Yang. 1992. "Microfoundations of a 
Mortgage Prepayment Function." The Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics 5 (2): 197-217. 
Gardner, Bruce L. 1975. "The Farm-Retail Price Spread in a Competitive Food 
Industry." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75 (3): 399-409. 
Gloy, Brent, Michael D. Boehlje, Craig L. Dobins, Christopher Hurt, and Timothy G. 
Baker. 2011. "Are economic fundamentals driving farmland values?" Choices 2. 
Goodwin, Barry K., and Matthew T. Holt. 1999. "Price Transmission and Asymmetric 
Adjustment in the U.S. Beef Sector." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 81 (3): 630-637. 
Goodwin, Barry K., and Nicholas E. Piggott. 2001. "Spatial Market Integration in the 
Presence of Threshold Effects." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 83 
(2): 302-317. 
Harris, J. Michael, Robert Williams, Robert Dubman, and John Dillard. 2009. "Debt 
Landscape for US Farms Has Shifted." Amber Wave 7 (no. 4): 14. 
Heien, Dale M. 1980. "Markup Pricing in a Dynamic Model of Food Industry." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62 (1): 10-18. 
Hendershott, Patric H., and Robert Van Order. 1987. "Pricing Mortgages: An 
Interpretation of the Models and Results." Journal of Financial Services 1 (1): 
19-55. 
Henderson, Jason, and Nathan Kaufman. 2013. "Farm Investment and Leverage Cycles: 
Will This Time Be Different?" Economic Review- Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City 89. 
Henderson, Jason, Brent Gloy, and Michael Boehlje. 2011. "Agriculture's boom-bust 
cycles: is this time different?" Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City 83. 
Herdt, Robert W., and Williard W. Cochrane. 1966. "Farm Land Prices and Farm 
Technological Advance." Journal of Farm Economics 48 (2): 243-263. 
Hull, John C. 2006. Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives. Upper Saddle River: 
Pearson Education. 
  
 
129 
Ibendahl, Gregory, and Terry Griffin. 2013. "The Connection between Cash Rents and 
Land Values." Journal of ASFMRA 239-247. 
Ibendahl, Gregory, and Terry Griffin. 2013. "The Connection Between Cash Rents and 
Land Values." Journal of ASFMRA 239-247. 
Jason, Henderson. 2008. "Will Farmland Values Keep Booming?" Choices 93 (2): 81-
104. 
Just, Richard E., and John A. Miranowski. 1993. "Understanding Farmland Price 
Changes." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75 (1): 156-168. 
Kau, James B., and Donald C. Keenan. 1995. "An Overview of the Option-Theoretic 
Pricing of Mortgages." Journal of Housing Research 6 (2.): 217. 
Kau, James B., and Thomas M. Springer. 1992. "The Prepayment Option on Mortgage 
Securities: A Random Coefficient Approach." Review of Quantitative Finance 
and Accounting 2 (1): 33-45. 
Kau, James B., Donald C. Keenan, and Taewon Kim. 1994. "Default Probabilities for 
Mortgages." Journal of Urban Economics 35 (3): 278-296. 
Kau, James B., Donald C. Keenan, and Walter J. Muller. 1993. "An Option-Based 
Pricing Model of Pricate Mortgage Insurance." Journal of Risk and Insurance 
288-299. 
Kaufman, Henry. 1986. "Debt: The Threat to Economic and Financial Stability ." 
Economic Review 3-11. 
Kaufman, Nathan. 2013. "Financing Young and Beginning Farmers." Main Street 
Economist.  
Kilian, Lutz, and Robert J. Vigfusson. 2011. "Are the Responses of the U.S. Asymmetric 
in Energy Price Increase and Decreases." Quantitative Economics 2 (3): 419-453. 
Kinnucan, Henry W., and Olan D. Forker. 1987. "Asymmetry in Farm-Retail Price 
Transmission for Major Dairy Products." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 69 (2): 285-292. 
Klinefelter, Danny A. 1973. "Facotrs Affecting Farmland Values Farmland Values in 
Illinois." Illinois Agricultural Economics 27-33. 
Lence, Sergio H. 2014. "Farmland Prices: Is This Time Different?" Applied Economic 
Perspectives and Policy 36 (4): 577-603. 
  
 
130 
Levin, Andrew, Chien-Fu Lin, and Chia-Shang James Chu. 2002. "Unit root tests in 
panel data: asymptotic and finite-sample properties." Journal of Econometrics 
108: 1-24. 
Lloyd, Tim. 1994. "Practitioners' Corner: Testing a Present Value Model of Agricultural 
Land Values." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 56 (2): 209-223. 
Melichar, Emanuel. 1979. "Capital Gains versus Current Income in the Farming Sector." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 61 (5): 1085-1092. 
Miller, Douglas J., and Marvin L. Hayenga. 2001. "Price Cycles and Asymmetric Price 
Transmission in the U.S. Pork Market." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 83 (3): 551-562. 
Moreno, Manuel, Javier F. Navas, and Federico Todeschini. 2009. "Land Valuation 
Using a Real Option Approach." RACSAM-Revista de la Real Academia de 
Ciencias Exactas, Fisicas y Naturales. Serie A. Matematicas 103 (2): 405-420. 
Moss, Charles B. 1997. "Returns, Interest Rates, and Inflation: How They Explain 
Changes in Farmland Values." American Journal of Agricutlural Economics 79 
(4): 1311-1318. 
Neumark, David, and Steven A. Sharpe. 1992. "Market Structure and the Nature of Price 
Rigidity: Evidence from the Market for consumer Deposits." Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 107: 657-680. 
Peltzman, Sam. 2000. "Prices Rise Fast than They Fall." Journal of Political Economy 
108 (3): 466-502. 
Penson, Jr., John B. 1987. "Evaluating Financial Trends in Agriculture." Agricultural 
Finance Review 14-20. 
Penson, Jr., John B., Dean W. Hughes, and Glenn L. Nelson. 1977. "Measurement of 
capacity depreciation based on engineering data." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 59 (2): 321-329. 
Penson, Jr., John B., Robert F. Romain, and Dean W. Hughes. 1981. "Net Investment in 
Farm Tractors: An Econometric Analysis." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 63 (4): 629-635. 
Peters, May, Suchada Langley, and Paul Westcott. 2009. "Agricultural Commodity Price 
Spikes in the 1970s and 1990s: Valuable Lessons for Today." Amber Waves, 
March 01. 
  
 
131 
Phipps, Tim T. 1984. "Land Prices and Farm-Based Returns." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 422-429. 
Pope, III, Arden C. 1985. "Agricultural Productive and Consumptive Use Components 
of Rural Land Values in Texas." Americal Journal of Agricultural Economics 81-
86. 
Pope, Rulon D., Randall A. Kramer, Richard D. Green, and B. Delworth Gardner. 1979. 
"An Evaluation of Econometric Models of US Farmland Prices." Western 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 107-119. 
Radchenko, Stanislav. 2005. "Oil price volatility nd the asymmetric response of gasoline 
prices to oil price increases and decreases." Energy Economics 27: 708-730. 
Reagan, Patricia B., and Martin L. Weitzman. 1982. "Asymmetries in PRice and 
Quantity Adjustments by the Competitive Firm." Journal of Economic Theory 
27: 410-420. 
Reynolds , John Everett, and John Francis Timmons. 1969. "Factors Affecting Farmland 
Values in the United States." Iowa State University Experimental Station 
Res.Bull.  
Roberts, Michael J., Barrett Kirwan, and Jeffrey Hopkins. 2003. "The Evidence of 
Government Program Payments on Agricultral Land Rents: The Challenges of 
Identification." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85 (3): 762-769. 
Robison, Lindon J., David A. Lins, and Ravi VenKataraman. 1985. "Cash Rents and 
Land Values in US Agriculture." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
67 (4): 794-805. 
Schmitz, Andrew. 1995. "Boom/Bust Cycles and Ricardian Rent." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 77 (5): 1110-1125. 
Scholnick, Barry. 1996. "Asymmetric Adjustment of Commercial Bank Interest Rates: 
Evidence from Malaysia and Singapore." Journal of International Money and 
Finance 15 (3): 485-496. 
Shaik, Saleem, Glenn A. Helmers, and Joseph A. Atwood. 2005. "The Evolution of 
Farm Programs and Their Contribution to Agricultural Land Values." American 
Journal of Agricultural Ecnomics 87: 1190-1197. 
Shalit, Haim, and Andrew Scmitz. 1982. "Farmland Accumulation and Prices." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64 (4): 710-719. 
Tong, H. 1983. "Threshold Models in Non-Linear Time Series Analysis." (Springer). 
  
 
132 
Tsay, Ruey S. 1989. "Testing and Modeling Threshold Autoregressive Processes." 
Journal of the American Statistical Association 84 (405): 231-240. 
Tweeten, Luther G., and C. Leroy Quance. 1969. "Positivistic MEasure of Aggregate 
Supply Elasticities: Some New Approaches." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 51: 342-352. 
Tweeten, Luther G., and James E. Martin. 1966. "A Methodology for Predicting U.S. 
Farm Real Estate Price Variation." Journal of Farm Economics 48 (2): 378-393. 
V. Cramon-Taubadel, Stephan. 1998. "Correction Representation: An Application to the 
German Pork Market ." European Review of Agricultural Economics 25 (1): 1-
18. 
V. Cramon-Taubadel, Stephan, and Jens-Peter Loy. 1996. "Price Asymmetry in the 
International Wheat Market: Comment." Canadian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 44: 311-317. 
Vantreese, Valerie L., Jerry R. Skees, and Michael R. Reed. 1986. "Using Capitalization 
Theory to Model Farmland Prices." North Central Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 135-142. 
Ward, Ronald W. 1982. "Asymmetry in Retail, Wholesale, and Shipping Point Pricing 
for Fresh Vegetables." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64 (2): 205-
212. 
Wolffram, Rudolf. 1971. "Positivistic Measures of Aggregate Supply Elasticities: Some 
New Approaches: Some Critical Notes." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 53 (2): 365-359. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2015. Introductory econometrics: A modern approach. Nelson 
Education. 
Xiaodong, Du, and David A. Hennessy. 2008. "The Planting Real Option in Cash Rent 
Valuation." Department of Economics, Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development. 
Young, Edwin, and Dennis A. Shields. 1996. "1996 FAIR Act Frames Farm Policy for 7 
Years." Agricultural Outlook Supplement, Economic Research Service, United 
States Department of Agriculture, Washington D.C. 
Zwilling, Bradley, Brandy Krapf, and Dwight Raab. 2016. "Working Capital and the 
Age of the Farm Operator." Farmdoc Daily.  
 
  
 
133 
APPENDIX A  
TABLES  
Table 2.1. 1996 Farm Bill crop support 
percentages 
Crop Percentage (%) 
Corn 46.2 
Wheat 26..3 
Upland Cotton 11.6 
Rice 8.5 
Other Feed Grains 7.4 
 
 
Table 2.2. 2002 Farm Bill direct payment rates and counter cyclical target 
prices 
  
Direct 
Payment 
Rate ($) 
Counter-Cyclical Payment 
Target Prices 
Commodity Unit 2002-2007 2002-2003 2004-2007 
Barley per bushel 0.24 2.21 2.24 
Corn per bushel 0.28 2.60 2.63 
Grain Sorghum per bushel 0.35 2.54 2.57 
Oats per bushel 0.02 1.40 1.44 
Other Oilseeds per hundredweight 0.80 9.80 10.10 
Peanuts per ton 36.00 495.00 495.00 
Rice per hundredweight 2.35 10.50 10.50 
Soybeans per bushel 0.44 5.80 5.80 
Upland Cotton per pound 0.07 0.72 0.72 
Wheat per bushel 0.52 3.86 3.92 
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Table 2.3. 2008 Farm Bill direct payment rate and counter-cyclical payment 
target prices 
  
Direct 
Payment 
Rate ($) 
Counter-Cyclical Payment  
Target Prices ($) 
Commodity Unit 2008 -2012 2008 2009 2010-2012 
Barley per bushel 0.24 2.24 2.24 2.63 
Chickpeas, large 
(Garbanzo bean, 
Kabuli) 
per 
hundredweight 0.28 
Not 
available 12.81 12.81 
Chickpeas, small 
(Garbanzo bean, 
Desi) 
per 
hundredweight 0.35 
Not 
available 10.36 10.36 
Corn per bushel 0.02 2.63 2.63 2.63 
Dry Peas 
Per 
hundredweight 0.80 
Not 
Available 8.32 8.32 
Grain Sorghum per bushel 36.00 2.57 2.57 2.63 
Lentils 
per 
hundredweight 0.44 
Not 
available 12.81 12.81 
Oats per bushel 0.07 1.44 1.44 1.79 
Other Oilseeds 
per 
hundredweight 0.52 10.10 10.10 12.68 
Peanuts per ton 2.35 495.00 495.00 495.00 
Rice, long grain 
per 
hundredweight 2.35 10.50 10.50 10.50 
Rice, 
medium/short 
grain 
per 
hundredweight 0.24 10.50 10.50 10.50 
Soybeans per bushel 0.28 5.80 5.80 6.00 
Upland Cotton per bound 0.35 0.71 0.71 0.71 
Wheat per bushel 0.02 3.92 3.92 3.92 
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Table 2.4. Crop futures contract specifications 
Crop Contract Exchange Historical Observations 
Corn December CBOT 1969-2017 
Soybeans November CBOT 1964-2017 
Chicago Wheat September CME 1965-2017 
Kansas City Wheat July CME 1977-2017 
 
 
Table 2.5. Summary statistics of crop futures prices 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
No. of 
Observations 
Earliest 
Observation 
Corn 473.85 198.89 268.41 1187.41 45 1973 
Soybeans 1131.69 411.86 547.88 2456.04 54 1964 
Chicago Wheat 761.75 311.70 414.74 1720.98 33 1965 
KC Wheat 594.47 202.29 388.11 1099.42 41 1977 
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Table 2.6. Summary statistics of real rent data 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
No. of 
Observations 
Alabama 55.65 13.73 37.03 78.69 50 
Arkansas 87.70 10.37 67.96 108.14 50 
Delaware 89.56 17.05 65.20 121.87 50 
Georgia 69.50 18.35 40.40 102.12 50 
Illinois 173.53 35.68 132.24 252.78 50 
Indiana 153.39 36.18 117.07 247.10 50 
Iowa 176.50 38.77 132.11 255.62 50 
Kansas 55.77 9.62 44.57 79.86 50 
Kentucky 103.26 22.18 70.03 140.59 50 
Louisiana 82.60 13.01 60.90 113.76 50 
Maryland 80.49 24.40 51.54 225.74 50 
Michigan 84.21 16.04 61.94 114.28 50 
Minnesota 110.48 25.30 79.75 171.12 50 
Mississippi 83.13 17.07 50.57 122.54 50 
Missouri 101.96 19.49 72.78 149.96 50 
Nebraska 160.39 42.11 105.07 250.79 46 
New York 54.84 13.33 33.29 78.11 50 
North Carolina 72.66 19.76 44.57 121.53 50 
North Dakota 51.17 9.72 37.70 75.40 50 
Ohio 117.78 28.73 89.00 188.28 50 
Oklahoma 43.63 13.54 28.55 72.99 50 
South Dakota 60.92 17.17 42.18 114.69 50 
Tennessee 87.54 19.51 57.03 126.57 50 
Wisconsin 91.16 17.96 61.28 124.20 50 
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Table 2.7. Summary statistics for real cropland prices 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
No. of 
Observations 
Alabama 2,246.60 404.78 1,536.73 2,670.89 20 
Arkansas 1,731.78 384.41 1,239.63 2,438.50 20 
Delaware 6,647.51 2,386.37 3,201.52 10,547.19 20 
Georgia 2,843.20 878.53 1,357.44 4,575.78 20 
Illinois 4,367.10 1,557.34 2,650.86 7,084.11 20 
Indiana 4,034.14 1,382.82 2,433.15 6,486.10 20 
Iowa 4,189.94 2,012.44 2,177.03 8,050.12 20 
Kansas 1,146.85 439.76 772.01 2,079.23 20 
Kentucky 2,749.21 465.63 1,920.91 3,392.30 20 
Louisiana 1,713.20 327.30 1,342.88 2,357.51 20 
Maryland 5,961.16 1,500.66 3,905.85 8,648.69 20 
Michigan 3,026.20 717.67 1,741.62 4,141.41 20 
Minnesota 2,571.45 1,028.92 1,395.86 4,480.47 20 
Mississippi 1,688.13 453.21 1,051.38 2,411.50 20 
Missouri 2,316.62 700.30 1,331.83 3,505.25 20 
Nebraska 2,393.62 1,268.64 1,306.22 4,765.67 20 
New York 1,908.58 410.73 1,306.22 2,471.01 20 
North Carolina 3,400.91 450.43 2,407.54 3,880.34 20 
North Dakota 905.87 488.29 529.16 1,947.83 20 
Ohio 3,776.29 845.87 2,548.41 5,324.67 20 
Oklahoma 1,003.95 254.78 708.18 1,475.70 20 
South Dakota 1,464.20 913.06 583.96 3,395.04 20 
Tennessee 2,929.62 312.96 2,343.51 3,426.80 20 
Wisconsin 2,998.04 925.40 1,331.83 4,409.09 20 
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Table 2.8. Recovered rho and R2 for the 
maximum likelihood estimations for each state 
State Recovered rho R2 
Alabama 0.947 0.818 
Arkansas 0.934 0.905 
Delaware 0.892 0.913 
Georgia 0.954 0.819 
Illinois 0.944 0.929 
Indiana 0.909 0.952 
Iowa 0.828 0.958 
Kansas 0.670 0.941 
Kentucky 0.790 0.845 
Louisiana 0.918 0.787 
Maryland 0.989 0.129 
Michigan 0.610 0.580 
Minnesota 0.821 0.910 
Mississippi 0.818 0.866 
Missouri 0.876 0.866 
Nebraska 0.667 0.934 
New York 0.570 0.862 
North Carolina 0.686 0.792 
North Dakota 0.899 0.890 
Ohio 0.965 0.823 
Oklahoma 0.595 0.509 
South Dakota 0.968 0.644 
Tennessee 0.541 0.907 
Wisconsin 0.957 0.894 
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Table 2.9. Model evaluation measures 
 
Model Capitalized Value 
State MAPE RMSE 
Mean 
Error MAPE RMSE 
Mean 
Error 
Alabama 84.10 1,933.56 -1,896.63 48.45 1,165.93 -1,115.75 
Arkansas 54.66 1,023.55 -970.05 27.73 493.39 389.86 
Delaware 89.54 6,488.71 -6,041.37 67.55 5,329.19 -4,778.05 
Georgia 78.29 2,418.42 -2,266.00 31.19 1,324.93 -1,012.93 
Illinois 64.91 3,163.69 -2,906.91 19.39 962.57 -291.76 
Indiana 67.69 2,988.43 -2,779.43 16.98 1,018.74 -572.67 
Iowa 60.88 3,168.31 -2,703.71 27.41 1,132.63 77.45 
Kansas 50.35 733.72 -619.32 29.34 335.95 94.42 
Kentucky 71.64 2,011.19 -1,975.44 13.80 508.26 -297.32 
Louisiana 65.78 1,185.77 -1,143.94 18.02 329.15 134.38 
Maryland 91.21 5,669.10 -5,467.62 68.85 4,476.56 -4,214.11 
Michigan 75.69 2,378.15 -2,303.89 29.80 1,062.10 -946.73 
Minnesota 59.65 1,802.04 -1,605.81 23.53 533.87 327.68 
Mississippi 60.75 1,116.01 -1,052.30 29.31 478.00 397.73 
Missouri 63.88 1,624.08 -1,517.80 18.70 405.83 50.42 
Nebraska 50.50 1,710.98 -1,360.35 60.28 1,112.22 932.89 
New York 81.86 1,617.73 -1,572.17 40.76 880.67 -813.63 
North 
Carolina 85.45 2,938.51 -2,909.70 53.99 1,890.99 -1,851.97 
North 
Dakota 49.10 662.18 -509.38 60.51 423.85 293.06 
Ohio 74.39 2,892.89 -2,816.28 30.45 1,297.83 -1,200.20 
Oklahoma 72.22 791.86 -745.02 26.77 366.50 -207.77 
South 
Dakota 49.25 1,163.01 -866.90 65.15 638.48 415.05 
Tennessee 78.64 2,326.46 -2,308.17 33.89 1,053.10 -1,008.18 
Wisconsin 72.01 2,364.39 -2,187.69 27.60 985.85 -752.02 
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Table 3.1. State and associated 
beginning date 
State Initial historical date 
Alabama 1968 
Arkansas 1968 
Delaware 1974 
Georgia 1974 
Illinois 1974 
Indiana 1974 
Iowa 1974 
Kansas 1974 
Kentucky 1968 
Louisiana 1968 
Maryland 1974 
Michigan 1974 
Minnesota 1974 
Mississippi 1968 
Missouri 1968 
Nebraska 1974 
New York 1974 
North Carolina 1968 
North Dakota 1968 
Ohio 1978 
Oklahoma 1978 
South Dakota 1974 
Tennessee 1968 
Wisconsin 1974 
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Table 3.2. State delineation based on crop production 
Corn Soybeans Wheat 
Delaware Alabama North Dakota 
Georgia Kentucky Oklahoma 
Illinois Louisiana 
Indiana Mississippi 
Iowa Missouri 
Kansas North Carolina 
Maryland Ohio 
Michigan Tennessee 
Maine 
Nebraska 
New York 
South Dakota 
Wisconsin 
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Table 3.3. Model parameterization for each model 
Step 
∆Rent
Lags 
Crop Price 
Lags 
Positive & Negative Crop 
Price Series Lags AIC BIC 
Corn 
Estimation 
Step 1 1, 2 0, 1, 2, 3 3,994.42 4,024.20 
Step 2 1 0, 1, 2, 3 3,981.47 4,024.1 
Step 3 1 0, 1, 2, 3 3.947.84 3,998.88 
Soybean 
Estimation 
Step 1 1, 2, 3 0, 1, 2, 3 2,762.14 2793.34 
Step 2 1, 2, 3 0, 1, 2, 3 2,755.72 2,804.03 
Step 3 1 0, 1, 2, 3 2,729.34 2,777.65 
Wheat 
Estimation 
Step 1 1 0, 1, 2, 3 326.63 340.29 
Step 2 1 0, 1, 2 ,3 330.44 353.21 
Step 3 1 0, 1, 2, 3 330.39 357.71 
0 represents the contemporaneous observation 
 143 
Table 3.4. Corn long-run level 
relationship regression output 
Long-run effects 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Georgia 
-21.134*** 
(4.8125) 
Illinois 
87.2459*** 
(4.8125) 
Indiana 
66.0793*** 
(4.8125) 
Iowa 
90.7063*** 
(4.8125) 
Kansas 
-33.9516*** 
(4.8125) 
Maryland 
-7.2023 
(4.8125) 
Michigan 
-3.9562 
(4.8125) 
Minnesota 
25.5612*** 
(4.8125) 
Nebraska 
71.4395*** 
(4.8125) 
New York 
-35.8175*** 
(4.8125) 
South Dakota 
-24.9599*** 
(4.8125) 
Wisconsin 
2.9908 
(4.8125) 
Corn Price 
0.0807*** 
(4.8125) 
R2 0.823 
Adjusted-R2 0.819 
No. of Observations 559 
*** Significant at the 1% critical level 
** Significant at the 5% critical level 
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 3.5. Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for the residuals recovered from 
the corn long-run level relationship regression output 
H0: Panels contain unit 
roots 
Number of panels: 13 
Ha: Panels are stationary Number of periods: 43 
ADF regressions: 1 lag 
Statistic P-value 
Unadjusted t -8.7394 
Adjusted t -3.6941 0.0001 
Table 3.6. Long-run coefficient stability test for the corn model 
Positive Residual Negative Residual 
t-statistic 1.2523 -0.2354 
H0: The coefficients are not statistically different for sub-groups of states 
T-statistics rejection region threshold with > 100 observations 
1% significance level: 2.640 
5% significance level: 1.660 
10% significance level: 1.290 
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Table 3.7. Corn error correction output 
Coefficient  
(standard error) 
t t-1 t-2 t-3 
∆Rent 
-0.0184*** 
(0.0433) 
Positive corn price 
0.0681*** 
(0.0176) 
0.0509*** 
(0.0184) 
-0.0042 
(0.0141) 
0.0706*** 
(0.0140) 
Negative corn price 
0.0715*** 
(0.0133) 
0.0023 
(0.0106) 
0.0282*** 
(0.0100) 
0.0084 
(0.0080) 
Positive residual series 
-0.2286*** 
(0.0374) 
Negative residual series 
0.0520 
(0.0523) 
Intercept 
1.1253 
(1.0215) 
R2 0.2874 
Adjusted-R2 0.2719 
No. of Observations 520 
*** Significant at the 1% critical level 
** Significant at the 5% critical level 
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 3.8. Corn price coefficient asymmetry t-test !"# = 	!"& !"&'# = 	!"&'&  !"&(# = 	!"&(& !"&)# = 	!"&)& *# = 	*&
t-statistic -0.1483 2.2823 -1.8790 3.8668 -4.3615 
H0: +,# = 	+,&
T-statistics rejection region threshold with > 100 observations 
1% significance level: 2.640 
5% significance level: 1.660 
10% significance level: 1.290 
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Table 3.9. Soybean long-run level 
relationship regression output 
Long-run effects 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Arkansas 
32.1512*** 
(2.6604) 
Kentucky 
47.4102*** 
(2.6604) 
Louisiana 
27.0110*** 
(2.6604) 
Mississippi 
27.1233*** 
(2.6604) 
Missouri 
46.8680*** 
(2.6604) 
North Carolina 
16.4581*** 
(2.6604) 
Ohio 
62.6025*** 
(2.6604) 
Tennessee 
31.5396*** 
(2.6604) 
Soybean Price 
0.0317*** 
(0.0014) 
Intercept 
19.8872*** 
(2.5073) 
R2 0.739 
Adjusted-R2 0.734 
No. of Observations 441 
*** Significant at the 1% critical level 
** Significant at the 5% critical level 
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 3.10. Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for the residuals recovered from 
the soybean long-run level relationship regression output 
H0: Panels contain unit roots Number of panels: 9 
Ha: Panels are stationary Number of periods: 49 
ADF regressions: 1 lag 
Statistic P-value 
Unadjusted t -7.8464 
Adjusted t -2.8999 0.0019 
Table 3.11. Long-run coefficient stability test for the soybean model 
Positive Residual Negative Residual 
t-statistic -0.5698 0.0432 
H0: The coefficients are not statistically different for sub-groups of states 
T-statistics rejection region threshold with > 100 observations 
1% significance level: 2.640 
5% significance level: 1.660 
10% significance level: 1.290 
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Table 3.12. Soybean error correction output 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
t t-1 t-2 t-3 
∆Rent  
(t-1) 
-0.0433 
(0.0492) 
Positive soybean 
price 
(t) 
0.0130*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0067** 
(0.0026) 
0.0100*** 
(0.0033) 
0.0126*** 
(0.0033) 
Negative 
soybean price 
(t) 
0.01490*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0094*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0048** 
(0.0024) 
0.0014 
(0.0023) 
Positive  
residual series 
-0.1000** 
(0.0438) 
Negative  
residual series 
-0.2495*** 
(0.0606) 
Intercept 
-0.6790 
(0.6291) 
R2 0.2737 
Adjusted-R2 0.2538 
No. of 
Observations 414 
*** Significant at the 1% critical level 
** Significant at the 5% critical level 
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 3.13. Soybean crop price coefficient asymmetry t-test !"# = 	!"& !"&'# = 	!"&'&  !"&(# = 	!"&(& !"&)# = 	!"&)& *# = 	*&
t-statistic -0.5003 -3.9486 1.2988 2.7833 1.9998 
H0: +,# = 	+,&
T-statistics rejection region threshold with > 100 observations 
1% significance level: 2.640 
5% significance level: 1.660 
10% significance level: 1.290 
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Table 3.14. Wheat long-run level 
relationship regression output 
Long-run effects 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
North Dakota 
10.7859*** 
(1.773) 
Wheat Price 
0.0343*** 
(0.005) 
Intercept 
19.154*** 
(2.921) 
R2 0.5579 
Adjusted-R2 0.546 
No. of Observations 78 
*** Significant at the 1% critical level 
** Significant at the 5% critical level 
* Significant at the 10% level
Table 3.15. Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for the residuals recovered 
from the wheat long-run level relationship regression output 
H0: Panels contain unit roots Number of panels: 2 
Ha: Panels are stationary Number of periods: 39 
ADF regressions: 1 lag 
Statistic P-value 
Unadjusted t -3.7035 
Adjusted t -1.7885 0.0368 
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Table 3.16. Wheat error correction model output 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
t t-1 t-2 t-3 
∆Rent 
0.0896 
(0.1100) 
Positive wheat price 
0.0037 
(0.0053) 
0.0010 
(0.0050) 
0.0065 
(0.0048) 
0.0053 
(0.0052) 
Negative wheat price 
0.0082 
(0.0051) 
0.0089* 
(0.0049) 
-0.0037 
(0.0046) 
0.0012 
(0.0038) 
Positive residual series 
-0.1634 
(0.1101) 
Negative residual 
series 
-0.0337 
(0.0794) 
Intercept 
-0.1933 
(0.5158) 
R2 0.3228 
Adjusted-R2 0.1986 
No. of Observations 72 
*** Significant at the 1% critical level 
** Significant at the 5% critical level 
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 3.17. Wheat price coefficient asymmetry t-test !"# = 	!"& !"&'# = 	!"&'&  !"&(# = 	!"&(& !"&)# = 	!"&)& *# = 	*&
t-statistic 
-0.6112 -1.1347 1.5497 0.6327 -0.9556 
H0: +,# = 	+,&
T-statistics rejection region threshold with > 70 observations 
1% significance level: 2.390 
5% significance level: 1.671 
10% significance level: 1.296 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics of capital expenditure regression data 
Capital 
expenditures 
on tractors 
Capital 
expenditures 
on machinery 
Non-real 
estate capital 
expenditures 
Real estate 
capital 
expenditures on 
buildings and 
improvements 
Total capital 
expenditures 
Total 
ROI 
Mean 5,729,719.94 10,227,698.17 20,418,525.01 9,838,942.24 30,257,467.25 1.27 
Min 2,586,454.00 5,288,642.00 10,804,382.63 4,873,636.00 15,678,018.63 1.06 
Max 10,675,121.00 19,617,553.00 35,023,289.99 18,439,490.47 52,247,874.26 1.53 
Standard 
deviation 1,961,023.61 3,806,937.15 5,929,148.59 3,183,526.13 8,870,474.29 0.08 
Observations 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 
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Table 4.2. Regional bank questions 
Question Categories of answer Possible responses 
7th District 
How will capital expenditures by 
producers in the year ahead compare to 
the expenditures of the past year? 
Land purchases or improvements, 
buildings and facilities, machinery 
and equipment, trucks and autos Higher, lower or the same 
How have your credit standards for 
approving agricultural loans during the 
past three months changed relative to a 
year earlier? 
Tightened considerably, tightened 
somewhat, remained basically 
unchanged, eased somewhat, and 
eased considerably 
Please indicate the percentage of the 
dollar amount of your bank's farm loan 
portfolio that currently falls within each 
of the following repayment 
classifications 
Major repayment problems requiring 
more collateral and/or long-term 
workouts and severe repayment 
problems which will likely result in 
loan losses and/or require forced sales 
of borrower's real assets Percent value 
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Table 4.2. Regional bank questions (cont.t) 
10th District 
What changes occurred in non-real 
estate farm loans at your bank in the 
past three months relative to a year 
earlier? Rate of loan repayment Higher, lower or the same 
What changes occurred in non-real 
estate farm loans at your bank in the 
past three months relative to a year 
earlier? Renewals and extensions Higher, lower or the same 
What changes occurred in non-real 
estate farm loans at your bank in the 
past three months relative to a year 
earlier? Amount of collateral required Higher, lower or the same 
What changes occurred in non-real 
estate farm loans at your bank in the 
past three months relative to a year 
earlier? Loan fund availability Higher, lower or the same 
 156 
Table 4.3. Regression output 
Coefficients 
(standard errors) 
Regression output Adjusted R2 ROI 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
OLS 
Total real estate capital 
expenditures on buildings and 
improvements 0.8473 
8,708,679** 
(3,821,131) 
0.9788*** 
(0.9788) 
Total non-real estate capital 
expenditures 0.8094 
20,400,000*** 
(7,426,051) 
0.9689*** 
(0.0779) 
Capital expenditures on tractors 0.7985 
5,147,986** 
(2,469,922) 
0.9362*** 
(0.0760) 
Capital expenditures on machinery 
& equipment 0.8530 
13,000,000*** 
(4,065,427) 
1.0015*** 
(0.0708) 
SUR 
Total real estate capital 
expenditures on buildings and 
improvements 0.8524 
6,894,255* 
(3,595,429) 
0.917*** 
(0.0655) 
Total non-real estate capital 
expenditures 0.8159 
17,500,000*** 
(6,680,363) 
0.918*** 
(0.0498) 
Capital expenditures on tractors 0.8075 
4,738,772** 
(2,307,539) 
0.899*** 
(0.0518) 
Capital expenditures on machinery 
& equipment 0.8554 
10,400,000*** 
(3,611,661) 
0.918*** 
(0.0481) 
*** Significant at the 1% critical level 
** Significant at the 5% critical level 
* Significant at the 10% level
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Table 4.4. Robustness tests 
Robustness test 
outcomes of OLS 
estimation 
Real estate capital 
expenditures on 
buildings and 
improvements 
Total non-real estate 
capital expenditures 
Capital expenditures 
on tractors 
Capital expenditures 
on machinery & 
equipment 
Mean VIF 1.46 1.29 1.13 1.41 
BG p-value 0.616 0.724 0.824 0.483 
White test p-value 0.223 0.142 0.249 0.169 
Table 4.5. Elasticity measures 
Model 
Real estate 
capital expenditures 
on buildings and 
improvements 
Total non-real estate 
capital expenditures 
Capital expenditures 
on tractors 
Capital expenditures 
on machinery & 
equipment 
OLS 
Total ROI 1.077 1.173 1.062 1.444 
Lagged dependent 
variable 0.964 0.966 0.948 0.987 
SUR 
Total ROI 0.828 0.955 0.930 1.106 
Lagged dependent 
variable 0.895 0.881 0.892 0.892 
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Table 4.6. Forecast evaluations 
Model RMSE MAPE 
OLS 
Total real estate capital 
expenditures on buildings 
and improvements 1,314,248.04 11.51 
Total non-real estate 
capital expenditures 5,893,161.89 23.11 
Capital expenditures on 
tractors 1,743,965.22 18.72 
Capital expenditures on 
machinery & equipment 2,548,531.66 20.12 
SUR 
Total real estate capital 
expenditures on buildings 
and improvements 1,302,411.80 11.31 
Total non-real estate 
capital expenditures 1,666,054.72 18.46 
Capital expenditures on 
tractors 2,419,511.19 20.10 
Capital expenditures on 
machinery & equipment 5,655,034.40 22.65 
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Table 4.7. Margin of error measurement of forecast models and actual observations 
Margin of error OLS SUR 
2014 2015 2014 2015 
Capital expenditures on tractors 95.34 132.78 93.81 130.73 
Capital expenditures on machinery 99.72 139.95 97.55 137.75 
Non-real estate capital 
expenditures 91.64 137.86 89.98 135.27 
Real estate capital expenditures on 
buildings and improvements 86.20 109.21 86.15 108.77 
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APPENDIX B 
FIGURES 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2.1. Two-step dynamic optimization example 
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Figure 2.2. Map of states tested and associated crop 
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Figure 2.3. Alabama cropland prices, modeled and actual 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Arkansas cropland prices, modeled and actual 
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Figure 2.5. Delaware cropland prices, modeled and actual 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Georgia cropland prices, modeled and actual 
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Figure 2.7. Illinois cropland prices, modeled and actual 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Indiana cropland prices, modeled and actual 
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Figure 2.9. Iowa cropland prices, modeled and actual 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10. Kansas cropland prices, modeled and actual 
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Figure 2.11. Kentucky cropland prices, modeled and actual 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Louisiana cropland prices, modeled and actual 
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Figure 2.13. Maryland cropland prices, modeled and actual 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14. Michigan cropland prices, modeled and actual 
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Figure 2.15. Minnesota cropland prices, modeled and actual 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16. Mississippi cropland prices, modeled and actual 
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Figure 2.17. Missouri cropland prices, modeled and actual 
 
 
 
Figure 2.18. Nebraska cropland prices, modeled and actual 
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Figure 2.19. New York cropland prices, modeled and actual 
 
 
 
Figure 2.20. North Carolina cropland prices, modeled and actual 
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Figure 2.21. North Dakota cropland prices, modeled and actual 
 
 
 
Figure 2.22. Ohio cropland prices, modeled and actual 
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Figure 2.23. Oklahoma cropland prices, modeled and actual 
 
 
 
Figure 2.24. South Dakota cropland prices, modeled and actual 
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Figure 2.25. Tennessee cropland prices, modeled and actual 
 
 
 
Figure 2.26. Wisconsin cropland prices, modeled and actual 
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Figure 4.1. Total national capital expenditures (USDA ERS 2016) 
Figure 4.2. Net farm income and land prices for Iowa (USDA ERS 2016) 
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Figure 4.3. Real and nominal national net farm income (USDA ERS 2016) 
Figure 4.4. National debt-to-asset ratio (USDA ERS 2016) 
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Figure 4.5. National net farm income and farm business sector outstanding 
debt (USDA ERS 2016) 
Figure 4.6.  National net farm income and capital expenditures 
 (USDA ERS 2016) 
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Times Interest Earned Ratio Debt Burden Ratio
Figure 4.7. Times interest earned and debt burden ratio for the United 
States (USDA ERS 2016) 
Figure 4.8. National real estate capital expenditure forecasts 
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Figure 4.9. National non-real estate capital expenditure forecasts 
Figure 4.10. National capital expenditure on tractors forecasts 
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Figure 4.11. National capital expenditure on machinery forecasts 
Figure 4.12. Loan repayment rate and loan renewals and extensions for 
the 10th District Federal Reserve Bank 
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Figure 4.13. Loan repayment rate and collateral requirement indexes for the 
10th District Federal Reserve Bank 
Figure 4.14. Loan fund availability and demand for renewals and 
extensions for the 7th District Federal Reserve Bank 
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Figure 4.15. Percent of loan portfolio in stress & changes in credit 
standards for the bank for the 7th District Federal Reserve Bank 
Figure 4.16. Change in credit standards and net farm income for the 7th 
District Federal Reserve Bank 
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Figure 4.17. Expected change in capital expenditures and loan stress levels for the 7th District Federal 
Reserve Bank 
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Figure 4.18. Timeline of boom-and-bust cycles in the farm business sector 
